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Population aging and health care expenditure 
growth
In recent decades, elderly populations in most developed countries have increased consid-
erably, both in absolute and relative terms. This growth of the elderly share of the popula-
tion is mainly attributable to two demographic transitions: the (simultaneous) increase in 
longevity and decrease in fertility. Additionally, for some European countries a third cause 
of population aging can be distinguished: the aging of the baby boom generation. The extent 
to which this third demographic transition contributes to population aging largely depends 
on the country under consideration. In the Netherlands, the baby boom was larger and 
lasted for a longer time. The aging of the Dutch population is therefore expected to reach its 
peak at 2040, later than other western countries. The Dutch population aged 65 and older 
increased from 770,500 in 1950 to 2,538,300 in 2010 which amounts to an increase of 329 
percent. In relative terms, the proportion of the population aged 65 and above doubled, from 
7.6 percent to 15.3 percent. However, population aging not only reflects an increasing share 
of the 65+ population, but also changes in the age distribution within this elderly cohort. 
The share of the very old has also gradually increased; the population aged 80 and above 
comprised 12.9 percent of the 65+ population in 1950, but 25.5 in 2010, and is expected to 
continue to rise to 33.3 in 2040 (Statistics Netherlands, 2011). As the first baby boomers have 
reached the age of 65 in 2010, population aging will accelerate the coming three decades.
Population aging will definitely have a large impact on society in general and on social se-
curity systems in particular. It challenges the financial sustainability of current pension and 
health care systems. The extent to which population aging threatens this modern welfare 
state largely depends on the underlying trend in ill-health, e.g. whether it is accompanied 
by a compression or expansion of ill-health (Fries, 1980; Olshansky et al., 1991). A compres-
sion of ill-health is likely to alleviate the societal consequences of population aging. It will 
not only have enormous benefits for population health, but may help increasing the labor 
force participation among the elderly and to reduce health care expenditures (HCE). The 
objectives of this thesis are restricted to improved understanding of the relative impact of 
population aging on the level of HCE.
Simultaneous to the aging of western populations, an upward trend in HCE has been 
observed, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 
the Netherlands, for instance, the total amount spent on health care in current prices more 
than doubled over a thirty year period: it increased from 25 billion in 1977 to 56 billion in 
2007. The average growth rate of total spending equaled 2.7 percent annually. The growth 
rate however accelerated in recent years and reached its peak in the period 2001-2003, when 
the annual growth rate averaged 4.7 percent. This relatively large growth could be explained 
by a relaxation of inpatient budgets resulting from a growing public dissatisfaction with 
long waiting lists. In relative terms, the amount spent on health care as a percentage of 
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GDP rose from 10.1 to 13.1 over the period 1977-2007. Again, the largest relative growth 
was observed for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003, when spending as a percentage of GDP 
increased by 0.5, 0.9 and 0.7 percentage points, respectively (Statistics Netherlands, 2011).
Previously in ‘Aging and Health Care Expenditures’
The impact of population aging on the level of HCE is an issue addressed by numerous 
examinations at the macro and microeconomic level. Macroeconomic studies have analyzed 
the variation in aggregate HCE, either absolutely or as a percentage of GDP, and either 
across countries or over time, as a function of determinants measured at the national level. 
The contribution of population aging to the level of spending could only be measured in 
some approximate way, e.g. the influence of the proportion of the elderly. The vast majority 
of macroeconomic studies found none or a limited effect of the age structure on national 
HCE. By contrast, GDP level is found to have a sizeable impact (e.g. Getzen, 1992; Gerdtham 
et al., 1992, 1998; van Elk, Mot, and Franses, 2010).
Microeconomic studies have investigated the impact of population aging by analyzing the 
variation in individual spending as a function of individual determinants. These studies first 
examined the impact of longevity gains on individual spending and then aggregated per 
capita spending to the level of national spending. Conclusions from these studies evolved 
over time and varied from a strong upward pressure of aging on the level of HCE to no 
impact at all (Payne et al., 2007). Traditionally, aging has been viewed as a prime suspect 
of HCE growth determinant as expenditures are generally higher in older age groups. This 
view was revised with the publication of the cost-of-dying and time-to-death literature: 
the high spending at older ages appeared to be associated much more with approaching 
death than with age itself. Hence, time-to-death was found to replace age as the main 
demographic determinant of HCE. The impact of population aging on the growth of HCE 
was reconsidered after consistent findings that the influence of population aging on HCE 
significantly reduced when time-to-death was taken into account. Chapter two provides a 
more detailed overview of the evidence to date on the impact of population aging on HCE. 
However, some important questions – that are definitely of interest in examining the relative 
contribution of population aging to the growth in HCE – remain far from resolved.
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Unresolved issues on the relative contribution of 
population aging
As different as chalk and cheese? Population aging and acute versus long-term 
care spending
First, a clear and consistent overview of the impact of aging on acute versus long-term care 
(LTC) spending appears to be lacking. Previous evidence has demonstrated that the impact 
of population aging strongly depends on the sector under consideration: acute or LTC (e.g. 
Payne et al., 2007; Werblow, Felder, and Zweifel, 2007; Häkkinen et al., 2008). Although 
the impact of aging on acute HCE has been studied abundantly, few studies have analyzed 
the impact of age and time-to-death on spending in the LTC sector. LTC service use is 
concentrated among the elderly as it is provided when individuals experience disability and/
or chronic illnesses and is often provided for a longer period. Hence, population aging is 
expected to increase LTC spending to a larger extent. LTC service needs most likely increase 
considerably in the next decades and may exceed the resources that society is willing to 
invest. It is therefore important to investigate the impact of population aging on LTC in 
greater depth. In addition, the influence of other driving forces of expenditure growth are 
likely to differ between the acute and LTC sector.
Going (in)formal
Second, but related to the previous point, is a lack of research on the consequences of 
population aging for the demand and supply of informal care. Although informal care 
comprises a substantial part of LTC provision, this important aspect of aging research has 
not received as much attention and is rather underdeveloped. Informal care has been found 
to be a substitute for home care and to postpone expensive LTC institutionalization (van 
Houtven and Norton, 2004; Bonsang, 2009). From a societal perspective, informal care – 
although often unpaid – is not a free service. The resource impact of population aging on 
the level of informal care use should therefore not be overlooked. The institutional context 
of the Netherlands emphasizes the role of informal care as the family is responsible for the 
provision of at least some basic LTC before becoming eligible to publicly financed LTC. In 
addition to an increasing demand for informal care, developments in the supply of informal 
care should not be ignored.
Older does not necessarily mean more expensive: ill-health, not age, is the key to 
health care use
Third, the majority of microeconomic studies failed to account for trends in health status 
even though health status should be the prime determinant of HCE (Andersen and New-
man, 1973). Examining the impact of aging on HCE in the absence of suitable information 
on health status assumes constant age-specific (or end of life) health status over time. Hence, 
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a compression or expansion of ill-health – that either decreases or increases the age-specific 
prevalence of health problems – will be ignored while the impact of population aging largely 
depends on underlying trends in health status. Projections of acute and LTC expenditures 
that account for changing health distributions are rather scarce.
It’s all relative: population aging is just one of the driving forces behind the HCE 
growth
Fourth, there is still substantial disagreement regarding the relative magnitude of the im-
pact of aging in relation to other drivers of HCE. Changes in the age composition of the 
population were found to account for less than one tenth of the total growth in HCE in 
developed countries over the period 1970-2002 (OECD, 2006). Instead, medical technologi-
cal progress, facilitated by national income growth, is viewed as the main determinant of 
HCE growth (e.g. Weisbrod, 1991; Newhouse, 1992). Many studies, however, have neglected 
the fact that population aging might interact with technological progress. Getting to grips 
with the relative contribution of aging is therefore a difficult task, but also because evidence 
on these separate drivers is obtained from either microeconomic (the effect of age) or 
macroeconomic (technology, income) studies. An overview of the evidence base on aging 
and other determinants closely associated to the impact of aging is therefore warranted to 
improve understanding of the relative and overall impact of aging.
Moreover, more empirical evidence that disentangles the contribution of several fac-
tors to HCE growth is required. HCE may grow for two broad types of reason. First the 
levels and/or distributions of the determinants of HCE may change (e.g. population aging, 
changing health patterns). Second, structural changes may alter the way in which given 
determinants impact on HCE. Medical technology, other changes in medical practice, and 
changes in health policy are the most likely sources of shifts in the relationship of HCE to its 
determinants. Most previous attempts to forecast future trends in HCE, including those that 
aim to identify the contribution of population aging, estimate a model of HCE and use this 
to simulate HCE under alternative scenarios about future trends in its determinants (e.g. 
Zweifel, Felder, and Meiers, 1999; Seshamani and Gray, 2004b; Stearns and Norton, 2004; 
Breyer and Felder, 2006; Lafortune et al. , 2007; Häkkinen et al., 2008). This assumes that 
the relationship of HCE to its determinants is stable, which is unlikely given that the health 
care sector is noted for technological progress, high government regulation and many 
policy reforms. Disentangling the contribution of several factors to HCE growth, including 
better insight in the contribution of structural changes which is currently a black box, will 
improve understanding of the nature of the HCE growth and projections of expenditures. 
Consequently, it provides alternative modes to influence the current HCE growth rate.
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Structure of the thesis
The main objective of this thesis is to enhance understanding of the (relative) impact of 
aging to acute and LTC expenditure growth in the Netherlands. In particular, it contributes 
to filling some of the previously unresolved issues in the literature on the role of population 
aging in HCE growth. The remainder of this chapter provides an overview of this thesis and 
the research questions addressed in each of these chapters.
The thesis is divided in three parts. Part A ‘the impact of population aging and other de-
terminants on health care expenditure growth’ consists of chapter two. It provides a general 
overview of the current state of the literature on the impact of population aging, and other 
determinants of HCE that are associated with the impact of aging on the recent growth in 
HCE. Because the literature on the determinants of HCE (growth) is plentiful and the de-
terminants are numerous, we first introduce a conceptual model to structure the discussion 
of determinants – and their evidence. In line with the thesis structure, chapter two makes 
a clear and consistent distinction between the influence of aging (-related determinants) 
on acute and LTC expenditures. Next, we discuss HCE projections in aging populations 
based on various (sets of) models. It will be demonstrated that richer models, with better 
information on health care need than age only, improve projections by their ability to ac-
count for the corresponding trends in need determinants, e.g. a compression or expansion 
of ill-health. The specific contribution of population aging to HCE growth is placed in 
perspective by discussing the relative role of aging compared to other driving forces behind 
the HCE growth.
Part B (chapter three to six) and C (chapter seven) present original empirical studies for the 
Netherlands. As much less is known about the impact of aging on LTC use and spending, 
the objective of part B is to investigate the impact of population aging on LTC spending in 
greater depth. Improved knowledge on the impact of aging on future LTC use and spend-
ing may help preparing the LTC system to its future needs. However, this requires in the 
first place a better insight in the decision process leading to LTC utilization. Of particular 
interest is the influence of the prime determinant of LTC use, disability status. Thus far, the 
vast majority of studies on the impact of aging on LTC use lacked data on disability status. 
Because disability is viewed as the key determinant of LTC use, disability is a prerequisite 
to obtain access to publicly financed LTC in the Netherlands, the future trend in disability 
proves to be of crucial importance for LTC expenditure growth. Chapter three therefore fo-
cuses on the influence of disability on home care and institutional LTC use as an important 
prerequisite for a better understanding of the determinants of LTC use.
Once the relationship between disability and LTC use has been empirically determined, 
chapter four then disentangles the respective roles of age, time-to-death and disability in 
explaining LTC expenditures. In addition, we illustrate the contributions of age, time-to-
death and disability by comparing projections of future LTC spending based on trends in 
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the age composition of the population, life expectancy and disability. Results reveal that the 
impact of aging on LTC expenditure is substantially overestimated when not accounting 
for longevity gains, but even more so when overlooking improvements in disability status.
Hence, reliable estimates of future trends in disability are required to improve prognoses 
of LTC spending. The objective of chapter five is therefore to estimate future disability rates 
and combine these with LTC utilization rates by disability, age and sex to obtain forecasts 
of home care and institutional LTC use. The resulting forecasts then allow accounting for 
changing disability patterns, e.g. a compression or expansion, instead of approximating it 
by age or time-to-death.
Because informal care is an important component of LTC, part B would not be complete 
without contributing to evidence on the impact of aging on informal care supply and spend-
ing. We however could only contribute to this in some approximate way. First, to be able 
to investigate the consequences of aging for informal care costs, informal care should be 
valued appropriately. Although the bulk of informal care is unpaid, the costs of informal 
care to society – e.g. the productivity losses – are substantial. Chapter six extends previous 
research on the monetary valuation of informal care by investigating the feasibility of the 
contingent valuation method to obtain a monetary value for an hour of informal care. Sec-
ond, chapter five accounts for the possible substitution of publicly financed LTC by informal 
care in projecting future LTC spending. We explicitly compare projections that do and do 
not account for trends in co-residence status – a proxy for informal care availability as the 
vast majority of informal care is provided by household members – and comment on the 
likely changes in the trend of informal care supply.
Part C ‘unraveling the determinants of acute health care expenditure growth’ consists of 
chapter seven. The objective of chapter seven is to decompose the Dutch acute HCE growth in 
the period 1998-2004 into a contribution of changes in population characteristics, changes 
in hospital-related factors, and changes in the HCE function. The contribution of changes in 
the acute HCE function mainly reflects medical technological progress, government policies, 
other changes in medical practices, and changes in demand behavior. As such, this chapter 
provides further evidence on the relative contribution of aging compared to other factors. 
The growth in two spending components, hospital and pharmaceutical expenditures, will 
be investigated separately because the contribution of factors to the expenditure growth 
varies between these two subsectors. In addition, an innovative decomposition method has 
been employed that decomposes the growth across the full expenditure distribution. The 
exploitation of this method enhanced insight in the acute HCE growth that could not have 
been delivered by traditional decomposition analyses.
Finally, chapter eight concludes and discusses the main results and take-away messages 
of the thesis.
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Abstract
Due to the rapid growth in population aging in developed countries, serious concerns have 
risen about the financial sustainability of health care systems. This chapter discusses the 
impact of population aging on health care expenditure (HCE). Its contribution is twofold. 
First, we reveal the different health determinants that constitute the effect of aging on HCE. 
Second, we analyse the consequences of important societal determinants of HCE that 
interact strongly with aging, like technological progress and national income. Throughout 
the chapter, we differentiate between the impact of aging on acute care and long-term care 
(LTC) expenditures.
Most literature on population aging and HCE is devoted to rough approximations of health 
determinants: either age or, in more recent years, mortality. Studies that include more 
detailed information on health and disability are scarce but they show that the influence 
of age and mortality on HCE is strongly diminished when health and disability are directly 
included. The direct effect of population aging on HCE growth is relevant, but modest: 
population aging explains 0.5-1.0 percent of the 4 percent real annual growth in HCE. The 
strongest driver of HCE seems to be technological innovation, facilitated by economic 
growth. All determinants, however, interact with each other: aging reinforces the impact of 
technological change, vice versa. The direct influence of aging is strongest on LTC, where age 
is a significant determinant of expenditures, even when health and disability are included.
HCE will continue to rise in the coming decades. Although the direct effect of aging is 
modest, many of the other important drivers of HCE, especially technological progress (for 
acute care) and disability (for LTC), seem to interact very strongly with age. Therefore, the 
relationship between age and HCE is still of great importance.
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2.1 Introduction
Over the last decades the impact of population aging on health care expenditures (HCE) 
has become a growing concern in developed countries. The increase of the relative share 
of elderly in the population is a combined result of increasing life expectancy and declin-
ing fertility rates. Simultaneous to population aging, HCE have risen sharply. In OECD 
countries, average expenditures increased from approximately 5 percent of GDP in 1970 to 
9 percent in 2007. Per capita HCE in current prices have risen from below $1000 in 1977 to 
over $3000 in 2007 (OECD, 2009). The association between age and HCE has raised serious 
concerns regarding the financial sustainability of health care systems.
Although consensus exists that growth in HCE can at least partially be attributed to ag-
ing (Yang, Norton, and Stearns, 2003; OECD, 2006; Payne et al., 2007; van Elk, Mot, and 
Franses, 2010), the extent of the impact of population aging on HCE is still unclear. The 
debate on aging is complicated because aging studies differ largely in approach. Most studies 
only model the relationship between age and HCE, whereas others also include (approxima-
tions of) health. Furthermore, some studies focus on individual HCE while others adopt a 
macroeconomic approach.
That the relationship between age and HCE largely results from decreasing health seems 
obvious. As organisms age, organ systems wear and the body’s ability to fight diseases 
declines (Partridge and Mangel, 1999). This decreasing health in turn leads to increasing 
utilization of health care and expenditures. Less clear is how expected increases in longev-
ity relate to health. There are three competing hypotheses on this relationship: expansion, 
compression, and postponement of morbidity (Fries, 1980; Olshansky et al., 1991; Payne et 
al., 2007). The expansion hypothesis assumes that longevity gains will increase the period 
of time lived with morbidity or disability. The compression hypothesis assumes that this 
period will shrink. In the postponement hypothesis longevity gains are expected merely to 
shift the period with morbidity or disability to an older age, while its duration remains con-
stant. Given the fact that the relationship between age and HCE is largely due to health, the 
consequences of longevity gains on HCE depend on which of these competing hypotheses 
is true.
Population aging is just one of the driving forces behind HCE. Other individual and 
societal factors are even more important. In fact, there seems to be a consensus that medi-
cal technology is the largest driver of HCE growth, facilitated by economic growth. Both 
factors, however, are strongly interrelated with aging. Not only can the introduction of new 
technologies lead to an increase in longevity, the aging of the population could also lead 
to an increased demand for medical technology aimed at the elderly. Therefore, while the 
isolated effect of aging might be relatively small compared to other factors, the broader 
effect of aging, as it interacts with other determinants, could be much more significant. It is 
difficult, however, to get some grasp of this broader effect because most studies on age and 
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health effects focus on individual persons and their health care consumption, while studies 
on the effects of income and medical technology are often based on aggregated data.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a consistent overview of the different branches of 
research on population aging and health expenditure. In the next section we introduce a 
conceptual model of HCE and its determinants. This chapter centres on two issues. First, 
we comprehensive discuss the relationship between age and its underlying individual 
determinants mortality, health and disability. Second, we discuss the full contribution of 
population aging to growth in HCE by considering its strong relationship with important 
societal determinants. We classify the evidence from literature according the different parts 
of the model, we clarify the relationships between determinants and we discuss their impact 
on projections of future HCE. We conclude with some recommendations for researchers 
and policy makers.
2.2 Conceptual framework
The conceptual framework of determinants of HCE in figure 2.1 was largely inspired by 
the behavioral model of Andersen and Newman (Andersen, 1995; Andersen and Newman, 
1973). This model provides a framework for viewing individual utilization of health care, 
taking into account both individual and societal determinants. We extended the model 

Individual determinants 












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
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
 Acute care 
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
 Acute care 
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Long term care 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual model of individual health care expenditures
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with an additional link between utilization of health care and expenditures. This link is 
mainly influenced by wages and prices, and the organization of the health care system. 
Furthermore, we distinguish explicitly between expenditures in acute care and LTC. The 
care involved in both sectors is very different in character and countries often organize the 
financing and service delivery of services separately. Consequently, determinants will have 
a different impact on acute and LTC expenditures.
The model has two main features which are relevant for our discussion of aging. First, 
we use the categorization of individual determinants to discuss the relationship between 
age, health and HCE. Second, we utilize the distinction between societal and individual 
determinants, and the interactions between the two, to assess the relationship between ag-
ing and income and medical technology.
Individual determinants were classified into three groups: predisposing, enabling, and 
need determinants. Predisposing determinants reflect the individual’s ‘propensity toward 
use’. These determinants influence the likelihood that an individual will use health care, 
without being directly responsible for that use. Age, sex, marital status, co-residence status, 
socio-economic status, and living and working conditions are examples. Age, the most im-
portant predisposing determinant for our discussion, is closely related to health and illness. 
However, it should still be considered to be a predisposing determinant, since age itself is 
not a reason for seeking health care (Andersen, 1995).
Enabling determinants concern the resources available to satisfy a need regarding health 
care use. Important enabling determinants are the level of health insurance coverage, indi-
vidual or household income, and informal care supply.
Need determinants regard the direct reasons why an individual, given the presence of 
predisposing and enabling determinants, seeks the use of health care: ill health and disabil-
ity. Health can be conceptualised in many different ways: the presence of (chronic) diseases, 
self-reported health, mental- and physical illness. These different concepts reflect different 
dimensions of health, with a possibly different influence on HCE. Disability reflects the way 
in which poor health limits the ability to perform (instrumental) activities of daily living 
((i)ADL) and mobility. Although health and disability are related, both determinants have 
a different relationship to HCE, especially between acute care and LTC. Moreover, effective 
health care and informal care (e.g., medication or appliances) might limit disability while 
not curing the disease, which means that the relationship between health status and dis-
ability is dynamic. We also include mortality as a need determinant. This might seem a bit 
strange, since mortality itself cannot lead to utilization of health care. However, many aging 
studies include time-to-death (TTD) as a proxy for health to explain HCE. We include TTD 
as a need determinant rather than a predisposing determinant, because instead of age, death 
is a consequence of ill health and not the other way round.
At the top of figure 2.1 the societal determinants of HCE are shown. We can distinguish 
between national income, health policy, medical technology, the organization of the health 
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care system and wage/price developments. National income provides the money for health 
care funding and thus has a constituting influence on the ability to pay. Medical technology 
influences the principles and techniques available to provide health care, and their costs. It 
tends to increase use, resulting in a rise in total HCE (Bodenheimer, 2005) and is by many 
viewed as the key driver of HCE growth (e.g. Newhouse, 1992). The organization of the 
health care system involves the provision and financing of health care services; it influences 
expenditures through the incentives it provides for all actors involved. Finally, wages and 
prices are among the main driving forces of growing HCE.
In the next sections we summarize the evidence from literature on the aging-related 
determinants that are shaded in figure 2.1. We discuss the individual determinants in depth 
and will talk about the societal determinants more briefly.
2.3 Individual determinants of health care 
expenditure: age, mortality, and health
A lot of discussion in health economic research on aging has focused on the question 
whether the relationship between age and HCE holds when health variables, or proxies like 
TTD, are also included in a model. Given the fact that the predisposing character of age lies 
mostly in an increasing likelihood of being in poor health, it should indeed be expected that 
the influence of age on HCE diminishes when health is controlled for. The debate, however, 
is not so much whether age has an additional predisposing effect on HCE besides health. 
Instead, the real question is whether age, or even TTD for that matter, can still be used as 
a good proxy for health when the aim is to assess the influence of population aging, and 
especially of longevity gains. In this section we discuss how research on aging has developed 
from age-based models towards TTD models and then towards more health based models.
The impact of age and mortality
Until the end of the 1980’s, studies on the consequences of population aging on HCE were 
mostly based on the observed cross sectional relationship between age and HCE, which 
showed a strong increase of HCE with age. Consequently, it was argued that population 
aging was responsible for much of the growth in HCE, since both the share of elderly and 
expenditures had been growing over time. The combination of cross sectional estimates of 
the relationship between age and HCE with expectations of the future age distribution led 
to predictions of large increases in HCE (Longman, 1987; OECD, 1988). Such studies (im-
plicitly) assumed that increases in longevity would not influence the relationship between 
age and HCE. However, insights from the cost of dying (COD) and TTD literature seemed 
to suggest that this assumption was incorrect (see Payne et al. 2007 for a review of the COD 
and TTD literature).
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The idea behind COD studies is that the largest part of HCE is made in the final year 
of life. HCE should therefore be differentiated between survivors and decedents. COD 
studies either analyse aggregate HCE of decedents by age, or compare age-specific HCE 
between survivors and decedents. For example, recent COD studies found that Medicare 
expenditures were six to seven times larger for decedents than survivors (Hogan et al., 2001; 
Lubitz et al., 2003). Also, the ratio of decedents’ to survivors’ HCE has been found to fall 
with age (e.g. Hoover et al., 2002; Madsen et al., 2002; Yang, Norton, and Stearns, 2003; 
Polder, Barendregt, and van Oers, 2006). The magnitude of this ratio depends on the sector 
under consideration (Madsen et al., 2002; Kildemoes et al., 2006). For LTC, the effect of 
age on expenditures was found to be particularly strong (McGrail et al., 2000; Spillman and 
Lubitz, 2000; Yang, Norton, and Stearns, 2003; Polder, Barendregt, and van Oers, 2006). 
By the 1980’s, the large proportion of HCE spent in the last periods of life had been well 
documented (Lubitz and Prihoda, 1984; McCall, 1984; Scitovsky, 1984). This result suggested 
that, “as age-specific death rates fall over time, there will be fewer people in the last year of 
life in any age category, and this will reduce age-specific health care expenditures” (Fuchs, 
1984). Thus, predictions of future HCE should be corrected by including the change in the 
age pattern as a consequence of increased longevity (Fuchs, 1984; Manton, 1982).
A more refined way of making such corrections was offered by TTD studies. Instead 
of comparing aggregated costs of decedents and survivors by age, TTD studies use indi-
vidual data to model HCE as a function of the time away from death, allowing for in-depth 
analyses of the effects of approaching death on HCE over time. In a seminal study, Roos, 
Montgomery, and Roos (1987) modelled hospital, nursing home, and primary care use as a 
function of age, sex, and TTD in Canada. Their sample included decedents (individuals in 
their last 8 years of life) and survivors. TTD was found to have a strong effect on use while 
the effect of age diminished but remained significant for most age groups. The effect of TTD 
was found to diminish with age, a finding confirmed by subsequent studies (e.g. Seshamani 
and Gray, 2004a; Stearns and Norton, 2004; Werblow, Felder, and Zweifel, 2007; Häkkinen 
et al., 2008).
In 1999, Zweifel, Felder, and Meiers (1999) put TTD squarely on the agenda by stating 
that age was a red herring, a distraction from the true drivers of HCE. Using Swiss HCE 
panel data from individuals in their last two years of life, Zweifel, Felder, and Meiers (1999) 
modelled quarterly HCE conditioning on age, sex, and TTD. Unlike Roos, Montgomery, 
and Roos (1987), they found that age no longer determined HCE among individuals aged 
65+. Instead, TTD explained most variation. Many TTD studies followed. Two types of 
TTD studies can be distinguished. The majority of studies published before 2004 only 
investigated the TTD hypothesis for decedents (Zweifel, Felder, and Meiers, 1999; Felder, 
Meier, and Schmitt, 2000; O’Neill et al., 2000; Seshamani and Gray, 2004a, 2004c). The 
second type of TTD studies examined the scope of the TTD hypothesis by expanding the 
model to survivors (Stearns and Norton, 2004; Zweifel, Felder, and Werblow, 2004; Wer-
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blow, Felder, and Zweifel, 2007; Häkkinen et al., 2008; Weaver et al., 2009; Felder, Werblow, 
and Zweifel, 2010). All studies concluded that TTD is the main demographic determinant of 
HCE. However, TTD studies reported different results concerning the exact time at which 
the approaching event of death becomes important for HCE. Results are often difficult to 
compare since studies vary largely in included time prior to death (2-30 years), popula-
tion samples, and health sectors. Zweifel, Felder, and Meiers (1999) found that TTD had a 
significant effect on HCE up to 1.5 years before death. A much longer effect of TTD – up to 
30 years prior to death – was found in other studies (Roos, Montgomery, and Roos, 1987; 
Lubitz, Beebe, and Baker, 1995; Seshamani and Gray, 2004c).
Results concerning the remaining effect of age on decedents’ HCE are inconclusive. While 
Zweifel, Felder, and Meiers (1999) reported no effect for age at all, other studies reported 
that expected HCE of survivors and to a lesser extent decedents were still associated with 
age, although its effect dropped substantially when accounting for TTD (e.g. Roos, Mont-
gomery, and Roos, 1987; Seshamani and Gray, 2004a; Stearns and Norton, 2004).
Like in COD studies, the effect of age and TTD on expenditures depends on the health 
sector. For most acute services, age had no or a negative effect on decedents’ expenditures 
and only a weak positive effect on survivors’ expenditures (e.g. Werblow, Felder, and 
Zweifel, 2007; Häkkinen et al., 2008). Although controlling for TTD importantly attenu-
ated the effect of age on expenditures for all services, age still importantly determined LTC 
expenditures (e.g. Roos, Montgomery, and Roos, 1987; Werblow, Felder, and Zweifel, 2007; 
Häkkinen et al., 2008; Weaver et al., 2009). LTC expenditures are also the main reason why 
studies on total HCE still found an age effect for both decedents and survivors.
Reconsidering the impact of age and mortality: controlling for health and 
disability
COD and TTD studies recognized the role of age as a predisposing determinant, in the sense 
that the relationship between age and HCE was considered to be mainly the result of the 
higher probability of dying at higher ages. However, the relationship between mortality and 
age itself is mostly the result of deteriorating health. Therefore, TTD could be just a proxy of 
health, or more accurately morbidity and disability, in explaining HCE. The concentration 
of HCE at the end of life should then be associated with a high burden of disease at the end 
of life. This was indeed confirmed by Hogan et al. (2001), who reported that decedents have 
an almost 4 times higher disease rate than survivors.
Studies that include health can be divided into four categories. First of all the classic 
cost of illness approach can be distinguished. These studies combine demographic and 
epidemiological data to estimate health care costs for all or specific diseases per age group 
(Meerding et al., 1998). Häkkinen et al. (2008) examined the influence of various chronic 
conditions on HCE at individual level in a sample of the non-institutionalized Finnish 65+ 
population. Most diseases greatly raised expenditures on health care, but the impact dif-
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fered per disease and type of care. Wong et al. (2008) examined the effect of co-morbidity 
on Dutch hospital expenditures, demonstrating that the costs of co-morbidity were higher 
than the sum of the costs of each disease separately.
Second, a number of COD and TTD studies are stratified by cause-of-death (Bird, Shugar-
man, and Lynn, 2002; Seshamani and Gray, 2004a; Wong et al., 2011). Bird et al. (2002) 
have reported the effect of cause-of-death on decedents’ total HCE; Seshamani and Gray 
considered only hospital expenditures. Decedents from cancer and respiratory diseases had 
significantly higher end-of-life spending than decedents from heart disease. Seshamani and 
Gray also reported higher hospital expenditures for decedents from stroke. Wong et al. 
(2011) considered disease-specific hospital expenditures. A significant effect of TTD was 
found for both strong and less lethal diseases but the effect was larger for the former.
Third, Dormont, Grignon, and Huber (2006) and Shang and Goldman (2008) used both 
TTD and general health measures to HCE. Dormont, Grignon, and Huber analysed the 
growth in age-specific spending on ambulatory care, pharmaceuticals and hospital care in 
France over the period 1992-2000. The increasing HCE by age could entirely be explained 
by differences in health. Hypertension, diabetes, metabolic disorders, and depression in-
creased pharmaceutical expenditures while ambulatory care expenditures were positively 
influenced by depression and the number of diseases. As in most other TTD studies two 
parts were distinguished. The first part regards the probability of using hospital care, and 
this probability was positively influenced by diabetes, cataracts, and TTD (approximated by 
death risk). The second part regards the conditional expenditure for admitted patients, and 
Dormont, Grignon, and Huber showed that hypertension and disability status significantly 
determined this conditional hospital expenditure. Shang and Goldman (2008) evaluated 
the effect of age on Medicare expenditures while further controlling for TTD (measured 
by remaining life expectancy), certain chronic conditions and ADL disabilities. As with 
Dormont, Grignon, and Huber (2006), TTD played only a limited role once morbidity 
was controlled for, although it is hard to understand their results because some exogenous 
variables are used twice: in modelling life expectancy and in measuring its effect on HCE 
once life expectancy is already controlled for.
Fourth, Lubitz et al. (2003) and Wouterse, Meijboom, and Polder (2011) analysed the 
long-term relationship between health status and HCE by examining cumulative HCE. 
Lubitz et al. (2003) quantified the relationship between self-reported health and disability 
on lifetime HCE from the age of 70 until death in the US. Elderly with better self-reported 
health lived longer, but incurred similar lifetime HCE than those reporting poor health. 
With respect to disability, lifetime HCE of non-disabled individuals were on average $9,000 
lower while they live on average 2.7 years longer than disabled individuals. Using Dutch 
hospital data over 8 years, Wouterse, Meijboom, and Polder (2011) reported similar findings. 
These results demonstrate that improvements in health lead to longer life expectancy, but 
generally not to lower HCE.
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A number of studies have focused on examining the effect of need factors on LTC use (de 
Meijer et al., 2009; Weaver et al., 2009; Wong et al., 2010; de Meijer et al., 2011;). Weaver 
et al. (2008) and de Meijer et al. (2009) separately examined the effect of need factors on 
institutional and home care use. They also confirmed that disability largely determined 
spending on institutional and home care, but age remained important as well. Cognitive 
functioning was found to influence institutional LTC use only (Weaver et al., 2009) while 
self-reported health or the presence of a chronic disease were not determining home care 
or institutional LTC use (de Meijer et al., 2009). Wong et al. (2011) analysed LTC use in a 
sample of discharged hospital patients aged 65+ in the Netherlands. Of the selected diseases, 
stroke was most strongly related to a nursing home admission, while lung cancer was the 
strongest determinant of discharge to home care. Finally, de Meijer et al. (2011) analysed 
home care and institutional LTC expenditures for the entire Dutch 55+ population condi-
tioning on cause-of-death. Death due to diabetes, mental illness, stroke, respiratory diseases 
or digestive diseases had higher LTC expenditures; death due to neoplasm was associated 
with lower institutional LTC expenditures but higher home care expenditures. Furthermore, 
using a sample of non-institutionalized individuals, TTD no longer determined home care 
expenditures once disability was controlled for.
In conclusion, we have seen that the discourse on the impact of aging on health expen-
diture moved from age models to more sophisticated analyses of time-to-death and most 
recently of health and disability. Not age as such matters, but the prevalence of disease, 
disability and co-morbidity in a certain year and even more during the whole span of life. 
The impact, however, differs for acute care and long term care.
2.4 Predictions based on individual determinants 
(age, mortality, and health)
Age-, TTD- and health-based models lead to different predictions of the effect of population 
aging on future HCE. Predictions from age-based models implicitly assume that gains in 
longevity do not influence the relationship between age and HCE. Instead, TTD models 
assume that the mortality-related component of HCE shifts equivalently with longevity 
gains. Thus, TTD based projections adhere to the postponement of morbidity hypothesis: 
the period spent in poor health, as far as it is responsible for HCE associated with TTD, is 
assumed to be merely postponed to a later age. The findings in the previous sections, for 
instance the variation in the effect of TTD by cause-of-death, imply that epidemiological 
changes can affect the relationship between TTD and HCE. Health-based models do not 
rely on an implicit assumption on the relationship between longevity gains and health. 
However, they have to rely on predictions of health and disability trends, which are much 
more ambiguous than trends in mortality.
Literature overview aging perspectives on health care expenditures 29
Projections based on age versus TTD.
Many forecasting studies have compared age-based and TTD models. A general and strong 
result, regardless of country or model specification, was that population aging had a signifi-
cantly lower impact on future HCE in TTD models than in naïve models. The difference 
between naïve and TTD models increases when the expected increase in life expectancy is 
larger and the projection period longer. Comparison of the exact impact of the inclusion of 
TTD on predictions between studies is complicated by the fact that demographic changes 
vary by country and not all studies reported the same type of outcome.
Studies on annual HCE growth rates find a rate roughly between 0.7-2.3 percent due to 
population aging when TTD is not included and a 0.1-0.5 percentage point lower rate when 
including TTD. In Switzerland, Steinmann, Telser, and Zweifel (2007) found an annual 
increase of 0.7 percent between 2005 and 2030 for the naïve projection and 0.55 percent 
when TTD was taken into account. Although the effect of population aging on predicted 
HCE is thus significantly smaller when including TTD, over a period of 25 years a growth 
rate of 0.55 percent still implies a 15 percent increase of HCE due purely to aging. Miller 
(2001) used a relatively long prediction period (1997-2070) and found somewhat higher 
average annual growth rates for the US: 1.3 (1.1) percent for a naïve (TTD) model. Shang 
and Goldman (2007) report an expected annual growth rate of Medicare expenditures over 
the period 2000-2080 due to population aging of 1.7 (1.5) percent for an age-based (TTD) 
model. For the Netherlands, Polder et al. (2006) predicted a 0.7 percent (naïve) and 0.61 
percent (TTD) annual growth between 2000 and 2020 due to population aging.
As the influence of TTD on expenditures varies with health services, the extent of the 
variations in prediction between age-based and TTD models also depends on the service 
under consideration. The difference between age-based and TTD models is particularly 
large for hospital expenditures and much less for primary care and pharmaceutical expen-
ditures. Seshamani and Gray (2004b) predicted hospital expenditures for the UK in 2026, 
finding that the annual growth rate due to aging dropped by 50 percent (0.8 to 0.4 percent) 
when TTD was included. Serup-Hansen, Wickstrinm, and Kristiansen (2002) projected 
Danish hospital and primary care expenditures for the period 1995-2020. The naïve (TTD) 
model predicted an annual growth rate of 0.78 (0.63) percent for hospital expenditures and 
0.33 (0.32) for primary care expenditures. Häkkinen et al. (2008) projected HCE in 2036 for 
Finland for different sectors. The difference in predicted annual growth rates between an 
age-based and TTD model was large for inpatient expenditures (1.7 versus 2.2 percent per 
annum) and somatic specialized care (1.5 versus 1.9 percent), but small for pharmaceutical 
expenditures (1.6 versus 1.7 percent), which was confirmed by Kildemoes et al. (2006) for 
Danish pharmaceutical expenditures. Using Dutch data on public LTC expenditures, de 
Meijer et al. (2011) predicted an annual growth rate of per capita LTC expenditures for 
the 50+ population over the period 2004-2040 of 1.14 percent for a naïve model and 0.69 
percent for a TTD model.
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Projections using trends in health and disability
As we have discussed, TTD models implicitly assume a postponement of morbidity as the 
period of morbidity preceding death is expected to shift to higher ages but remains constant 
in duration. However, recent evidence seems to support, although not unambiguously, 
the compression hypothesis, i.e. the period lived with disease expands over time, but self 
perceived health and years without physical limitations tends to increase over time. Due 
to the complex nature of health, evidence on its time trends tends to vary by country, and 
sometimes even within countries (Lafortune et al. 2007; Parker and Thorslund, 2007; Mack-
enbach et al., 2008). Despite the widely divergent results, the tendency seems to be that the 
elderly report more diseases and health problems but fewer disabilities (de Hollander, 2006; 
Parker and Thorslund, 2007; van der Lucht and Polder, 2010).
In comparison to the extensive TTD literature, few projections of future HCE control-
ling for trends in better need determinants have been made. Manton and colleagues (2006, 
2007) investigated how the decline in disability among the US elderly between 1982 and 
1999 affected future Medicare costs. Although their projections are outdated – 2004 and 
2009 – the results are still worth mentioning as they demonstrated that projections account-
ing for the recent disability decline approached the actual amount spend most accurately. 
For the 2009 projection, the annual growth of Medicare expenditures between 2004-2009 
was estimated to be 9.80 percent based on a model that assumed stable disability prevalence 
and 6.49 percent based on a model that assumed a continuation of the disability decline 
observed between 1989-1999. Stearns et al. (2007) simulated the implications of changing 
age and disability patterns on LTC spending in the US. The effects of population aging and 
increasing longevity are found to be modest relative to the effect of changes in disability 
prevalence.
Whereas Manton et al. and Stearns et al. examined disability trends in the elderly only, 
Bhattacharya et al. (2004) argued that cohort effects have to be taken into account when 
projecting HCE for the future elderly. Because the disability trend among the young declines 
at a lower rate than that of the elderly, they argued that future elderly will be more disabled 
than projected from an extrapolation of the recent disability trend among the elderly. Using 
Medicare data, per capita HCE were projected to decline for the next 15-20 years, which is 
in line with recent projections that used declining disability among the elderly. Accounting 
for cohort effects, however, per capita HCE were expected to rise after 2020. Therefore, they 
concluded that cost forecasts for the elderly depend on the incorporation of cohort effects 
regarding disability; including these effects yielded more pessimistic scenarios for future 
Medicare expenditures.
De Meijer et al. (2011) demonstrated the importance of omitting important determinants 
by projecting per capita LTC expenditures for the Dutch 50+ population for the year 2040. 
While a naïve model estimated an annual growth rate of 1.14 percent, accounting for the 
increasing number of elderly living alone resulted in an annual growth rate of 1.19 percent. 
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They also estimated the growth rate of per capita home care expenditure to be 0.46 percent 
when extrapolating recent declines in severe disability (1.5 percent annually; Lafortune et 
al., 2007; Perenboom et al., 2004), while the growth rate was estimated to be 1.12 percent 
using a naïve model and 0,74 percent according to a TTD model.
We conclude that TTD, morbidity and disability have a major impact on demographic 
projections of future HCE. These models, however, are solely based on the individual 
determinants of HCE. For an even better understanding we should also acknowledge the 
influence of societal determinants.
2.5 Societal determinants: national income, 
technology and wages
Income
In general, income reflects the ability and willingness to pay for health care. However, 
income appears twice in the framework of figure 2.1: as an individual enabling determinant, 
in the form of individual income, and as a societal determinant, in the form of national 
income. Although there is a relationship between individual and national income, their in-
fluence on HCE can be quite different. Macro studies find that on the national level, income 
is a major determinant of HCE (Newhouse, 1977). Also, national income growth seems to 
be strongly correlated with HCE growth (Gerdtham et al., 1992; OECD, 2006; van Elk, Mot, 
and Franses, 2010). In fact, the national income elasticity of health care is commonly found 
to be greater than one, suggesting that health care is a luxury good (Newhouse, 1977). On 
the individual level, however, income is found to have a very small impact on HCE (Getzen, 
2000; Doorslaer, Koolman, and Jones, 2004; van Ourti, 2004). This apparent paradox can 
be resolved by explicitly taking into account the different levels of analysis and the different 
variation within and between groups. In the presence of health insurance, the marginal 
price of health care is typically (near) zero. Therefore, on an individual level income differ-
ences do not play a large role in explaining differences in HCE among individuals belonging 
to the same group of insured (which in many cases is more or less the total population). 
In contrast, collective or national income is a strong explanatory factor when explaining 
differences between groups (countries, insurance groups) where it does reflect a societal 
willingness to pay for health care (Getzen, 2000). In relation to the conceptual model, 
we could say that the political willingness to pay and the societal ability to pay eventually 
largely accommodates the level of HCE, whereas the distribution of collectively-financed 
care, moderated by the organization of the health care system, is determined mostly by 
individual determinants.
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Medical technology
Progress in medical technology is often mentioned as the most important driver of HCE 
growth (e.g. Weisbrod, 1991; Newhouse, 1992). Technological progress has two contrasting 
effects on HCE. On the one hand, technological progress can mitigate expensive care and 
reduce costs (Cutler and McClellan, 2001; Cutler, 2007). On the other hand, it also tends to 
increase use. Or, intuitively stated by Jones (2002): “Medical advances allow diseases to be 
cured today at a cost that could not be cured at any price in the past”. In general, the second 
effect turns out to be larger resulting in a rise in total HCE (Bodenheimer, 2005). Although 
intuitively strong, direct evidence on the impact of technological progress is relatively scarce. 
For instance, Newhouse (1992) reached his conclusion by eliminating other explanatory fac-
tors, not by direct evidence. It has, however, been shown that medical spending in general 
(Cutler, 2007) and pharmaceuticals spending in particular (Lichtenberg, 2007; Civan and 
Koksal, 2010) often provide health gains at reasonable costs, but the budget impact and costs 
per additional life year vary substantially among new innovations (Goldman et al., 2005). 
Moreover, most innovations that provide health gains also raise HCE.
A number of studies have attempted to analyse the role of technological progress explicitly 
(Breyer and Ulrich, 2000; Jones, 2002; Okunade and Murthy, 2002; Suen, 2005; Goldman 
et al., 2005; Westerhout, 2006; Dormont, Grignon, and Huber, 2006). Using macro data 
for Western Germany for the period 1970-1995, Breyer and Ulrich (2000) estimated that 
technological progress increased per capita HCE by 0.8-1.4 percent annually. Suen (2005) 
showed for the US that the rising trend in HCE and the significant increase in life expectancy 
during the second half of the 20th century can be explained by medical technological prog-
ress and higher incomes. Okundade and Murthy (2002) approximated medical progress by 
total R&D spending and health-specific R&D spending in the US, finding a significant effect 
on HCE for the period 1960-1997. Westerhout (2006) combined the elasticity between the 
growth rate of new pharmaceutical and the size of their potential market with the expected 
increase in the number of elderly and estimated an additional 0.6 percent annual growth in 
HCE due to medical progress.
Dormont, Grignon, and Huber (2006) decomposed the relative contributions of changes 
in demography, morbidity and health care practices to the HCE growth in France over the 
period 1992-2000. Changes in practices given a certain level of morbidity were assumed to 
reflect the impact of medical technology. Their conclusion was that “changes in practices 
appear to be the main driver in the increase in expenditures”, especially for pharmaceutical 
expenditures. Seventy percent of pharmaceutical spending growth could be explained by 
changes in practices.
Wages/prices
Research on wages/prices showed that labour productivity in health care tends to develop 
more slowly than the general economy, causing health care prices to increase faster than 
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inflation – a phenomena called Baumol’s disease. Baumol’s disease comprises a structural 
factor causing prices in health care to outpace general inflation. Okunade Karakus, and 
Okeke (2004) have found an increase of relative prices of health care in OECD countries 
over most of the 1968-1997 period. The relative price increase of HCE increased the price of 
health care, but also lowered the demand (through price elasticity). Although study find-
ings vary (Murillo, Piatecki, and Saez, 1993; Murthy and Ukpolo, 1994; Okunade, Karakus, 
and Okeke, 2004), it seems most likely that Baumol’s disease leads to higher HCE and a 
somewhat smaller volume of health care use (Hartwig, 2008; van Elk, Mot, and Franses, 
2010). The size of the effect on HCE can be considerable, approaching the isolated impact 
of aging. Population aging is expected to lead to serious labour shortages in health care, in 
particularly in LTC, which likely results in an upward pressure on wages in the health care 
sector (Dixon, 2003; Simoens, Villeneuve, and Hurst, 2005). Population aging is therefore 
likely to increase the contribution of Baumol’s disease to the HCE growth.
Dynamics
HCE growth due to national income growth and technological innovation is not necessarily 
age neutral. For instance, medical innovations aimed at diseases occurring at old age have 
a different effect on the age profile of HCE than innovations aimed at diseases occurring 
mostly at a young age. When innovations are mostly aimed at the elderly, the broader effects 
of aging might be larger than the direct effect.
Findings on differences in HCE growth between age groups are not conclusive. Between 
1963 and 1987 medical expenditures of the elderly in the US rose more quickly than expen-
ditures for other age groups (Meara, White, and Cutler, 2004), but after 1987 HCE growth 
has been somewhat higher for middle aged groups than for the elderly (e.g. Hartman et al., 
2008; Meara, White, and Cutler, 2004). This finding seems to be related to policy changes, 
especially in Medicare (Meara, White, and Cutler, 2004). For Germany, Buchner and Wasem 
(2006) found a steepening of the age curve of HCE during the period 1979-1996. Dormont, 
Grignon, and Huber (2006) demonstrated that HCE in France grew disproportionately for 
those aged 60+ over the period 1992-2000. For the Netherlands, Wong et al (submitted) 
investigated the effect of medical patents for different age groups, and found that the influ-
ence of innovations on hospital use is largest for the older age groups.
Furthermore, apart from Payne et al. (2009), COD and TTD studies have found a relatively 
larger increase in survivors’ than decedents’ HCE over time (McGrail et al., 2000; Spillman 
and Lubitz, 2000; Zweifel, Felder, and Meiers, 1999; Hogan et al., 2001). The downward 
sloping curve of the costs of dying with age was found to persist over time (McGrail et al., 
2000; Spillman and Lubitz, 2000). For Switzerland, Felder and Werblow (2008) found that, 
after controlling for mortality changes, there was no steepening of the remaining age effect.
Kramarow et al. (2007) show that for the US between 1992 to 2003 HCE have grown more 
for people in better health than they have for people in poor health. Institutional changes 
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may have played a role here. For an earlier period, Manton et al. (2006) stated that the 
decrease in Medicare spending for disabled individuals between 1982 and 1989 was probably 
related to the establishment of the prospective payment system in 1984, while the increase 
in the period 1989-1994 was probably due to the expansion of LTC benefits. Goldman et al. 
(2005) used simulations to estimate the effects of ten key technologies, most likely to affect 
the health of the elderly positively in the future, on HCE in the US. They found that all of 
these innovations will lead to an increase in HCE: their costs overwhelm any savings in 
HCE from improved health (Lubitz, 2005).
In conclusion, medical technology plays an important role, but until now the real impact 
on HCE in the dynamic interaction with individual determinants as morbidity and mor-
tality, remains largely unravelled. Because medical innovations are developed to improve 
health suggests a relatively large growth of HCE for the unhealthy (i.e. elderly).
2.6 Discussion and conclusion
Aging in perspective
We have discussed the relationship between aging and HCE from two angles: the relation-
ship between aging and underlying individual determinants such as mortality and health, 
and the impact of aging in relation to that of other determinants of HCE. What has the 
discussion contributed? First, we have shown the value of explicitly considering health-
related causes of the relationship between age and HCE. Age-based models implicitly 
assume that increases in longevity have no effect on the age pattern of HCE. The TTD 
literature has convincingly shown that significant parts of HCE are extended to older ages 
when life expectancy increases. This has led to a re-appreciation of the role of population 
aging in rising HCE. Population aging was expected to have limited impact on the growth 
in acute care spending, but was still expected to contribute importantly to the LTC spending 
growth. However, as we have argued, TTD itself at best approximates underlying health. An 
increasing number of studies have shown that when health or disability are included the 
role of TTD is also limited. A consequence of these findings is that when trends in health 
or disability do not coincide with trends in mortality, as seems to be the case, TTD models 
lead to inaccurate predictions of the consequence of longevity gains on HCE. However, due 
to data limitations and uncertainty about future health trends, projections based on health 
and disability have remained relatively scarce.
Second, although population aging contributes to the HCE growth, its direct effect is 
modest in comparison to total HCE growth: population aging explains 0.5-1.0 percent of 
a total annual real growth rate that can reach 4-5 percent (Burner, Waldo, and McKusick, 
1992; Reinhardt, 2003; Richardson and McKie, 1999). National income growth, determining 
the societal ability and willingness to pay for health care, is strongly associated with HCE 
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growth on an aggregated level. Other major drivers of growth are medical technology and 
increasing relative prices (Baumol’s disease). Results on aggregate HCE are mostly based 
on macro studies that can only include the effect of population aging in some approximate 
way (e.g. the share of the population older than 65). However, results on individual HCE 
show that the distribution of collectively financed care is largely determined by health and 
disability. Moreover, we have showed that age is not only strongly related to these individual 
determinants but also to societal determinants. It seems reasonable to expect that a large 
part of future medical innovations will be used for the groups with the highest needs: the 
elderly. Although not all studies agree, this expectation seems to be confirmed by the rela-
tively large growth of HCE for the elderly, compared to other age groups.
Although the direct effect of population aging has been shown to be rather limited, it does 
by no means limit the importance of aging for HCE. Many important drivers of HCE – mor-
tality, need determinants and technological progress – seem to interact very strongly with 
age. As we have seen, the chance that medical innovation will lead to lower expenditures is 
very small. Notwithstanding advances in acute care might limit disability and subsequently 
lower the demand for LTC.
Future research
The evidence summarized in this chapter reveals some important blind spots that could be 
addressed in future research. A more integrated approach of aging and HCE is needed on 
two terrains. First, although the inclusion of health and disability measures in HCE models 
yielded good results, more research is needed. In particular, epidemiological expertise on 
future health and disability trends has to be combined with health economic models to 
gain better predictions of future HCE. An especially relevant issue is that most studies that 
project HCE based on trends in mortality and need determinants assume that the trends are 
exogenous. Longevity gains and improvements in morbidity and disability, however, may be 
partly due to HCE growth. This reversed relationship can lead to endogeneity issues. Future 
HCE might depend on the costs of improving health or prolonging life when additional 
HCE are spend during the life years gained. So, ideally, this approach should take the mutual 
relationship between health and HCE into account. An example of such a more integrated 
approach is the theoretical model by Hall and Jones (2007) that relates HCE and resulting 
longevity gains to income growth.
Second, the considerable gap between micro studies (mainly concerned with individual 
determinants of HCE) and macro studies (mainly concerned with societal determinants) is 
consequential. The impact of interacting individual and societal determinants – e.g. medical 
innovation and health – on HCE is not fully understood. Research that directly examines 
the relationship between technological progress and expenditures in the acute and LTC 
sectors is an example of what is needed here. These studies should also take into account the 
moderating role of the health care system.
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Third, the fit between past projections of HCE and the actual development of HCE should 
be assessed more frequently to be able to better evaluate current projections of future HCE. 
Knowledge about future spending levels could be gained by accounting for the goodness-of-
fit of past projection models. To our best knowledge, only Manton et al. (2007) have studied 
goodness of fit. The numerous studies in recent years created a window of opportunity for 
the comparison of projected and realised HCE.
Policy recommendations
The literature generally suggests three types of policies that could be exploited in an attempt 
to moderate HCE. We will briefly reflect on each of them. First, increasing the health of 
the general population through prevention is often suggested as a good way to limit HCE 
growth. Unfortunately, most evidence indicates that the effect of health improvement on 
HCE is limited at best. Any HCE decrease due to health improvement seems to be counter-
acted by postponing costs to later ages.
Second, limiting the disabling effect of diseases seems to be a promising approach. As 
previously discussed, LTC expenditures are strongly associated with disability. If we were 
to elevate the state of disabled individuals – either by actual improvements in disability or 
by an increased use of devices that support independent living – at low costs, savings could 
be substantial.
Third, although institutional reforms are a preferred option to moderate HCE growth, 
improvements in health and population aging – two important factors of HCE – are seldom 
stimulated by them. Therefore, more attention should be paid to institutional reforms aimed 
at as well as moderating HCE as improving health. The evidence on these institutional fac-
tors, however, is scarce. Some research funding should be devoted to the understanding of 
institutional determinants within the dynamic relationships between need and supply.
Conclusion
HCE will continue to rise in the coming decades. Age as such is a limited driver of HCE. 
Notwithstanding, most determinants of HCE are directly or indirectly age-related. The odds 
are very high that the larger part of the increase in future expenditures will go to the elderly. 
If increases in HCE reflect an increasing willingness to pay for health, HCE growth in itself 
would not be a problem. But the large extent to which HCE will be used by the elderly in 
combination with a financing system that distributes the costs over the entire population 
can lead to a strain between age groups. Therefore, although put in perspective, the relation-
ship between age and HCE is still of great importance.
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Abstract
In view of aging populations, it is important to improve our understanding of the determi-
nation of long-term care (LTC) service use among the middle-aged and elderly population. 
We examined the likelihood of using two levels of LTC – home care and institutional care 
– in the Netherlands and focused on the influence of the measured degree of disability.
We pooled two cross-sectional surveys – one that excluded institutionalized and one that 
was targeted at institutionalized individuals aged 50+. Disability is measured by impairment 
in daily activities (iADL, ADL) and mobility. Consistency with official Dutch LTC eligibility 
criteria resulted in the selection of an ordered response model to analyze utilization. We 
compared a model with separate disability indicators to one with a disability index.
Age and disability, but not general health, proved to be the main determinants of utiliza-
tion, with the composite index sufficiently representing the disaggregated components. The 
presence of at least one disability displayed a greater effect on utilization than any additional 
disabilities. Apart from disability and age, sex, living alone, psychological problems, and 
hospitalizations showed a significant influence on LTC use. Some determinants affected the 
likelihood of home care or institutional care use differently.
Even after extensive control for disability, age remains an important driver of LTC use. By 
contrast, general health status hardly affects LTC use. The model and disability index can be 
used as a policy tool for simulating LTC needs.
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3.1 Introduction
Long-term care (LTC) expenditures in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries have increased considerably in recent decades (Cotis, 
2003). LTC is provided when individuals experience disabilities and/or chronic diseases 
and is often required until the end of life. Consequently, the majority of LTC is used by 
the middle-aged and elderly. This is illustrated by the fact that the Dutch 55+ population 
accounts for 88 percent of total LTC expenditures (CAK, 2005). Given projections that the 
ratio of people over 65 to those between 20 and 64 in OECD countries will double between 
now and 2050 (Cotis, 2003), a higher proportion of the population will inevitably be in need 
for LTC resulting in a strain on public budgets. Appropriate attention must thus be given to 
LTC utilization by the middle-aged and elderly to guarantee adequate access to LTC of an 
acceptable quality. Improved understanding of the factors that influence LTC use will be of 
great importance for obtaining accurate forecasts of future need and for developing policies 
to alleviate the pressure caused by aging populations on health care budgets.
Recent studies have suggested that, rather than with age itself, health expenditures are 
associated with proximity-to-death (Payne et al., 2007; Werblow, Felder, and Zweifel, 2007). 
An exception is LTC utilization, where aging might matter regardless of proximity-to-death 
(Payne et al., 2007). However, proximity-to-death might serve as a proxy for health and 
disability, when data on the latter are lacking. While disability forecasts abound (Fries, 1980, 
2003; Picavet and Hoeymans, 2002; Perenboom et al., 2004; Spillman, 2004Lafortune et al., 
2007), few studies have related disability to institutional LTC and home care simultane-
ously. We are able to examine both institutional and home care utilization of the Dutch 
50+ population concurrently by pooling representative samples of the institutionalized and 
non-institutionalized. In particular, we aim to identify the set of disability indicators that 
performs best in explaining home care and institutional care utilization.
Dutch citizens are entitled to publicly financed LTC. Postponing/preventing institution-
alization is an explicit goal of Dutch LTC policy. To reach a desired allocation of public 
resources, an assessment agency has been established to regulate access to public services 
by performing objective, independent and comprehensive assessments. Guidelines have 
been developed to structure this process. These guidelines are based on the International 
Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF), which is used in many countries. 
Next to disability and health, eligibility of individuals is subject to their living situation and 
availability of (in)formal caregivers (van Gameren and Woittiez, 2005; Peeters and Francke, 
2007). Public LTC is not entirely free, because income-related copayments are charged. 
Next to public LTC, citizens can purchase (additional) private LTC. In 2003, 13.5 percent of 
the LTC users consumed private LTC (Jonker et al., 2007).
Manton et al. have investigated the chronic disability trend between 1982 and 2004 in the 
US elderly population. They found a decline in disability and used the relationship between 
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disability and Medicare service use to estimate future Medicare expenditures (Manton, Gu, 
and Lamb, 2006; Manton and Lamb, 2007). They find clear evidence of costs rising with 
disability level and conclude that a continuation of declines in disability rates could be suf-
ficient to keep Medicare financially sustainable.
The majority of previous studies explaining utilization have tended to focus on either 
home care (Kemper, 1992; Knol, Haken, and Kempen, 2003; van Campen and Woittiez, 2003) 
or institutional LTC (Dijkstra, 2001; Pot, Deeg, and Knipscheer, 2001). For the Netherlands, 
three studies have included both types of LTC. Van Campen & van Gameren analyzed the 
use of care packages which differed by intensity of service (van Campen and van Gameren, 
2005). Instead of imposing a hierarchy they estimated a multinomial model in which the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption is crucial. When analyzing LTC 
services this assumption is probably violated because a particular service cannot be equally 
substituted by the remaining services as some are obviously closer substitutes than others. 
Portrait et al. and Geerlings et al. investigated LTC utilization among the elderly included 
in the Longitudinal Aging Study Amsterdam (Portrait, Lindeboom, and Deeg, 1999, 2000; 
Geerlings et al., 2005). Portrait et al. assessed the relationship between five health indicators, 
and utilization. While their purpose is similar, our study focuses more on the relationship 
between utilization and disability since disability appears to be more important for LTC 
than health. Geerlings et al. studied the determinants of transitions in LTC service use, 
including (in)formal home care and institutional care. All three studies found that health, 
disability and age are important predictors of utilization, and of transitions between care 
types.
This study extends the existing evidence in two respects. First, unlike many previous 
studies, it models the probability of home care and institutional LTC use jointly. Home 
care includes publicly or privately financed domestic help, personal care and nursing care 
provided by (in)formal providers. Institutional LTC is defined as a permanent admission 
to a residential or nursing home. Traditionally, residential homes provide living assistance 
only, whereas nursing homes also provide personal care. We aggregated these two types of 
admissions (1) for improved international comparability, as most countries do not make 
this distinction, and (2) because both institutions are converging due to recent policies, e.g. 
patients receive an indication for admission to an institution generally, not specifically to 
a residential or nursing home. Secondly, an ordered response model (ORM) is used that is 
in accordance with the eligibility guidelines which assume a hierarchical ordering of LTC 
services. An ORM is more efficient than a multinomial model, as it assumes a hierarchy in 
the outcomes (Long, 1997). We adopt a more flexible ORM that allows disability to have a 
different impact on the use of each service level; a fixed increase in disability status need not 
increase the odds to require home care or institutional LTC versus no LTC the same way as 
it increases the odds to require institutional LTC versus no LTC or home care.
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3.2 Methods
Data and sample selection
We pooled data from two cross-sectional surveys: the Facilities Use Survey (FUS) 2003 and 
the Elderly in Institutions Survey (EIS) 2004 (GfK, 2004, 2005). The FUS is a population 
survey among private households, whereas the EIS is a survey among the 55+ residents of 
LTC institutions (Jonker et al., 2007). The questionnaires of both surveys were identical 
regarding the variables of interest.
For FUS, households were sampled from a national sample of postal addresses. Of the 
gross sample, 60% of the households participated containing 4982 individuals aged 50+, 
our target population. Item non-response further reduced the sample to 3362 respondents.
The sample selection of EIS consisted of two stages. First, institutions were selected based 
on their capacity. Institutions were stratified by type (residential home, psycho geriatric and 
somatic ward of a nursing home) and district. Second, in all selected institutions a sample 
of 5-7 permanent residents and two reserve samples were randomly selected. In order to 
obtain the desired 1.150 participants, respondents who refused participation were replaced 
by a reserve. A proxy respondent was interviewed when the respondent was not capable to 
answer the questions. In total, 1158 residents participated in EIS, resulting in 792 complete 
cases. The pooled study sample therefore comprised 4154 respondents. In 2004, only 2.4% of 
the Dutch 50+ population lived in an LTC institution, indicating that the institutionalized 
were substantially oversampled (Statistics Netherlands, 2008).
The sample selection and non-response may cause selection bias. Selection is likely 
to cause biased estimates when the selection of a respondent is associated with both the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables (Hernan, Hernandez-Diaz, and Robins, 
2004). In our case, selection is dependent on use by definition since the FUS excluded 
institutionalized while EIS targeted institutionalized. In addition, item non-response was 
dependent on respondent characteristics, especially general health. To correct for selection 
bias, we applied a two-step procedure. First, Horvitz-Thompson (HT) weights were derived 
to correct for selection caused by item non-response (Horvitz and Thompson, 1952). HT 
weighting variables were type of LTC and self-assessed health. Secondly, to generalize the 
results to the Dutch 50+ population, iterative proportional fitting (IPF) was applied to cor-
rect the marginal distribution of key variables in our HT-weighted sample to their equiva-
lent distribution in the Dutch 50+ population (Battaglia et al., 2004; Bethlehem, 2008). The 
IPF weighting variables are age*sex*marital status, type of institution and province. IPF 
weights were calculated with the SAS raking macro (Izrael, David, and Battaglia, 2004). 
Final weights were obtained by multiplying the HT and IPF weights.
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Variables
Three types of LTC services could be distinguished: informal home care, formal home care 
and permanently institutionalized. In accordance with the eligibility guidelines, we as-
sumed a hierarchy going from no LTC, to home care to institutional care. According to the 
eligibility guidelines, health and disability should be the primary determinants of LTC use. 
We added socio-demographic and socio-economic determinants to evaluate their influence 
on use. This selection of determinants corresponds to the individual determinants included 
in the Health Behavior Model (Andersen and Newman, 2005).
Because our focus is on the relationship with disability, we describe its indicators in more 
detail. The disability indicators used were iADL (Lawton and Brody, 1969), ADL (Katz et 
al., 1963), mobility, and being hampered in daily activities by chronic conditions, all self-
reported. Table 3.1 describes responses by item and answer categories. Only respondents 
reporting inability to perform an activity independently were considered to be disabled for 
this activity.
Table 3.1 Results polychoric PCA - contribution of individual items to disability score
Disability Item
Able to perform 
without difficulty
Able to perform 
with difficulty
Not able to perform 
/ only with help
Hampered in daily activities -0.11 0.16 0.33
iADL
daily shopping -0.08 0.28 0.46
preparing hot meals -0.07 0.25 0.40
cleaning the bed -0.10 0.23 0.43
doing laundry -0.08 0.23 0.39
light housework -0.06 0.32 0.48
heavy housework -0.15 0.14 0.35
paying bills -0.06 0.24 0.37
ADL
getting in / out of bed -0.06 0.36 0.64
(un)dressing oneself -0.06 0.36 0.60
washing face and hands -0.02 0.50 0.66
washing oneself completely -0.04 0.40 0.56
toileting -0.03 0.47 0.66
Mobility
getting up / sitting down -0.06 0.35 0.64
walking one flight of stairs -0.09 0.27 0.49
walking 10 min -0.07 0.30 0.50
leaving / entering house -0.04 0.41 0.59
moving outdoors -0.07 0.33 0.54
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One important choice was whether to combine the large number of disability indicators 
into a single composite index. On the one hand, ease of interpretation, parsimony and the 
intention to simulate future LTC needs favoured the construction of a single index. On the 
other hand, a higher explanatory power, and a better insight for policy makers and caregivers 
favoured the use of separate disability indicators. To meet demands for both, we present two 
models. Our disability index includes all items listed in table 3.1. It was constructed by means 
of a polychoric principal component analysis (PCA), which is more appropriate for ordinal 
variables by allowing for non-linearity in the scale of the individual items (Kolenikov and 
Ángeles, 2004). The index was rescaled from 0 (not disabled) to 10 (severely disabled).
Cognitive impairment has been demonstrated to be a main determinant of institutional 
care (Weaver et al., 2009). Because cognitive functioning is part of mental functioning, it is 
measured only crudely by the indicator of ‘psychological problems’.
Model specification
To exploit the hierarchy in services, an ordered response model (ORM) is used, like the 
ordered logit or the proportional odds model (Long, 1997). It assumes a continuous latent 
variable Y* and a set of threshold values (j) linking the M ordered outcomes to Y*. The 
probability that Y>j for individual i can be written as:
Pr (Yi > j) = 
exp (Xiβ)
1 + exp (Xiβ)
, j = 1,2,...,M-1
Central to the ordered logit model is the parallel regression assumption (PRA), which 
assumes that the coefficients of the explanatory variables are identical across all possible 
dichotomizations of the outcome variable, i.e. the β’s do not vary depending on the thresh-
olds. In practice the PRA is often violated. Ignoring these violations may result in biased 
estimates and overlooking important differences in the relationship between explanatory 
variables at different threshold levels. As the PRA is often not violated by all explanatory 
variables we chose a model which relaxes the PRA only for the explanatory variables that do 
violate it: the partial proportional odds (PPO) model (Williams, 2006).
If, for instance, only one variable, X3, violates the PRA, then its coefficient is estimated for 
each threshold, and therefore receives a subscript j. The probability that Y>j for individual i 
in a PPO model can then be written as:
Pr (Yi > j) = 
exp (X1iβ1 + X2iβ2 + X3iβ3j)
1 + exp(X1iβ1 + X2iβ2 + X3iβ3j)
, j = 1,2,...,M-1
In our model M=3, resulting in two coefficients to be estimated for each variable that vio-
lates the PRA.
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3.3 Results
Sample
The selection issue is clear from a comparison of the characteristics of the weighted and 
unweighted samples in Table 3.2. The unweighted sample overrepresents the institutional-
ized population, and therefore shows a higher proportion of females and respondents living 
alone, who were less wealthy, more disabled and use more LTC services. The last three col-
umns of table 3.2 describe the population stratified by LTC service. Of the weighted sample 
of institutional residents, 78.3% was admitted to a residential home, 10.5% to a somatic ward 
and 11.3% to a PG ward. Moving from no LTC to home care to institutional care, an increas-
ing proportion of the population is female, living alone, older, has a lower socio-economic 
status, and reports worse health and disability status.
Disability Index
Table 3.1 displays the latent score coefficients of the PCA. The non-linear increase in the co-
efficients per item confirms the appropriateness of using a polychoric PCA. The coefficients 
show an increasing pattern with negative coefficients for ‘no disability’. ADL disabilities are 
generally most severe, followed by mobility and iADL disabilities, with hampered in daily 
activities being the mildest disability. The average disability score is 2.3, ranging from 1.6 
for respondents not using LTC to 6.5 for institutionalized respondents; 48% reported no 
disability at all.
Determinants of LTC Use
Table 3.3 shows both models for LTC use: model 1 includes the disaggregated disability 
indicators, model 2 the disability index. For variables violating the PRA, one coefficient for 
each threshold is estimated.
In both models, only a minority of determinants violate the PRA. The Wald test indicates 
that the model is not too restricted by assuming that the PRA is not violated by all determi-
nants. The pseudo R²’s are quite high (around 0.50). While including extensive information 
on disability and health, the age variables still jointly significantly determine use (p=0.000; 
not in table 3.3). General health, on the other hand, appears to influence use only margin-
ally, once disability is controlled for.
In model 1 all disability indicators show a significant influence on utilization. The pres-
ence of iADL, ADL, and/or mobility increases the probability of using a higher level of care. 
In addition, the number of disabilities also matters as most coefficients of the indicators 
increase with the number of reported iADL, ADL and mobility problems. However, the 
effect of a first disability is substantially higher than that of additional disabilities.
As logit coefficients do not allow for a direct interpretation of the size of the effects, we 
have computed the average partial effects (table 3.4; Wooldridge, 2002). A partial effect 
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Table 3.2 Description of the study sample stratified by LTC utilization
Total sample
(unweighted)
Total sample
(weighted)
No LTC
(weighted)
N=3.499
Home care
(weighted)
N=555
Institutional 
care
(weighted)
N=100
Socio-demographics
 Sex (male=1) 43.9% 46.2% 50.0% 25.7% 25.8%
 Age 67.1 ± 12.6 64.6 ± 10.8 62.4 ± 9.3 74.7 ± 10.7 85.5 ± 7.0
 Household composition
 Living together 70.5% 71.2% 78.4% 32.8% 32.0%
 Living alone widowed 19.0% 14.8% 8.5% 48.7% 48.2%
 Living alone other reason 10.6% 17.0% 13.1% 18.5% 19.8%
Socio-economics
 At least middle education 34.7% 38.3% 41.6% 21.7% 13.5%
 Income per month* 1435 ± 666 1482 ± 702 1532 ± 720 1230 ± 551 1105 ± 269
Health & Sensory problems
 Self-assessed health
 (Very) Poor 4.7% 3.3% 1.7% 11.5% 15.3%
 Fair 20.9% 20.0% 15.3% 45.9% 42.8%
 Good 49.0% 50.5% 53.0% 36.9% 39.0%
 Very good 25.4% 26.1% 30.0% 5.7% 2.9%
 Nr of physical chronic diseases 1.7 ± 1.9 1.6 ± 1.9 1.3 ± 1.6 3.0 ± 2.3 3.1 ± 2.2
 Psychological problems† 11.8% 8.0% 6.8% 13.3% 24.0%
 Hospitalization last year 12.8% 12.3% 9.7% 26.8% 22.0%
 Hearing limitation 9.5% 8.0% 7.0% 12.6% 16.8%
 Vision limitation 13.9% 9.9% 8.0% 17.7% 31.7%
Disability status
 Hampered in daily activities 38.2% 31.8% 24.5% 68.8% 83.1%
 Prevalence iADL disability 24.8% 15.5% 6.1% 62.0% 84.8%
 Number of iADL disabilities+ 3.9 ± 2.3 2.6 ± 2.0 2.0 ± 1.7 2.5 ± 1.8 4.5 ± 2.0
 Prevalence ADL disability 14.3% 3.2% 0.6% 8.9% 62.6%
 Number of ADL disabilities+ 2.9 ± 1.6 2.2 ± 1.4 1.8 ± 1.1 2.0 ± 1.2 2.6 ± 1.6
 Prevalence mobility disability 18.9% 7.3% 2.1% 27.7% 78.1%
 Number of mobility 
disabilities+
3.1 ± 1.5 2.3 ± 1.3 1.8 ± 0.9 2.1 ± 1.1 3.1 ± 1.4
 Disability Index > 0 56.4% 51.8% 43.7% 94.2% 99.8%
 Disability Index Score 3.6 ± 0.1 2.3 ± 2.3 1.6 ± 1.7 3.7 ± 2.5 6.5 ± 2.6
* Net equivalent household income per month (equivalence factor: √household members) 
†  Indicator variable: (1) if respondent has psychological chronic condition, is a resident of PG ward nursing 
home, or has contacted mental health care institution in last year 
+ Conditional on prevalence
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Table 3.3 Models LTC with disaggregated disability indicators (model 1) and disability index (model 2)
MODEL 1 MODEL 2
Threshold 1
No LTC vs HC/IC
Threshold 2
No LTC/HC vs IC
Threshold 1
No LTC vs HC/IC
Threshold 2
No LTC/HC vs IC
β (z-value) β (z-value) β (z-value) β (z-value)
Socio-demographics
 Sex (male=1) -2.060 (-1.92) -2.658* (-2.48)
 Age -0.123 (-1.23) -0.056 (-0.50) -0.111 (-1.14) -0.024 (-0.23)
 Age² 0.001 (1.92) 0.001 (1.75)
 Age * Sex 0.023 (1.57) 0.030* (2.05)
 Household composition
 Living alone widowed 1.825*** (8.76) -0.269 (-1.00) 1.881*** (9.25) -0.206 (-0.80)
 Living alone other reason 1.421*** (6.72) 1.383*** (6.59)
Socio-economics
 At least middle education -0.456* (-2.29) -0.262 (-1.40)
 Income per month (x €1000) -0.028 (-0.20) 0.010 (0.08)
Health & Sensory problems
 Self-assessed health
 (Very) Poor -0.034 (-0.08) -0.066 (-0.16)
 Fair 0.736* (2.36) 0.127 (0.35) 0.497 (1.68)
 Good 0.290 (1.16) 0.132 (0.52)
 Nr of physical chronic diseases 0.036 (0.86) 0.052 (1.28)
 Psychological problems 0.793*** (3.47) 0.711** (3.22)
 Hospitalization 0.821*** (3.74) -0.057 (-0.16) 0.871*** (3.93) 0.199 (0.65)
 Hearing limitation -1.243*** (-4.17) -1.107*** (-4.06)
 Vision limitation -0.301 (-1.40) -0.433* (-2.07)
Disability status
 Hampered in daily activities 1.017*** (5.29)
 1 iADL problem 1.731*** (8.02) 0.680 (1.92)
 2 – 3 iADL problems 1.842*** (6.72)
 4 – 7 iADL problems 1.721*** (4.86)
 1 ADL problem 1.188* (2.51)
 2 – 3 ADL problems 0.967* (2.12)
 4 – 5 ADL problems 2.210** (3.05)
 1 Mobility problem 0.690* (2.41)
 2 – 3 Mobility problems 0.803* (2.22)
 4 – 5 Mobility problems 1.538* (2.47)
 Prevalence disability 1.210*** (4.37)
 Disability Index Score 0.459*** (11.03)
Constant -2.032 (-0.59) -9.796* (-2.22) -2.693 (-0.80) -12.159** (-2.82)
N 4154 4154
Mc Fadden’s Pseudo R² 0.51 0.49
Log pseudolikelihood -1027 -1075
Wald test for (p-value) 0.29 0.07
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; Weighted estimates
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Table 3.4 Average partial effects per LTC service estimated by model 1 & model 2
Average partial effects
Model 1
Aggregated disability measures
Model 2
Disability index
No LTC Home care Institutional care No LTC Home care
Institutional
care
Socio-demographics
 Sex (male=1) 0.025 -0.023 -0.002 0.033 -0.031 -0.002
 Age (females) -0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.003
 Age (males) -0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.005 0.003 0.003
 Household composition
 Living alone widowed -0.133 0.136 -0.003 -0.146 0.149 -0.003
 Living alone other reason -0.095 0.072 0.023 -0.098 0.073 0.025
Socio-economics
 At least middle education 0.027 -0.022 -0.005 0.017 -0.013 -0.004
 Income per month (per €1000) -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000
Health & Sensory problems
 Self-assessed health
 (Very) Poor
 Fair
 Good
0.002
-0.046
-0.017
-0.002
0.044
0.013
-0.000
0.001
0.004
0.004
-0.032
-0.008
-0.003
0.025
0.006
-0.001
0.007
0.002
 Nr of physical chronic diseases -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.003 0.000
 Psychological problems -0.054 0.042 0.011 -0.046 0.036 0.010
 Hospitalization -0.055 0.056 -0.000 -0.056 0.053 0.003
 Hearing limitation 0.063 -0.050 -0.013 0.072 -0.055 -0.016
 Vision limitation 0.017 -0.014 -0.004 0.028 -0.022 -0.006
Disability status
 Hampered in daily activities -0.067 0.056 0.012
 1 iADL problem -0.147 0.141 0.006
 2 – 3 iADL problems -0.160 0.135 0.025
 4 – 7 iADL problems -0.146 0.124 0.022
 1 ADL problem -0.089 0.070 0.019
 2 – 3 ADL problems -0.070 0.056 0.014
 4 – 5 ADL problems -0.194 0.149 0.045
 1 Mobility problem -0.048 0.039 0.008
 2 – 3 Mobility problems -0.057 0.047 0.011
 4 – 5 Mobility problems -0.123 0.098 0.025
 Prevalence disability -0.078 0.061 0.018
 Disability Score (0 – 10) -0.029 0.023 0.006
Partial effect continuous variables: the effect of one unit change of the explanatory variable on the probability 
to use each type of LTC. 
Partial effect discrete and indicator variables: the effect of a change from 0 to 1 on the probability to use each 
type of LTC. For indicator variables: partial effect with respect to the reference category
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is the change in the predicted probability by a one unit change in the explanatory vari-
able. It depends on both the coefficient and the threshold estimates, and was evaluated for 
each individual and then averaged across the weighted sample distribution. Respondents 
hampered in daily activities have a 6.7% higher probability of using LTC than respondents 
not hampered in daily activities, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, respondents who reported 
one iADL, ADL or mobility problem had on average a 14.1%, 7.0% and 3.9% higher prob-
ability of using home care, respectively and a 0.0%, 1.9% and 0.1% higher probability of 
being institutionalized, than someone who did not report these disabilities. To illustrate 
the effect of additional disabilities: respondents who reported one, two to three or more 
mobility problems had respectively a 4.8%, 5.7% and 12.3% higher probability to use LTC 
than those not reporting mobility problems. The partial effects for institutional care are 
substantially lower because the additional ‘need’ required for home care is much smaller 
than that required for using institutional rather than home care.
Concerning general health, respondents with psychological problems had a significantly 
higher probability of using more intensive services. A hospitalization is associated with a 
5.6% higher probability of using home care but not with institutionalization. Interestingly, 
respondents with hearing problems had a significantly lower probability of using more 
intensive services.
Regarding socio-demographics, the partial effect for home care (institutional care) of a 
one year increase in age is 0.3% (0.2%) for both males and females. Widow(er)s living alone 
had a 13.6% higher probability of home care but no higher probability of being institutional-
ized. Other respondents living alone had a 7.2% (2.3%) higher probability on using home 
care (institutional care). More education resulted in a 2.2% (0.5%) lower probability of using 
home care (institutional care).
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Figure 3.1 Relationship between disability index and use stratified by type of LTC
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In model 2, almost the same determinants influence utilization. Variables violating the 
PRA are identical and the partial effects are similar. Unsurprisingly, the disability index has 
a very large and significant influence on utilization. Respondents with at least one disability 
had a 6.1% (1.8%) higher probability of using home care (institutional care). Additionally, 
those with a one point higher disability score had a 2.3% (0.6%) higher probability on using 
home care (institutional care). Figure 3.1 presents the probability of use as a function of dis-
ability, holding everything else constant. The probability of no use decreases fairly linearly 
with level of disability while the probability of using institutional LTC increases. With an 
increasing disability score the likelihood of using home care first increases, then decreases. 
At the maximum, respondents with a disability score of 6 have a 60% chance of using home 
care. For the more disabled, the probability to use home care decreases, instead their prob-
ability to be institutionalized increases. Respondents with a disability score higher than 
8.5 are more likely to be institutionalized than to use home care. To illustrate this level of 
disability: an individual with a disability score of 8.5 is hampered in daily activities, disabled 
in all iADL activities, and disabled in 4 out of 10 ADL/mobility activities.
3.4 Discussion
We have examined the determinants of LTC utilization among the Dutch middle-aged and 
elderly population. Our approach goes beyond earlier efforts in a number of respects. First, 
we were able to pool two data sets – one of independently living and one of institutionalized 
individuals – with identical questions for the variables of interest, resulting in a data set 
including institutional care and home care use as well as extensive disability information. 
Secondly, we use a partial proportional odds model to quantify the influence of the determi-
nants of two levels of LTC use, thereby exploiting the underlying hierarchy of services. The 
crucial assumption of a hierarchy in service use is in accordance with Dutch LTC policy and 
the eligibility guidelines. Third, we scrutinised a range of disability indicators, optimized the 
mix of disability indicators for explaining utilization, and compared this to a model using a 
single disability index. Finally, we selected the most appropriate model among the ordered 
models, as only a few of the explanatory variables violated the PRA.
Our findings are as follows. First, even after controlling extensively for disability, age 
remains an important driver of LTC use. Second, next to age, self-reported disability is the 
other important determinant of LTC use. The more parsimonious model using the single 
composite index was only marginally less powerful in explaining LTC use, indicating that 
the disability index sufficiently captures the disaggregated components. Third, both the 
prevalence and additional disabilities were found to influence utilization, but the presence 
of at least one disability displays a greater effect than any additional disabilities. Fourth, 
and not unexpectedly, the average level of disability required to move into home care is 
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considerably lower than the average level required to move from home care to an institu-
tion. Finally, after appropriate control for disability, general health hardly affected LTC use.
Recent studies found that the effect of age on LTC utilization decreases considerably – but 
does not vanish completely – when accounting for proximity-to-death, which presumably 
acts as a proxy for morbidity/disability (Payne et al., 2007;Weaver et al., 2009;Werblow, 
Felder, and Zweifel, 2007). In our study, age also remains one of the main drivers of LTC 
utilization, even after extensively controlling for disability and health. Consequently, as 
other studies have claimed before, we anticipate that LTC needs of aging populations will 
keep increasing regardless of trends in disability by age. However, because we found that 
disability is also an important driver of LTC use in its own right, it still provides an op-
portunity for policymakers since disability trends can be influenced.
The model and disability index can be useful for a number of purposes under the as-
sumption that the causal relationships correspond with the estimated associations. First, by 
exploiting the hierarchy in LTC, our model provides a more informative forecast of future 
LTC needs based on scenario’s for developments in demography and disability. When doing 
so, it is important to bear in mind that not only individual determinants, but also health care 
organizational features (e.g. the eligibility criteria, informal care availability, and waiting 
lists) co-determine utilization (Andersen and Newman, 2005). Nonetheless, when reliable 
forecasts of disability rates are available, models such as ours can prove useful for forecast-
ing LTC needs.
In interpreting the results of this study, the limitations of the data are to be born in mind. 
The use of cross-sectional data variation does not allow to interpret the partial effects of the 
determinants as causal effects.
While our findings clearly and to a considerable extent reflect the eligibility criteria 
used by the assessment agency, the models do not merely replicate the rules. First, they 
are guidelines which still leave room for discretionary decision making. For example, they 
allow the agency’s decision makers to apply a personal set of weights to all criteria, and they 
allow personal judgment to influence the categorization of dysfunction. Second, part of the 
decision power remains with the individual, e.g. the decision to contact the agency and to 
consume LTC care not indicated by the agency, thereby leaving room for care preferences on 
the demand side. We believe that the independent needs assessment and the use of eligibility 
guidelines has made LTC use in the Netherlands relatively insensitive to provider incentives 
and patient incomes. As a result, the allocation of LTC services appears to occur largely 
according to need. This is an important result also for other countries facing rising LTC 
service needs resulting in demand exceeding supply. Clearly, the finding that low income 
does not appear to be a barrier to utilization is likely to be related to the universal coverage 
of LTC use in the Netherlands and this might not necessarily hold for countries without 
such extensive coverage.
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Recognizing that disability proves to be a key determinant of LTC use in the Netherlands, 
policies which aim to achieve a compression of the burden of disability would contribute to 
the alleviation of the societal consequences of population aging.
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Abstract
In view of population aging, better understanding of what drives long-term care expendi-
ture (LTCE) is warranted. Time-to-death (TTD) has commonly been used to project LTCE 
because it was a better predictor than age. We reconsider the roles of age and TTD by con-
trolling for disability and co-residence and illustrate their relevance for projecting LTCE.
We analyze spending on institutional and home care for the entire Dutch 55+ population, 
conditioning on age, sex, TTD, cause-of-death and co-residence. We further examined 
home care expenditures for a sample of non-institutionalized conditioning additionally on 
disability.
Those living alone or deceased from diabetes, mental illness, stroke, respiratory or digestive 
disease have higher LTCE, while a cancer death is associated with lower expenditures. TTD 
no longer determines home care expenditures when disability is controlled for. This suggests 
that TTD largely approximates disability. Nonetheless, further standardization of disability 
measurement is required before disability could replace TTD in LTCE projections models.
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4.1 Introduction
Long-term care (LTC) is provided when individuals experience disability and/or chronic 
disease and is often required from the onset of such conditions for the remaining lifetime. 
Consequently, the great majority of LTC is used by the middle-aged and elderly. In 2005, 
the Dutch 55+ population accounted for 88 percent of public LTC expenditures (LTCE) 
on home care and institutional LTC. Given the rapid rise in the proportion of elderly 
and their high LTC use rates, population aging is expected to accelerate LTCE growth in 
developed countries in the next decades. Considering this increased pressure on the LTC 
sector, improved understanding of the factors that determine LTC use and expenditure is 
of utmost importance to enable more accurate projections of the need for such services, 
and to develop adequate policies to alleviate the pressure that population aging places on 
healthcare budgets.
Given that both acute and LTC expenditures rise with age, no controversy exists that 
the expected growth in healthcare expenditures (HCE) can to some extent be attributed 
to population aging (Pezzin, Kemper, and Reschovsky, 1996; Yang, Norton, and Stearns, 
2003; Comas-Herrera et al., 2007). But because the most rapid growth in elderly cohorts 
has still to occur, it is of interest to identify the relative contribution of population aging. 
The literature on this subject seems to have concluded that the proclaimed effect of age on 
HCE is a ‘red herring’ – i.e. a distraction away from the ‘true driver’ of HCE: time-to-death 
(TTD; see Payne et al. 2007 for a review). A consensus has emerged that TTD and not 
age determines expenditures on acute care, whereas both determine LTCE (Yang, Norton, 
and Stearns, 2003; Comas-Herrera et al., 2007; Werblow, Felder, and Zweifel, 2007). The 
inclusion of TTD is therefore advocated in models used to explain and project acute and 
LTC expenditures.
This study reconsiders the role of TTD in LTCE models. First, while inclusion of TTD 
in LTCE models usually raises explanatory power, TTD models still do not adequately 
represent the actual causes of spending. It is not TTD itself but the degree of disability 
experienced in the period before death which drives the demand for LTC. This suggests that 
TTD itself is also a ‘red herring’ if it merely acts as a proxy for disability. Second, the contri-
bution of aging to future growth in LTCE largely depends on the trend in the period lived 
with disability, i.e. whether a compression, expansion or postponement of disability prevails 
(Fries, 1980; Payne et al., 2007).1 While some of the recent evidence supports a compression 
of disability, in the sense of a compression of the number of absolute years lived with dis-
ability (Manton, Gu, and Lamb, 2006; Payne et al., 2007), TTD models implicitly assume a 
postponement of the absolute years of life lived with disability. They assume that longevity 
1 This paper concentrates on trends in disability instead of morbidity because that is the main driver of LTC use 
(de Meijer et al., 2009), while morbidity explains especially acute care expenditures.
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gains merely shift the period lived with disability to higher ages, while its duration remains 
constant. Relying on TTD models to project LTCE may then lead to biased projections be-
cause the relationship between TTD and disability is dynamic, rather than constant. Third, 
many studies have failed to correct for the endogeneity of TTD which is partly caused by 
omitting disability (e.g. Zweifel, Felder, and Werblow, 2004; Felder, Werblow, and Zweifel, 
2010). Accounting for disability therefore mitigates this endogeneity bias. Clearly, previous 
studies have included TTD because disability data were lacking. Given improved data avail-
ability, we are able to reconsider the roles of both TTD and age in generating LTCE.
Our main objective is to further clarify to what extent aging increases LTCE by dis-
entangling the roles of age, TTD and disability in explaining LTCE. Our approach goes 
beyond earlier efforts in a number of respects. First, access to population data on public 
LTC enables us to examine the determinants of LTCE for the entire Dutch 55+ population. 
We separately model total LTCE, institutional and home care expenditures. Second, next 
to the determinants usually included in expenditure models, our data allow us to examine 
the influence of cause-of-death (COD) and co-residence status on LTCE. COD information 
makes it possible to investigate the role of TTD by disease group which is likely to differ as 
the disabling impact and duration of diseases greatly varies. Considering future trends in 
epidemiology, this addition will allow for better projections of LTCE. Co-residence status, 
like TTD, is associated with age and LTCE. Its inclusion is important because it is a proxy 
for another important determinant: informal care availability (Sundström, 1992). Informal 
care potentially substitutes for home care and generally postpones LTC admissions (van 
Houtven and Norton, 2004; Bonsang, 2009). Third, for a representative sample of the non-
institutionalized Dutch population, we can take the analysis of home care expenditures one 
step further and condition also on morbidity and disability. Our analysis sheds new light 
on the consequences of population aging for LTCE through a re-examination of the relative 
roles of age and TTD. Although age and TTD are often found to be key predictors of LTCE, 
neither of them are causes of LTCE in and of themselves, but merely act as proxies for 
disability. They may even become redundant in explaining LTCE after appropriate control 
for disability. Finally, LTCE projections based on trends in demographics, co-residence and 
disability illustrate the usefulness of our models, in particular, by demonstrating the bias 
introduced when using TTD to approximate disability.
4.2 Demand for public LTC in the Netherlands
In this chapter, LTC services include all publicly financed institutional LTC or formal home 
care, except home care financed by a personal care budget (PCB). With a PCB a patient 
receives a cash benefit to purchase LTC services directly instead of receiving these services 
as benefits-in-kind – i.e. when the insurer is responsible for the delivery of LTC by the 
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provider of the patient’s choice. Institutional LTC includes both temporary and permanent 
admissions to residential and nursing homes. Residential homes merely provide assistance 
with domestic tasks, whereas nursing homes also provide personal and nursing care. Insti-
tutional LTC accounts for 70% of total LTC spending. Formal home care services include 
domestic care, personal care and nursing care. Consequently, the following LTC services are 
not considered: privately financed LTC, publicly financed home care by a PCB and informal 
LTC. Informal care availability is approximated by co-residence status. Overall, our analysis 
includes the bulk of public LTC expenditure.2
All Dutch citizens are entitled to public LTC currently covered under the Exceptional Medi-
cal Expenses Act and the Social Support Act.3 Public resources are allocated by an agency that 
regulates access to public LTC by performing objective, independent and comprehensive 
assessments. Guidelines – based on the International Classification of Functioning, Dis-
ability and Health (World Health Organisation, 2001) – have been developed to structure 
this process. Next to functioning, disability and health, the guidelines take into account the 
living situation and informal care availability (van Gameren and Woittiez, 2005; Peeters and 
Francke, 2007). Public LTC is not entirely free of charge; an income-related copayment is 
charged. Note that the institutional alternatives – nursing and residential homes – are mutu-
ally exclusive while the different home care services are not and the decision to use either one 
or a combination of different home care services is determined simultaneously (van Houtven 
and Norton, 2004). Once considered eligible, individuals choose whether to receive this as a 
benefit-in-kind or as a PCB. Recall that we are only modeling the former services.
4.3 Data and methods
We first analyze total LTC, institutional LTC and home care expenditures for the entire 
Dutch 55+ population, conditional on age, sex, TTD, COD, and co-residence.4 Next, we 
examine home care expenditures for a random sample of the non-institutionalized 55+ 
population, conditioning additionally on morbidity and disability information. In the re-
mainder of this chapter we will refer to these distinct models as the ‘population model’ and 
the ‘extended home care model’.
2 PCB-financed LTCE account for 5-10% of public home care expenditures (Ministry of Health Welfare and 
Sports, 2006). Institutional LTC is hardly ever paid out of pocket in the Netherlands, privately financed LTC 
therefore only constitutes a relevant alternative for home care; 1.4% of the 30+ population and 13.5% of the LTC 
users consumed private home care in 2003 (Jonker et al., 2007).
3 The Social Support Act is implemented in 2007; coverage of domestic care and domestic help has shifted from 
the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act to the Social Support Act and access to these services is currently regula-
ted by local governments.
4 We restrict our attention to this sub-population, as these are the ones who need LTC. As noted above, in 2005, 
the 55+ population account for 88 percent of the LTCE in The Netherlands.
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Data
Population model
Three data sources linked at the individual level are used: the Registration of the Administra-
tive Office Exceptional Medical Expenses 2004, the Death Causes Registration 2004-2007 
and the Municipality Register 1998-2006. These three national registrations register (a) the 
use and amount of public LTC, (b) TTD and COD, and (c) several household and individual 
characteristics, respectively. COD is classified according to the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD-10). All citizens aged 55 to 90 in 2004 with complete information on co-
residence status are selected. This excludes less than 0.5%, mainly those who had moved into 
an institution before 1998.5
Extended home care model
The General Survey of Living Conditions (POLS), which includes a detailed Health Survey, 
is also linked to the datasets described above. POLS is an annual cross-sectional survey 
among a random sample of the non-institutionalized population. We included all individu-
als participating in the Health Surveys of 2004 and 2005. POLS respondents were sampled 
in two stages. First, municipalities were randomly sampled, with the selection probability 
weighted according to their population size. Second, individuals were randomly selected 
from the sampled municipalities. Of these sampled individuals, 63% agreed to participate 
in the original Health Survey of which 5534 individuals were aged 55+. Item non-response 
reduced the sample to 4176. We refer to this sample as the Health Survey sample.
Due to item and unit non-response the Health Survey sample was on average younger 
and further away from death than the Dutch independently living 55+ population. We 
reweighted the Health Survey sample. Weights were derived to correct the joint distribution 
of the weighting variables in the Health Survey sample to the distribution of the Dutch 
independently living 55+ population (Horvitz and Thompson, 1952). Weighting variables 
were age, sex, co-residence and TTD. These weights were used in all analyses presented.
Dependent variables
We transform administrative data on annual expenditures on total LTC, institutional LTC 
and home care into average monthly expenditures.6 This approach enables the inclusion of 
those deceased during the measurement year7, while correcting for the fact that expenditures 
of these decedents are observed for less than an entire year. Average monthly expenditures 
5 The excluded observations were on average older, more often female and closer to death. Because this selective 
drop-out comprises less than 0.5% of the population, it is unlikely to have affected our results.
6 Similarly to O’Neill et al. (2000) in an analysis of GP care costs in England.
7 The measurement year of expenditure is 2004 for the population models and 2004 or 2005 in the extended home 
care model as this pools those cross-sections of the Health Survey.
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for those who survived the measurement year are computed by dividing annual expen-
ditures by 12. For those who died during the measurement year, yearly expenditures are 
divided by the days alive in the measurement year and multiplied by 366/12 to approximate 
average monthly expenditures.8
Total LTCE consist of the sum of institutional LTC and home care expenditures. Prices 
of admission days in a residential and nursing home were taken from Oostenbrink et al. 
(2004). Three different types of nursing home wards could be distinguished: somatic, psy-
cho-geriatric and mixed wards. All three types of nursing home admissions are substantially 
more expensive than a residential home admission. We used recent approximations of the 
amount of use of somatic, psycho-geriatric and mixed wards and their relative price differ-
ences to estimate separate service prices for these three different types of nursing home use. 
Concerning home care, maximum hour tariffs per home care service for 2004 were used 
as unit prices to compute home care expenditures. These tariffs are set by the Dutch Care 
Authority and are commonly employed by home care providers to set their prices.
Selection of determinants
The Dutch institutional context and findings of previous studies determined our selection 
of covariates. TTD is measured by an indicator of survival status, i.e. whether the individual 
is alive 3 years after the measurement year, and a continuous variable measuring TTD in 
months from 1 January of the measurement year (censored at 48 for survivors) and its square. 
Given the eligibility guidelines used by the needs assessment agency, informal care availabil-
ity, morbidity and disability are expected to be strongly associated with use. Informal care 
availability is proxied by co-residence status, measured at 1 January of the measurement year 
for non-institutionalized individuals and at the month preceding institutionalization for 
institutionalized individuals. As previous studies reported evidence of interactions between 
age, sex and TTD and TTD and co-residence (Seshamani and Gray, 2004c; Werblow, Felder, 
and Zweifel, 2007; Weaver et al., 2009), we also included these interactions. We further 
included interactions between co-residence and age/sex. Informal care availability might 
differentially affect LTCE for males and females due to differences in opportunity costs and 
ability to provide adequate care. Furthermore, the effect of co-residence may decline with 
age as elderly become less able to provide adequate care. COD is the only morbidity proxy 
available for the population models. Although its effect on LTCE has not been investigated, 
COD is proved to significantly influence hospital expenditures (Seshamani and Gray, 2004c). 
We categorize COD based on prevalence: cancer, diabetes, mental disease (95% Alzheimer’s 
disease), cardiovascular disease (CVD), respiratory diseases, digestive diseases, and other. 
8 This approach yields an overestimation of average monthly expenditures for decedents in 2004 that used LTC 
because the effect of TTD on expenditures is not linear. We prefer this limitation to not being able to include 
decedents of 2004. We checked robustness and models using as dependent variable the expenditures incurred 
during the full year of 2004 (excluding decedents in 2004) returned very similar estimated effects of covariates.
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CVD is divided further into cerebrovascular accident (CVA) and other CVD because CVA 
is associated with a higher burden of disability. The reference category is an external cause 
of mortality, mainly traffic and work-related accidents. Interactions between COD and TTD 
are included to account for the differential impact of TTD by disease category. This interac-
tion also approximates the effect of the severity/stage of the disease on LTCE.
A much broader range of morbidity and disability indicators is available for the Health 
Survey sample. We included the following morbidity indicators: self-reported health, men-
tal health, having a chronic condition, and hospitalized in the preceding 5 years. Disability 
is measured by activities of daily living (ADL; Katz et al., 1963), mobility, and limitations in 
daily activities by chronic conditions. Education and equivalent household income are in-
cluded as measures of socio-economic status because income-related copayments for public 
LTC push some higher income users into private LTC. Because of smaller sample size, we 
did not include COD. All covariates apart from TTD, age, sex, co-residence and income 
were self-reported. For a more detailed description of the covariates, see appendix 4.1.
Model specification
We use a two-part model – which is commonly selected to analyze HCE (Jones, 2000) – to 
model average monthly LTCE as a function of personal characteristics. This model accounts 
for the high proportion of non-users (84%) by separately analyzing the decision to use LTC 
(I) and the level of expenditures conditional on having any (II).9 Part I is a probit that 
models the probability of using LTC:
Pr (LTCEij > 0 | Xi) = Φ (β1j Xi)
for individual i and type of LTC j, with j=1 (total LTC, population), 2 (institutional LTC, 
population), 3 (home care, population), 4 (home care, Health Survey sample). Φ represents 
the cumulative standard normal distribution, β1 a vector of parameters to be estimated and 
Xi a vector of covariates. Part II models the level of expenditures conditional on having 
any. We followed the procedure proposed by Manning and Mullahy (2001) to select the 
most appropriate model for part II. We detected heteroskedasticity and skewness in the 
residuals from ordinary least squares (OLS) models on the logarithm of expenditures in all 
cases. Hence, log OLS models with a homoskedastic smearing factor to retransform logged 
expenditures back to its raw scale would lead to biased predictions of means and partial 
effects. Alternatives are to use heteroskedastic smearing factors, or to use generalized linear 
models (GLM) that avoid the retransformation problem altogether. We used Box-Cox tests 
and Modified Park tests to select, respectively, the link function and the family of GLM 
that best suited our data. The preferred GLM specification was one with power link and 
9 See Jones (2000) for a more complete discussion of the relative merits of the two-part model.
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gamma family, for all types of expenditures. This specification outperformed OLS as well 
as log OLS with heteroskedastic retransformation according to mean-squared errors and 
modified Hosmer-Lemeshow statistics. The preferred GLM model specifies the conditional 
mean expenditures as:
E (LTCEij  | LTCEij > 0, Xi) = λ  β2j Xi +1,
where β2 is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and λ the Box-Cox transformation pa-
rameter. The conditional variance as a function of the mean is specified as:
V (LTCEij  | LTCEij > 0, Xi) = E(LTCEij | LTCEij > 0, Xi)²,
i.e. the standard deviation is proportional to the mean.10 The expected value of expenditures 
combines parts I and II in the following way:
E (LTCEij  | Xi )  = Φ (β1j, Xi) *= λ  β2j Xi +1,
where Φ() is the probability given by part I and the last term is the expected level of expen-
ditures estimated by part II. We included the same covariates in part I and part II of the 
model.
Endogeneity
TTD and co-residence status may be endogenous to the level of LTCE. Endogeneity may 
arise in the case of co-residing with an adult child (Weaver et al., 2009). The decision to 
co-reside and to use LTC is a simultaneous one when adult children move in with a parent 
who experiences increasing disability to provide informal care. Moreover, unobserved het-
erogeneity may influence both living and care situations. Unfortunately, we could not test 
for the endogeneity of co-residence status because our data lacks appropriate instruments. 
Due to failure to correct for the possible endogeneity of co-residence, this study may have 
underestimated its effect on the level of LTCE, as found by Weaver et al. (2009). However, 
we believe that endogeneity of co-residing is limited in our case because in the Netherlands 
adult children very rarely move back in with their parents.11
Concerning potential endogeneity of TTD, many previous studies have attempted to 
deal with it (e.g. Stearns and Norton, 2004; Zweifel, Felder, and Werblow, 2004; Weaver et 
al., 2009; Felder, Werblow, and Zweifel, 2010). The majority of studies, however, focused 
10 We also considered an extended estimating equations model (Basu and Rathouz, 2005), which estimates the link 
and variance power function simultaneously. This model gave similar results to the chosen GLM specification.
11 Among a panel of 55+ sickness-fund insured 1998-2007, of those co-residing with an adult child at t1 only 0.12% 
of these adult children did not live with a child at t0.
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on the possibility of TTD being endogenous to acute or total HCE as the amount of care 
consumed is found to increase longevity (Becker, Philipson, and Soares, 2005; Hall and 
Jones, 2007). None of these studies were able to appropriately solve the endogeneity of TTD 
because valid instruments were lacking. Studies that partly corrected for endogeneity bias 
concluded that the effect of TTD on the level of HCE is underestimated in the presence of 
endogeneity (Stearns and Norton, 2004; Weaver et al., 2009; Felder, Werblow, and Zweifel, 
2010). In the specific case of LTCE, however, the endogeneity problem is probably more 
limited. Evidence for LTC to extend longevity is much rarer than for acute care because 
the majority of LTC services assist individuals with daily activities instead of treating their 
medical conditions. Moreover, instead of extending life, it could also be argued that LTC use 
shortens life because institutionalization decreases the motivation to live. Finally, endoge-
neity of both TTD and co-residing is mitigated in the extended home care model because of 
reduced unobserved heterogeneity.
4.4 Results
Descriptive statistics
The first 3 columns of table 4.1 present summary statistics for the Dutch 55+ population, and 
for the subpopulations of institutional and home care users. Of the population, 15.7% used 
LTC; 4.5% used institutional LTC and 12.7% used home care. Expected average monthly 
LTCE in 2004 were €207; €149 on institutional and €59 on home care. 10.7% died in 2004-
2007. Home care users and – to a greater extent – institutional LTC users are older, more 
often female, living alone and closer to death than non-users. A large proportion of cancer 
deaths exists among non-users and home care users, while deaths due to mental illnesses 
and CVA are more prevalent among the institutionalized.
The last two columns of table 4.1 describe the Health Survey sample. Users’ average 
monthly home care expenditures amounted to €350. Compared to the entire Health Survey 
sample, users are older, more often female, living alone, closer to death, have a lower socio-
economic status, and report worse morbidity and disability status.
Results for population models
Appendix 4.2 presents full estimates for the population models. The majority of determi-
nants and interactions have significant coefficients on both the probability of use and the 
conditional level of LTC, institutional care and home care expenditures. Interpretation of the 
probit and GLM coefficients is complicated by the nonlinearity of the models and the pres-
ence of interaction terms (Ai and Norton, 2003). We, therefore, interpret the effect of covari-
ates by means of their average partial effects (APE; table 4.2; Wooldridge, 2002), defined as 
the average change in the predicted probability or conditional level of expenditures resulting 
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Table 4.2 Average partial effects of covariates on the likelihood of total LTC, institutional and home care use 
and average monthly expenditures in 2004
Covariates
Total LTC Institutional LTC Home care
Part I Part II Part I * 
IIa
Part I Part II Part I 
* IIa
Part I Part II Part I 
* IIa
Male -0.061 -109 -79 -0.014 -210 -55 -0.050 -83 -22
Age (overall) 0.010 47 17 0.004 -2 12 0.007 20 4
 Age in female survivors 0.013 39 16 0.004 12 12 0.010 13 4
 Age in female decedents 0.016 94 93 0.017 5 63 0.003 30 9
 Age in male survivors 0.006 19 6 0.002 -23 4 0.004 7 2
 Age in male decedents 0.015 29 37 0.010 -28 30 0.006 18 6
Alive (overall) -0.120 -797 -283 -0.050 -667 -204 -0.086 -365 -80
 Alive in females co-residing -0.137 -929 -283 -0.046 -845 -204 -0.105 -376 -81
 Alive in females living alone -0.179 -744 -516 -0.101 -561 -365 -0.103 -358 -141
 Alive in males co-residing -0.069 -848 -149 -0.026 -783 -113 -0.057 -351 -40
 Alive in males living alone -0.151 -670 -376 -0.063 -625 -257 -0.110 -396 -125
 Alive in individuals aged 55-74 -0.108 -866 -203 -0.033 -1067 -140 -0.088 -362 -66
 Alive in individuals aged 75+ -0.161 -763 -550 -0.106 -576 -416 -0.080 -366 -127
Cause-of-death (ref. group: external)
 Cancer 0.049 -455 -97 -0.049 -526 -232 0.094 168 152
 Diabetes 0.146 469 513 0.093 242 367 0.086 263 135
 Mental 0.257 2573 2192 0.351 2025 2267 -0.076 273 -2
 CVD apart from CVA 0.012 -8 17 -0.009 95 -11 0.022 33 20
 CVA 0.088 891 629 0.104 697 550 0.009 157 45
 Disease respiratory system 0.155 690 669 0.107 669 552 0.080 194 108
 Disease digestive system 0.067 337 291 0.036 545 247 0.041 38 36
 Other 0.112 920 703 0.109 699 567 0.028 326 106
TTD (overall) -0.006 -46 -35 -0.005 -25 -22 -0.003 -28 -13
 TTD in females co-residing -0.008 -44 -36 -0.004 -25 -24 -0.005 -26 -15
 TTD in females living alone -0.003 -49 -41 -0.006 -24 -28 0.001 -26 -10
 TTD in males co-residing -0.009 -47 -30 -0.004 -26 -16 -0.006 -29 -14
 TTD in males living alone -0.005 -42 -32 -0.005 -26 -22 -0.002 -33 -15
 TTD for COD cancer -0.012 -63 -42 -0.004 -16 -13 -0.011 -75 -33
 TTD for COD diabetes -0.003 -36 -29 -0.004 -26 -22 0.000 -21 -6
 TTD for COD mental disease -0.005 -72 -79 -0.010 -41 -76 0.005 -23 2
 TTD for COD CVD excl. CVA -0.003 -30 -19 -0.003 -21 -15 -0.000 -16 -4
 TTD for COD CVA -0.004 -48 -40 -0.006 -28 -35 0.001 -18 -3
 TTD for COD respiratory disease -0.005 -40 -36 -0.006 -27 -31 -0.000 -19 -5
 TTD for COD digestive disease -0.004 -32 -25 -0.005 -17 -22 -0.000 -13 -3
 TTD for COD other -0.004 -44 -36 -0.005 -24 -28 0.000 -28 -7
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from a one unit change in the covariate. APE’s were obtained empirically through simula-
tions and we report some APE’s for subgroups to demonstrate the effect of interactions.12
On average, the probability of using institutional LTC (home care) is 1.4 (5.0) percentage 
points (pp) lower among males. Expected monthly LTCE for males are on average €79 lower 
than for females. In all three models, age has a highly significant influence. A one year 
increase in age raises the average probability of using LTC, institutional LTC and home 
care, respectively, by 1pp, 0.4pp and 0.7pp. A one year increase in age increases conditional 
monthly LTC and home care expenditures by €47 and €20, respectively. The negative effect 
of age on conditional institutional LTCE – mainly driven by males – is probably caused 
by differences in service prices and population characteristics of residential and nursing 
homes, with the latter having much higher costs but lower average age of residents (Oosten-
brink et al., 2004). However, expected expenditures on both types of LTC increase with age. 
Age has a larger effect on expected home care and institutional LTCE in females. Although 
the absolute effect of age is greater for decedents, the relative age effect – e.g. the percentage 
increase of expected LTCE with age – is greater for survivors.
Survivor status and TTD turn out to be major predictors of both institutional and home 
care expenditures. Decedents have on average a 12pp higher probability of using LTC and 
€283 higher expected monthly LTCE, but the effect differs by COD: compared to external 
causes, all COD, apart from CVD, materially influence the probability of use and the condi-
tional level of expenditures. On average, decedents of a mental illness cost €2192 more than 
those deceased due to external causes, while cancer decedents have lower (-€97) expected 
12 Standard errors are omitted for two reasons: (i) the data we use are stored in a protected remote access environ-
ment of Statistics Netherlands. Given the current access rules and costs (in particular the limitations in terms of 
time available for each analysis) it is simply impossible to bootstrap these APEs as these runs would take weeks 
to complete; (ii) The significance of APE estimates largely depends on the estimated regression coefficients which 
we report in appendix 4.2.
Table 4.2 Average partial effects of covariates on the likelihood of total LTC, institutional and home care 
use and average monthly expenditures in 2004 (table continued)
Covariates
Total LTC Institutional LTC Home care
Part I Part 
II
Part 
I * IIa
Part I Part 
II
Part 
I * IIa
Part I Part 
II
Part 
I * IIa
Living alone (overall) 0.107 -95 77 0.019 -611 28 0.099 96 46
 Living alone in females 55-74 years 0.082 35 51 0.011 -843 19 0.079 98 31
 Living alone in females 75+ 0.158 -167 80 0.034 -702 -25 0.150 70 80
 Living alone in males 55-74 years 0.085 63 74 0.014 -493 39 0.075 158 31
 Living alone in males 75+ 0.232 -152 204 0.051 -290 110 0.210 143 115
a  The presented APE’s on PartI*PartII do not simply equal the product of APE’s on each part as they are 
partial effects averaged over the sample (and not partial effects for an average or reference individual). 
Partial effect continuous variables: the effect of a one unit change in the covariate on the outcome. 
Partial effect discrete and indicator variables: the effect of a change from 0 to 1 on the outcome. For indicator 
variables: partial effect with respect to the reference category
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LTCE. The effect of a mental COD is particularly large on institutional LTC because de-
mentia patients often need institutional care and are therefore less likely to use home care. 
The lower average LTCE of cancer decedents derive from their lower expected institutional 
expenditures, as many cancer patients die at home or in the hospital. All other causes of 
death have a positive effect on LTCE; individuals deceased from a disease of the respiratory 
system, CVA or diabetes cost on average €669, €629, and €513 more compared to those 
deceased due to external causes.
As has previously been found for acute care expenditures (e.g. Zweifel, Felder, and Meiers, 
1999; Seshamani and Gray, 2004c; Stearns and Norton, 2004), the relative effect of survival 
status and TTD decreases with age. The ratio of predicted LTCE among decedents to survi-
vors decreases from 18 at age 55 to 1.7 at age 90. Survival status and TTD have a larger effect 
for females and individuals living alone: female (male) decedents co-residing have on average 
€283 (€149) higher expenditures compared to survivors while this is €516 (€376) for females 
(males) who live alone. On average, a TTD of 1 month less results in €35 higher average 
monthly LTCE. Interactions between TTD and COD demonstrate that the effect of TTD is 
particularly large in cancer and mental illness decedents. Remember that the effect of TTD in 
cancer (mental illness) decedents primarily influences home care (institutional LTC) expen-
ditures. For cancer, this larger effect can be attributed to the faster progression of the disease.
Co-residence status significantly influences the probability of positive use, but more so 
for home care than for institutional LTC. This finding confirms that informal care is a closer 
substitute for less skilled LTC services (Bonsang, 2009). Figure 4.1 shows the predicted 
LTCE by age, sex and co-residence. Living alone increases expenditures, but more so for 
males than for females. The effect of co-residence first increases with age but gradually 
decreases at older ages, suggesting that the ability to provide adequate care tends to decrease 
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above a certain age. Females (males) aged 75+ living alone have a 15.8pp (23.2pp) higher 
probability of using LTC and incur on average €80 (€204) higher expected LTCE than those 
co-residing. The positive effect of co-residing on conditional institutional LTCE confirms 
that informal care might postpone institutionalization. During this postponement, the 
disability status of informal care recipients continues to deteriorate, resulting in higher 
disability at the time of institutionalization, hence higher conditional institutional LTCE 
among elderly co-residing prior to institutionalization.
Results for extended home care model
Table 4.3 presents the APE’s of covariates on the probability and (conditional) level of 
home care expenditures.13 APE estimation was bootstrapped to obtain standard errors for 
statistical inference (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). Both parts of the model for home care 
expenditures fit the data quite well; part I has a pseudo R² of 0.39 and part II has a deviance 
of 1.21. Overall, most covariates affect home care expenditures as expected. Even after in-
cluding extensive information on morbidity and disability, age still significantly determines 
the probability of positive use and the level of home care expenditures (the age variables 
are jointly significant). The influence of age on home care expenditures is larger for females 
than for males: a one year older female (male) costs on average €3 (€1) more, ceteris paribus. 
The effects of TTD and survival are attenuated considerably with the inclusion of disability 
and morbidity variables. F-tests reveal that TTD and survival jointly have a significant nega-
tive effect on the probability of home care use. By contrast, the APE’s and joint significance 
test (see appendix 4.3) of the disability variables demonstrate that the effect of disability 
on home care use and expenditures is much more sizeable. It is worth noting that morbid-
ity indicators, apart from previous hospitalizations, do not influence home care use, while 
ADL, mobility, and limitations in daily activities all increase the likelihood of using home 
care. Individuals moderately (severely) disabled in ADL have on average €29 (€176) higher 
monthly home care expenditures than those not disabled. This large effect of disability is not 
surprising given that disability is the foremost prerequisite for obtaining access to publicly 
financed home care (de Meijer et al., 2009). A second central eligibility criterion is the 
availability of informal care and this is reflected in the strong effect of co-residence on the 
likelihood to use home care. Again, this effect is stronger for males than females. Males 
(females) living alone cost on average €38 (€17) more than those co-residing. Finally, the 
finding that individuals with higher incomes have a lower probability of home care use 
confirms that income-related copayments do provide an incentive for higher incomes to 
substitute public by private home care, even though income does not significantly influence 
the conditional level of home care expenditures.
13 Appendix 4.3 shows estimated coefficients and joint significance tests for age, TTD and disability.
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Table 4.3 Average partial effects for the probability of positive use (part I), conditional (part II) and expected 
(part I * II) average monthly home care expenditures for the Health survey sample
Covariates Home care
Part I Part II Part I * IIa
Demographic characteristics
 Age (overall) 0.006*** 8* 2***
 Age in females 0.007*** 9* 3***
 Age in males 0.004*** 6 1***
 Male -0.026** 24 -3
 Alive after 3 years 0.019 -83 -4
 Time-to-death in months -0.005 0 -2
 Living alone in females 0.069*** 4 17*
 Living alone in males 0.117*** 120 38***
Socio-economic characteristics
 Education middle 0.012 -79 -3
 Education high -0.011 -9 -4
 Income (x €1000) -0.002** -2 -1
Health status indicators
 Self-reported health - Good 0.014 -295 -27
 Self-reported health – Fair 0.035 -193 -10
 Self-reported health – (very) Poor 0.011 -169 -14
 Chronic condition -0.008 45 3
 Mental health -0.000 0 0
 Previous hospitalization 0.048*** -26 9
Disability status indicators
 Limited in daily activities - mildly 0.033 35 12
 Limited in daily activities - severely 0.058** 51 19
 ADL – mildly disabled 0.016 47 8
 ADL – moderately disabled 0.071* 101 29*
 ADL – severely disabled 0.152** 695*** 176***
 Mobility – mildly disabled 0.000 -33 -3
 Mobility – moderately disabled 0.072** -30 13
 Mobility – severely disabled 0.066* -3 16
a  The presented APE’s on Part I*Part II do not simply equal the product of APE’s on each part, as they are 
partial effects averaged over the sample (and not partial effects for an average or reference individual). 
Partial effect continuous variables: the effect of a one unit change in the covariate on the outcome. 
Partial effect discrete and indicator variables: the effect of a change from 0 to 1 on the outcome. For 
indicator variables: partial effect with respect to the reference category. 
Standard errors to obtain significance levels obtained by bootstrapping.
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Effect of age and TTD re-evaluated
Figures 4.2a-c evaluate the role of age in determining LTC, institutional LTC and home 
care for the Dutch population when conditioning on additional determinants. The Y-axis 
represents the additional average monthly LTCE of individuals aged 56-90 compared to 
individuals aged 55. The slope of the line thus represents the age effect. The different lines in 
Figure 4.2 Additional average monthly (a) LTC, (b) institutional LTC, and (c) home care expenditures by age 
compared to a 55-year old (population model)
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the figure evaluate the age effect in: (1) a naïve model analyzing expenditures as a function 
of age and sex, (2) a TTD model, including additionally TTD, (3) one adding COD, and (4) 
one adding co-residence. For all types of expenditures, the age effect increases more rapidly 
at higher ages. The inclusion of TTD considerably attenuates the effect of age on all types 
of LTCE, but the effect remains significant. Therefore, TTD could indeed partially explain 
the higher expenditures among the higher aged. The inclusion of COD only marginally 
decreases the effect of age on expenditures. By controlling additionally for co-residence, 
the effect of age on home care expenditures – and to a lesser extent on institutional LTCE – 
decreases but remains significant for all LTC services.
When moving to the extended home care model we are able to further examine the 
changes in the age effect on home care expenditures by controlling additionally for dis-
ability and morbidity (figure 4.3). Again, by adding TTD to a naïve model, the age effect 
decreases but remains important. By contrast, controlling instead for disability substantially 
reduces the effect of age on the level of expenditures. Adding TTD to the former model 
shows that a marginal part of the age effect left after controlling for disability can be at-
tributed to TTD. Finally, inclusion of co-residence status further decreases the age effect, 
but it remains significant.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate the TTD effect by presenting additional predicted average 
monthly expenditures of decedents by TTD compared to those of survivors. Figure 4.4 
compares the effect of TTD in a TTD-only model to that in models that control in addi-
tion for: (1) COD and (2) COD and co-residence status, all estimated with the population 
model. For both types of expenditures, the TTD effect increases more rapidly when moving 
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closer to death. The consequences of adding COD to a TTD model are striking: the curve 
both shifts downward and flattens considerably, i.e. the TTD effect is attenuated. Although 
the effect of survivor status remains – i.e. some excess spending between decedents and 
survivors persists – the excess spending for decedents falls, particularly for home care. The 
substantial fall in the impact of TTD on home care expenditures may be associated with 
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the rate of progression of fatal diseases, e.g. individuals suffering from cancer may prefer 
to die at home while home care may not be an option for those suffering from diseases that 
are fatal only after a longer period. Further control for co-residence hardly affects the TTD 
effect on (any type of) expenditure.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the changes in the TTD effect on home care expenditures estimated 
by the extended home care model. Instead of COD, we condition here on morbidity and dis-
ability measures, available for both decedents and survivors. As for COD, adding disability 
to a TTD model substantially attenuates the TTD effect. Expenditure differences between 
decedents and survivors fall dramatically and expenditures also vary little with TTD among 
decedents. While the TTD model predicts individuals in their last month of life to cost on 
average €120 more compared to survivors, these same individuals cost on average only €45 
more after controlling for disability. Further control for morbidity and co-residence only 
marginally changes this TTD effect.
Projections of LTCE
This section outlines some LTCE projections for the 55+ population based on trends in 
demography, co-residence, and disability. It is important to bear in mind that not only 
individual determinants, but also health care supply and organizational features (e.g. the 
eligibility criteria, informal care availability, and waiting lists) co-determine utilization and 
expenditures (Getzen, 2001; Andersen and Newman, 2005). We assume these constant in 
our projections. Table 4.4 presents projections of (1) the absolute level of expenditures and 
(2) per capita expenditures on total LTC, institutional LTC and home care in 2040. While 
the per capita projections only account for shifting age distributions, the projections for the 
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Figure 4.5 Additional average monthly home care expenditures by TTD of decedents compared to survivors 
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absolute level of LTCE also take into account the growing size of the elderly population. 
Average monthly (per capita) LTCE in 2004 are indexed at 100. Both indices show a similar 
trend: LTCE are expected to grow fastest using a naïve projection model, while TTD and 
especially disability result in much lower LTCE projections. Using a naïve age-based model, 
per capita LTCE among the 55+ population in 2040 are expected to be 50% higher in 2040, 
i.e. LTCE in 2040 are indexed at 150; 154 for institutional LTC and 141 for home care. Clearly, 
TTD models result in more optimistic projections as longevity gains partly shift LTCE to 
higher ages.14 According to a TTD model, the index of per capita LTCE is expected to equal 
128 in 2040. Predictions using disability as well as TTD could only be estimated for home 
care (from the extended home care model). Extrapolating recent declines in severe disabil-
ity15 (Perenboom et al., 2004; Lafortune et al., 2007), the index of home care expenditures is 
expected to equal 117 in 2040. This decrease in severe disability is likely to affect institutional 
LTCE to an even greater extent, as those with severe disability are much more likely to reside 
in an institution (de Meijer et al., 2009). For all models and types of spending, expenditures 
are expected to rise more rapidly when accounting for the growing size of the elderly popu-
lation group, e.g. a naïve (TTD) model projects per capita LTCE to grow by 50% (28%) while 
the absolute level of LTCE is expected to grow by 128% (94%).
Finally, the expected rise in the share of elderly living alone – especially among males 
– will lead to higher public expenditures on LTC, ceteris paribus. Due to greater expected 
improvements in longevity among males, they are more likely to live alone in old age in 
the future (OECD, 2005; Statistics Netherlands, 2010). Other trends contributing to lower 
14 Life expectancy is expected to rise for males (females) aged 55-90 on average by 3.0 (2.0) years between 2004 and 
2040 in the Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands, 2011).
15 1.5% yearly decline in severe disability
Table 4.4 Projected growth in (per capita) LTCE for 55+ individuals in 2040 based on various models (index 
= 100 in 2004)
LTCE Institutional LTCE Home care expenditures
Model Index 2040 Per capita index 2040 Index 2040
Per capita 
index 2040 Index 2040
Per capita 
index 2040
Naïve model (1) 228 150 233 154 214 141
Naïve + co-residence (2a) 232 153 NA NA NA NA
TTD model (2b) 194 128 196 129 187 124
Disability model (2c) NA NA NA NA 123 117a
a  Based on a reduced version of the extended home care model (including the covariates age, age², sex, 
age*sex, alive, TTD and disability); The extended home care model estimates home care expenditures to 
rise by 56%, 51% and 17% between 2004 and 2040 using a naïve, TTD and disability model, respectively. 
Although the growth rates differ with those estimated by the population model, the projections move in the 
same direction. The difference is caused by the samples: the population model includes all 55+ individuals; 
the extended home care model only includes the non-institutionalized 55+ population.
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proportions of co-residing elderly are an individualization of society and increasing divorce 
rates. Projections of per capita LTCE in 2040 that account for these trends are indexed at 153, 
i.e. 3 pp higher than naïve projections.
4.5 Discussion
We have examined the determinants of public LTCE, including both institutional LTC and 
home care, for the Dutch 55+ population. We have focused on the relative roles played by 
age, TTD and disability and have illustrated the usefulness of the various models by means 
of future LTCE projections based on expected trends in determinants. Our main findings 
are as follows. First, both co-residence status and COD are important determinants of LTCE. 
Individuals living alone are substantially more likely to use LTC, especially home care, and 
their expected level of LTCE is much higher. The large variation in decedent expenditures by 
COD confirms that the relationship between TTD and LTCE is dynamic: epidemiological 
changes will affect the importance of each COD and consequently the overall influence of 
TTD on LTCE. Individuals who will die from diabetes, a mental illness, CVA, a respiratory 
or digestive disease have significantly higher average monthly LTCE compared to individu-
als dying due to external causes. The lower LTCE among cancer decedents derive from their 
lower level of institutional LTCE. The common covariates – age, sex and TTD – show the 
expected effects. However, we have found LTCE – measured in absolute terms – to increase 
considerably faster with age among non-survivors while (Yang, Norton, and Stearns, 2003) 
find a similar increase of age-specific nursing home expenditures for both survivors and 
non-survivors.
Second, the effects of some covariates display substantial heterogeneity. For example, males 
living alone have substantially higher LTCE compared to females living alone, especially for 
the oldest elderly. Also the effect of TTD varies considerably by sex and co-residence, with 
a larger effect of TTD on expected expenditures in females and those living alone. The latter 
finding supports that of (Weaver et al., 2009) who concluded that informal care availability 
significantly reduces the effect of TTD on the probability of LTC use. We also find that 
survival status affects conditional LTCE to a greater extent for co-residing individuals. We 
interpret this finding as further evidence that formal LTC use is postponed by informal care 
because co-residing individuals tend to be more disabled when they enter LTC institutions.
Third, we demonstrate the age effect to be confounded by TTD and co-residence status, 
but even more so by disability status: it declines after controlling for TTD and co-residence 
but these declines are dwarfed by the decrease occurring after controlling for disability, the 
foremost prerequisite for obtaining access to public LTC. Unfortunately we were not able to 
examine this for institutional LTC. Despite the substantial fall in its effect after control for 
disability, age still significantly determines home care expenditures. Next to age, disability 
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and co-residence status are the other two important determinants of home care expendi-
tures. Various mechanisms could explain why age retains a significant impact on LTCE: 
(1) assessment agencies may take into account the age of the applicant regardless of their 
objective need for LTC; (2) disability is still incompletely captured by our measures; and (3) 
co-residence status incompletely approximates informal care availability.
Fourth, the effect of survivor status and the TTD effect clearly diminish after control for 
COD in the population model, especially for home care, but it remains significant. Only 
after further control for disability (in the extended home care model), does the effect of 
TTD on the expected level of home care expenditures become insignificant. This finding 
– along with the effect of COD on LTCE – confirms that TTD indeed mainly approximates 
disability.
Finally, projections of LTCE for 2040 vary across models that account for different trends 
in its determinants. Projections taking into account the increasing share of single living 
elderly are slightly more pessimistic than naïve age-based projections. On the other hand, 
TTD projections lead to considerably lower projected LTCE for 2040 compared to naïve 
projections as they account for changes in age-specific LTCE resulting from longevity gains. 
Projections that also account for disability trends – instead of mortality trends only – lead to 
even more optimistic projections of LTCE. The discrepancy in projections based on either 
mortality or disability trends highlights the bias associated with using TTD to approximate 
disability when projecting LTCE. Unfortunately, we could only illustrate this discrepancy 
for home care expenditures.
Three points are worth noting regarding the use of co-residence in modeling and project-
ing LTCE. First, the relationship between co-residence – as used to approximate informal 
care availability – and LTCE is probably dynamic. Co-residence reduces LTCE more for 
males than females which must be due to a higher male labor force participation and lower 
male uptake of informal care and self-care. This gender gap is expected to narrow as a result 
of increased female labor participation and increased participation in household duties by 
males. Second, co-residence only crudely approximates informal care availability because it 
ignores informal care sources outside the household. Third, because our models – to a large 
extent – replicate the eligibility criteria applied, the influence of co-residence on LTCE may 
be stronger in the Netherlands than elsewhere. However, our models do not merely repro-
duce eligibility rules since the guidelines still leave room for discretionary decision making 
and personal judgment. Moreover, the decision to demand public LTC by contacting the 
agency instead of choosing other, private sources of LTC still remains with the individual 
and her social environment.
Previous studies have already concluded that the rising LTCE with age could partly be 
attributed to TTD (Yang, Norton, and Stearns, 2003; Werblow, Felder, and Zweifel, 2007). 
We confirm that TTD itself imperfectly approximates disability in determining LTCE and 
even becomes redundant after appropriate control for the latter, although it still importantly 
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determines the probability of use (see also Weaver et al., 2009). The insignificant effect of 
TTD on expected LTCE indicates that TTD itself can be regarded as a ‘red herring’ for 
LTC and raises doubts about its validity for projecting LTCE. Projections using TTD rather 
than disability implicitly assume that longevity gains merely shift disability to older ages. As 
such, they ignore the dynamics in the relationship between TTD and disability caused by 
epidemiological changes, and therefore contradict recent evidence favoring a compression 
of disability (Fries, 1980; , Gu, and Lamb, 2006; Payne et al., 2007). Hence, a TTD model 
might still overestimate the effect of aging on future LTCE, as is illustrated by our projec-
tions. It has often been argued that the contribution of aging to growth in HCE is relatively 
small compared to the impact of technology (e.g. Breyer and Felder, 2006). Technological 
innovation is, however, much less likely to increase LTCE because there have been far less 
advances in the use of technology for LTC provision.
Unfortunately, we were only able to fully examine the relevance of TTD for modeling 
home care expenditures because disability data on institutionalized individuals were lack-
ing. Finally, our conclusions cannot be generalized to acute HCE as previous studies found 
the effect of TTD to be much larger for acute than for LTC (Yang, Norton, and Stearns, 2003; 
Werblow, Felder, and Zweifel, 2007).
Concluding, while previous studies have shown that TTD explains LTCE over and above 
the effect of age (e.g. Yang, Norton, and Stearns, 2003; Werblow, Felder, and Zweifel, 2007), 
we demonstrate that, after control for disability, TTD itself becomes a ‘red herring’, while 
age and informal care availability remain important determinants of LTCE. The finding 
that TTD largely acts as a proxy for disability – along with previous evidence supporting a 
compression of disability – suggests that where possible, inclusion of more appropriate in-
dicators of care needs, like disability, is highly desirable for improved expenditure forecasts. 
We recognize that this will not always be feasible. Data on mortality are more readily and 
routinely available than on disability, as is illustrated by the lack of disability information 
in our own data on institutional LTC users. Unlike survivor status, which is fairly easy to 
document, disability measures are typically self-reported, lack a universal definition and are 
therefore less comparable across populations (Payne et al., 2007). This often also complicates 
the determination of disability trends that are needed for LTCE projections (Cutler, 2001). 
But it is worth keeping in mind that – unlike in the case of medical care spending – LTC 
spending is driven more by disability than by survival trends.
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Appendices
Appendix 4.1 Description of variables in population and extended home care model
Variable Description Model3
Dependent variable
LTC Expenditures Average monthly LTC, institutional LTC and home care expenditures in 2004
Average monthly home care expenditures in 2004 or 2005
P
E
Covariates
Male
Age
Age²
Age3
Age * Male
Age² * Male
Alive
TTD
TTD²
Living alone
Alive * male
TTD * male
TTD² * male
Alive * age
TTD * age
TTD² * age
Alive * living alone
TTD * living alone
TTD² * living alone
Living alone* male
Living alone* age
Sex of respondent: 0 = female; 1 = male
Age of respondent
Age² of respondent
Age3 of respondent
Interaction age * male
Interaction age² * male
Indicator TTD: 0 = not deceased within 3 years after measurement year; 1 = 
deceased within 3 years after measurement year
Time-to-death in months; survivors are set to the maximum of 48
Time-to-death in months²
Co-residence status: 0 = co-residing; 1 = living alone
Interaction alive * male; 1 = male alive; 0 = else
Interaction TTD * male: 0 = female; else = TTD of males
Interaction TTD² * male: 0 = female; else = TTD² of males
Interaction alive * age; 0 = deceased; else = age of survivors
Interaction TTD * age
Interaction TTD² * age
Interaction alive * living alone; 1 = alive living alone; 0 = else
Interaction TTD * living alone; 0 = co-residing; else = TTD of those living alone
Interaction TTD² * living alone; 0 = co-residing; else = TTD² of those living 
alone
Interaction male * living alone; 1 = male living alone; 0 = else
Interaction living alone * age; 0 = co-residing; else = age of those living alone
P+E
P+E
P+E
P
P+E
P
P+E
P+E
P
P+E
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P+E
P
Education
Income
Highest educational level: 0 = low; 1 = middle; 2 = high
Logarithm of monthly net equivalent household income = log(monthly 
household income/household members^0.5); information obtained from 
income production system
E
E
COD
TTD * COD
TTD² * COD
Self-reported health
Chronic condition
Hospitalization
Mental health
Indicators cause-of-death: external cause of mortality (reference category), 
cancer, diabetes, mental disease, CVD exclusive CVA, CVA, respiratory disease, 
digestive disease, else
Interaction TTD * COD; for all indicators of COD. Approximates severity/stage 
of the disease.
Interaction TTD² * COD; for all indicators of COD.
Indicators: very good (reference category), good, fair, (very)poor
Presence of chronic condition: 0 = no; 1 = yes
Hospitalized in last 5 years; Indicator: 0 = no; 1 = yes
Score on Mental Health Inventory 5; range 0 – 100 (=healthy)
P
P
P
E
E
E
E
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Appendix 4.1 Description of variables in population and extended home care model (table continued)
Variable Description Model3
Limited in daily 
activities
ADL disability1
Mobility disability²
Only for individuals who reported to have a chronic condition. Indicators: not 
limited (reference category), mildly limited, severely limited
Indicators: not disabled, could perform all items independently (reference 
category); mildly disabled, could perform at least one item with some difficulty 
and all remaining items independently; moderately disabled, could perform 
at least one item with much difficulty and all remaining items independently 
or with some difficulty; severely disabled, could not perform at least one item 
independently
see coding ADL disability
E
E
E
1  ADL items: eating/drinking, (un)dressing, washing hands and face, washing oneself completely, transfer 
from chair
²  Mobility items: moving indoors, moving outdoors, walking stairs, transfer from bed, entering/leaving room
3 Covariate is included in: P = population model; E = extended home care model
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Appendix 4.3 Estimates of covariate effects on the probability of and expenditures on home care
Covariates
Home care
Probit GLM
Socio-demographic characteristics
 Male -0.99 (0.71) 0.17 (0.35)
 Age 0.08 (0.06) -0.01 (0.03)
 Age²/1000 -0.22 (0.46) 0.03 (0.02)
 Male * Age 0.01 (0.01) - 0.00 (0.00)
 Alive after 3 years 0.16 (0.31) -0.09 (0.10)
 TTD in months -0.02 (0.01) -0.00 (0.00)
 Living alone 0.41 (0.10)*** 0.00 (0.04)
 Male * Living alone 0.67 (0.16)*** 0.13 (0.08)
Socio-economic characteristics
 Education (low = 0)
 Middle 0.10 (0.08) -0.06 (0.04)
 High -0.09 (0.12) -0.01 (0.06)
 Income (logged) -0.24 (0.09)** -0.04 (0.04)
Health status indicators
 Self-reported health (very good = 0)
 Good 0.13 (0.16) -0.30 (0.18)
 Fair 0.30 (0.18) -0.17 (0.18)
 (very) Poor 0.10 (0.21) -0.15 (0.19)
 Respondent has chronic condition -0.07 (0.14) 0.05 (0.08)
 Mental Health Score -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
 Previous hospitalization 0.42 (0.09)*** -0.03 (0.04)
Disability status indicators
 Limited in daily activities (no = 0)
 Mildly limited 0.28 (0.14)* 0.04 (0.08)
 Severely limited 0.45 (0.15)** 0.06 (0.09)
 ADL (not disabled = 0)
 Mildly disabled 0.13 (0.11) 0.07 (0.05)
 Moderately disabled 0.49 (0.19)* 0.14 (0.07)*
 Severely disabled 0.92 (0.22)*** 0.56 (0.09)***
 Mobility (not disabled = 0)
 Mildly disabled 0.00 (0.11) -0.04 (0.06)
 Moderately disabled 0.51 (0.14)*** -0.03 (0.06)
 Severely disabled 0.47 (0.20)* -0.00 (0.07)
 Intercept -3.34 (2.52) 2.34 (1.27)**
Power function GLM (link; fixed) 0.155
N 4176 401
Pseudo-R²/Deviance 0.390 1.213
(*), (**), and (***) denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level respectively. Standard errors 
are in parentheses.
Statistics joint F-test age variables: 74*** (part I) and 15*** (part II)
Statistics joint F-test TTD and alive: 7* (part I) and 4 (part II)
Statistics joint F-test disability variables: 100*** (part I) and 77 (part II)
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Abstract
The impact population aging exerts on future levels of long-term care (LTC) spending is 
an urgent topic in which few studies have accounted for disability trends. We forecast indi-
vidual lifetime and population aggregate annual LTC spending for the Dutch 55+ population 
to 2020 accounting for changing disability patterns.
Three levels of (dis)ability were distinguished: none, mild, and severe. Two-part models 
were employed to estimate LTC spending as a function of age, gender, and disability. A 
multistate life table model was used to forecast age-specific prevalence of disability and life 
expectancy (LE) in each disability state. Finally, two-part model estimates and multistate 
projections were combined to obtain forecasts of LTC expenditures.
LE is expected to increase while life years in severe disability remain constant, resulting in 
a relative compression of severe disability. Mildly disabled life-years increase, especially for 
women. Lifetime home care spending – mainly determined by mild disability – increase 
while institutional spending remains fairly constant due to stable LE with severe disability. 
Lifetime LTC expenditures, largely determined by institutional spending, are thus hardly 
influenced by increasing LE. Aggregate spending for the 55+ population is expected to rise 
by 19.2 percent.
Life extension with improved disability profiles will not seriously increase lifetime spend-
ing. The growth of the elderly cohort, however, will considerably increase aggregate spend-
ing. Stimulating a compression of disability is among the main solutions to alleviate the 
consequences of longevity gains and population aging to growth of LTC spending.
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5.1 Introduction
The impact of population aging on the level of health care expenditures has become a topic 
of growing attention over the last decades. Of particular interest is its impact on long-term 
care (LTC) spending. While the increase in the acute care expenditure age profile can 
entirely be explained by age-specific differences in health status (often approximated by 
time-to-death), LTC expenditures increase with age even after accounting for variations in 
health status. Besides, LTC use is more concentrated among the middle-aged and elderly. 
Hence, the most dramatic spending growth due to population aging is expected in the LTC 
sector (Liu, Manton, and Aragon, 2000; Spillman and Lubitz, 2000; Yang, Norton, and 
Stearns, 2003; Polder, Barendregt, and van Oers, 2006; Payne et al., 2007; Werblow, Felder, 
and Zweifel, 2007; Häkkinen et al., 2008; Weaver et al., 2009).
Population aging, defined as the increasing share of elderly in a population, results from 
lower birth rates, longevity gains, and baby boomer aging. The increasing proportion of elderly 
and the growing proportion of the very old in the elderly cohort will swell the need for LTC. 
And longevity gains means needing LTC for longer periods. Population aging thus impacts 
the group of individuals requiring LTC, aggregate annual LTC spending, and individual life-
time LTC spending. Since disability is the main determinant of LTC use, (Lubitz et al., 2003; 
Manton, Gu, and Lamb, 2006; de Meijer et al., 2009) the growth of aggregate and lifetime LTC 
spending is strongly associated with future disability trends (Stearns, Norton, and Yang, 2007).
Forecasting individual lifetime and population aggregate LTC spending is challenging 
because it requires estimates of disability prevalence and mortality. Estimating such trends 
is complicated: disability is a stock measure governed by inflows (incidence) and outflows 
(recovery or mortality) that are likely to change over time. While past disability trends have 
been investigated abundantly (Waidmann and Liu, 2000; Freedman, Martin, and Schoeni, 
2002; Freedman et al., 2004; Manton, Gu, and Lamb, 2006; Lafortune et al., 2007; Manton 
and Lamb, 2007; Manton, 2008), few studies have exploited the trends to forecast future 
LTC use or spending. We aim to assess the effect of aging (the growing number of elderly 
and longevity gains) on the future trend of lifetime and aggregate LTC spending for the 
Dutch 55+ population by explicitly accounting for changing disability patterns. Given fur-
ther population aging, it is important to estimate future levels of LTC spending to prepare 
the LTC sector for future needs.
Disability trends and LTC spending forecast
Evidence on disability trends varies across and even within countries (Lafortune et al., 2007; 
Parker and Thorslund, 2007). Trends depend on the selected measure of disability (iADL, 
ADL, or mobility) and the severity of disability. A consistent decrease in disability preva-
lence has been documented for the US (Waidmann and Liu, 2000; Freedman, Martin, and 
Schoeni, 2002; Freedman et al., 2004; Manton, Gu, and Lamb, 2006; Lafortune et al., 2007; 
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Manton and Lamb, 2007; Manton, 2008). Evidence on disability trends in other developed 
countries is less conclusive (Jacobzone et al., 1998; Lafortune et al., 2007; Jang and Kim, 
2010). Although Puts et al. (2008) report declining ADL and mobility prevalences for the 
Dutch non-institutionalized elderly from 1987 to 2001, Picavet et al. (2002) found a declining 
mobility prevalence for males and a constant ADL disability trend for the period 1990-1998. 
Finally, a meta-analysis on the disability trend in the non-institutionalized Dutch popula-
tion over 1990-2007 reported constant ADL and mobility disabilities (van Gool et al., 2011).
Disability-free life expectancy (DFLE) as a proportion of total LE increased for both males 
and females in the US in 1980-1990 (Crimmins, Saito, and Ingegneri, 1997; Manton, Gu, and 
Lamb, 2006). A similar trend has been observed for males in several European countries, 
but the trend for females was inconclusive (Perenboom, van Oyen, and Mutafova, 2003; 
Robine, Romieu, and Michel, 2003). In the Netherlands a decrease of LE with moderate and 
severe disability and an increase of LE with mild disability have been observed (Perenboom 
et al., 2004). A US study extrapolated the annual disability decline of 0.8% observed in 
1910-1999 and estimated a DFLE at age 65 to grow from 79.9 percent in 2015 to 85.2 percent 
in 2080 (Manton, Gu, and Lamb, 2006).
Future disability trends are shown to largely impact LTC spending forecasts. LTC spend-
ing in OECD countries from 2005-2050 will increase from 1.1 to 2.8 percent of GDP under 
stable age-specific severe disability prevalence but only to 1.9 percent with declining severe 
disability rates (Lafortune et al., 2007). Similar results were found in other studies (Manton, 
Gu, and Lamb, 2006; Comas-Herrera et al., 2007). Moreover, forecasts using an extrapola-
tion of the disability decline were more optimistic and best approached the actual amount 
spent (Manton and Lamb, 2007). If and to what extent recent disability declines will con-
tinue given less healthy lifestyles and higher disability rates of the middle-aged population 
is, however, debatable (Lakdawalla et al., 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Sturm, Ringel, and 
Andreyeva, 2004).
Our study extends findings of previous studies in three respects. First, we estimate future 
disability prevalence and DFLE for the Dutch 55+ population. As the trends of disability and 
DFLE have been shown to depend on the severity of disability, we simultaneously forecast 
mild and severe disability. Second, we use the forecasts to estimate lifetime and aggregate 
public LTC spending. Previous studies have only applied LTC spending by age and gender 
to the future age-sex decomposition of the population. Third, unlike previous studies, our 
LTC forecasts distinguish between home care and institutional LTC.
All Dutch citizens are entitled to publicly financed LTC. For our purposes, services include 
publicly financed institutional LTC and home care but not home care financed by a personal 
care budget (PCB; 5-10% of publicly financed home care). Institutional LTC includes resi-
dential and nursing home admissions. Residential homes provide living assistance; nursing 
homes also provide personal and nursing care. Overall, our analysis includes the bulk of 
public LTC expenditure.
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5.2 Methods
To forecast future LTC spending by accounting for changing disability patterns, we first 
estimate the relation between disability and LTC and then combine them with disability 
prevalence forecasts from a previously published multistate model (Majer, van Baal, and 
Mackenbach, 2011). The multistate-model explicitly accounts for trends in the disability 
incidence and mortality over time.
Data to model individual LTC function
We used three data sets to model yearly LTC expenditures: the Health Survey 2004/5, the 
Registration of the Administrative Office Exceptional Medical Expenses (CAK) 2004/5, 
and the Elderly in Institutions Survey 2004 (EIS). We used the Health Survey, an annual 
cross-sectional survey among a representative sample (n≈10,000) of the Dutch non-institu-
tionalized population, to obtain information on disability. Health Survey respondents were 
selected by a two-stage sampling design: first, local governments proportional to their size 
were selected; second, individuals within the selected local governments were randomly 
sampled. Our study population comprised individuals aged 55-97. Disability was measured 
by the inability to (un)dress, wash face and hands, wash oneself completely, transfer from 
chair, transfer from bed, move outdoors, climb stairs, and enter/leave the house. Mild dis-
ability was defined as the inability to perform at least one item without difficulty; severe 
disability as the inability to perform at least one item.
We obtained information on LTC spending by linking the Health Survey to a second 
data set, CAK, which registers public LTC use for each citizen aged 18 or older by type of 
service. Total LTC spending is composed of institutional LTC and home care expenditures. 
Because the Health Survey excludes the institutionalized population, we added a random 
sample (n=1,000) of institutional LTC users from CAK 2004/5. As we did not have disability 
information on this subsample, we used a third data set, the Elderly in Institutions Survey 
2004 (EIS; de Meijer et al., 2009), to assign disability status to this subsample. The EIS is 
a national representative sample of the 55+ institutionalized population whose disability 
items are identical to the Health Survey. We assigned disability status to our institution-
alized sample such that the distribution of disability by sex and type of LTC institution 
equalled the EIS sample. 95.8 and 86.5% of LTC residents were mildly and severely disabled, 
respectively. The high disability rates are consistent with eligibility guidelines to obtain ac-
cess to public LTC institutions.
Item non-response excluded four individuals, leaving a sample of 6,512 individuals. 
Post stratification weights were obtained to correct the joint distribution of weighting 
variables in our sample to those of the Dutch 55+ population. Weighting variables were 
age*sex*institutionalized.
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Modelling individual LTC expenditure
We employed a two-part model – common to health care expenditures analysis (Jones, 
2000) – to estimate LTC spending given age, sex, and disability status. A two-part model 
accounts for the high proportion of non-users by separately analysing use (part I) and 
the level of expenditures conditional on use (part II). Part I contains a probit model that 
analyses the probability of using LTC. We followed the procedure proposed by Manning 
and Mullahy (2001) to select the most appropriate model for part II. A generalized linear 
model with power link and gamma family best suited our data. The Box Cox transformation 
parameter was used as the power link. Expected expenditures for individual i are obtained 
by multiplying parts I and II:
E (LTCEij  | Xi )  = Φ (β1j, Xi) *= λ  β2j Xi +1,
where Φ() is the probability given by part I and λ ( ) is the conditional level of expenditures 
given by part II for individual i and type of LTC j, with j=1 (total LTC), j=2 (institutional 
LTC), j=3 (home care). β1 and β2 are vectors of parameters to be estimated by part I and part 
II, respectively, and Xi is a vector of covariates, i.e., orthogonal age variables of severity one 
and two, sex, disability, and interactions between disability and age.
Forecasting disability prevalence and (DF)LE
To forecast disability prevalence and (DF)LE we used a multistate life table model that 
distinguished three states: non-disabled, disabled, and dead. Connecting the health states, 
transition probabilities were estimated as a function of age and calendar year. We forecast 
transition probabilities up to 2020 based on trends over the period 1989-2007. Forecasts of 
all the transition rates employed the Lee-Carter (1992) method, a popular method used by 
demographers and actuaries to forecast life expectancy.
Having obtained the future age-specific transition probabilities, life expectancy with 
and without disability could be estimated. The model was employed twice to estimate the 
prevalence of mild and severe disability. The reader is referred to Majer, van Baal, and Mack-
enbach (2011) for an extensive description of the model used to forecast life expectancy with 
and without disability by age and sex.
We used different sources to estimate all the parameters of the model. The Human 
Mortality Database gave us gender- and age-specific (55+) mortality rates from 1989 to 
2007. The Health Surveys 1989-2007 were used to estimate disability prevalence in the non-
institutionalized population. National statistics on LTC institution residents by age and sex 
were pooled to the Health Surveys to obtain complete age- and gender-specific disability 
prevalence for the entire 55+ population. Finally, the data set was linked to the Death Reg-
istry to obtain mortality rates by disability status.
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Forecasting LTC expenditure
Forecasting lifetime expenditures required combining the probabilities of surviving to future 
ages, being disabled, and using LTC plus the conditional expenditures of LTC. In accordance 
with the forecasts of (DF)LE, lifetime expenditures were computed using a period rather 
than cohort measure. Expected lifetime spending for an individual (E(LT_LTCE)) could be 
expressed as the sum of the product of (i) the probability of being alive (Si) at a certain age 
given sex and disability status, and (ii) the expected level of LTC spending at a certain age 
given sex, disability, and survival status summing over all the ages between 55 years and death:
E (LT_LTCEij  | Si,  Xi )  = 
d
∑
age≥55
Pr(Si = 1 | Xi) *E(LTCEij  | Xi )
where the first term on the right hand side is the survival probability as a function of age, 
sex and disability status as forecasted by the model.
Aggregated expenditures were estimated to 2020. Aggregate LTC expenditure was defined 
as the sum of individual expenditures given the number of individuals forecasted by Sta-
tistics Netherlands (2011) combined with the disability prevalence forecasts of our model.
5.3 Results
Descriptives
Table 5.1 provides summary statistics for the study sample and for the subsamples of institu-
tional and home care users: 14.7% used LTC (average cost = €1,647), 11.6% used home care 
(€522), and 3.5% used institutional care (€1,125). Home care users – and to a greater extent 
Table 5.1 Description of LTC estimation sample (weighted; standard deviations after ±-sign)
Total sample
(n=6,512)
Institutional users 
sample (n=1,049)
Home care users sample 
(n=679)
LTC consumption
 LTC use (%)
 Mean LTC costs
14.7
1,647 ± 8,167
100.0
32,617 ± 26,961
100.0
5,124 ± 8,257
 Institutional LTC use (%)
 Mean Institutional LTC costs
3.5
1,125 ± 7,778
100.0
32,081 ± 27,092
3.2
619 ± 5310
 Home care use (%)
 Mean home care costs
11.6
522 ± 2,569
10.6
536 ± 2,410
100.0
4504 ± 6249
Demographics
 Age 67.6 ± 9.4 83.1 ± 7.6 77.0 ± 8.7
 Male (%) 45.7 25.1 25.3
Disability (%)
 Non-disabled
 Mildly disabled
 Severely disabled
66.8
30.7
2.5
6.3
23.3
70.4
20.9
78.6
0.5
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institutional users – were older, more often female and more often disabled. The prevalence 
of mild disability was lower for institutional residents than home care users because the 
institutionalized are more often severely disabled.
LTC spending by age, sex and disability
Figure 5.1 displays home care and institutional LTC use and spending by age, sex, and dis-
ability status. The first, second and third rows present the predicted probabilities of use, 
conditional expenditures, and expected expenditures, respectively. The probability of using 
LTC and the level of (un)conditional spending increase with the severity of disability. Home 
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Figure 5.1 LTC use and (un)conditional spending stratified by age, sex and disability status
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care use and spending, however, is highest for the mildly disabled elderly; the severely 
disabled elderly are more likely to be institutionalized. The probability of using home care 
or institutional LTC increases with age. Conditional home care spending increases and in-
stitutional LTC spending decreases with age. The latter finding is caused by the fact that the 
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Figure 5.2 Trends in mortality rates and disability prevalence stratified by age and sex
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younger institutional LTC users are rarely admitted to residential homes (the least expensive 
LTC institution) but more often to somatic nursing homes. Females are more likely to use 
both types of LTC and spend on average more than males. This finding could either be due 
to their higher morbidity level or lower availability of adequate informal care sources. No 
substantial differences in conditional expenditures were found between males and females. 
The difference in unconditional expenditures is thus driven mainly by the probability of 
using LTC.
Disability prevalence trend
Figure 5.2 presents the trend in mild and severe disability prevalence. The proportion of 
non-disabled elderly decreased for females, but remained fairly constant for males. The 
higher disability rates among females are entirely driven by increases in mild disability. Mild 
disability rates also increased for males, but less seriously. The prevalence of severe disability 
decreased for both sexes and is expected to further decrease the coming years.
(DF)LE trend
The trend in life expectancy (LE) at age 55 stratified by disability status is illustrated in figure 
5.3. LE at age 55 will continue to increase, but more for males than for females. LE for males 
is expected to increase by 2.0 years, from 24.9 (2008) to 26.9 (2020); for females it is ex-
pected to increase by 1.1 years (28.6 to 29.7). For both sexes, the number of severely disabled 
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Figure 5.3 Trend in life expectancy at age 55 stratified by life years with no, mild and severe disability
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life years will remain constant, but the number of mildly-disabled life years will probably 
increase. For females, the expected increase in life years with mild disability dominates the 
total increase in LE, resulting in a slight decrease of absolute LE years without disability. A 
relative compression of severe disability accompanying an expansion of mild disability is 
estimated for both sexes. In 2008, 8.0 (13.0) percent of the remaining LE for males (females) 
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Figure 5.4 Trend in lifetime spending from the age of 55 accounting for the disability trend
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was spent severe disability; this is expected to decrease to 7.0 (12.0) percent by 2020. The 
proportion of life years lived with mild disability is expected to increase from 20.7 to 22.1 
percent for males and from 31.0 to 35.0 percent for females. Overall, the proportion of DFLE 
will remain constant for males and decrease for females.
Lifetime spending forecasts
Figure 5.4 presents lifetime spending per capita at age 55 stratified by LTC service. Females 
spend about twice as much as males on both LTC services. Home care spending is expected 
to increase by €1416 for males and €3169 for females. Most of the growth is caused by the 
expansion of mild disability as most spending on home care is incurred during mildly dis-
abled life years. The bulk of institutional LTC spending is incurred during severely disabled 
life years. The pattern of lifetime spending on institutional LTC therefore coincides with the 
trend in severely disabled life years: lifetime institutional LTC spending slightly increases 
for males and decreases for females. Overall, total spending on LTC is expected to increase 
by €3836 (5.4 percent) for males and €1694 (1.3 percent) for females. Additional LTC spend-
ing per life year gained is €1585 for males and €1540 for females.
Aggregated spending forecasts
The effect of the increasing number of elderly and the oldest of the old becomes apparent 
in the aggregated spending forecasts. Accounting for the trend in disability prevalence, ag-
gregated LTC spending for the 55+ population is expected to increase from €22.0 to €26.2 
billion between 2008 and 2020, a 19.2 percent growth. Increased use of institutional LTC is 
responsible for about three quarters of the total aggregate growth in LTC spending.
5.4 Discussion
We have forecasted lifetime and aggregated LTC spending among the Dutch 55+ population 
out to 2020. Our approach goes beyond earlier efforts in that (i) our forecasts explicitly 
account for changes in disability patterns and longevity with and without mild and severe 
disability, and (ii) we distinguish forecasts of home care and institutional LTC expenditures.
There are several notable findings. First, disability trends depend on the severity of dis-
ability. A prevalence shift has been observed from severe to mild disability. Concerning 
DFLE, a simultaneous compression of severe and expansion of mild disability prevails. 
For females, the proportion of non-disabled years is expected to decrease. Second, lifetime 
spending for females is approximately double that of males primarily because females have 
a higher LE (with disability) and secondarily because they more often rely on formal care in 
the absence of informal care sources. Third, future longevity gains coinciding with a com-
pression of severe disability are not very costly. Home care is mainly used during life years 
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with mild disability; institutional LTC is strongly associated with severe disability. As such, 
a compression of severe and expansion of mild disability will increase lifetime spending 
on the least intensive LTC service: home care. Finally, the substantial effect of population 
aging on aggregate LTC spending reflects the substantial growth of the elderly cohort. Given 
such dramatic growth in future public LTC spending, changes in LTC financing might be 
necessary to keep LTC provision efficient and equitable. 
Recent studies have found that disability is the main determinant of LTC use and spend-
ing, which is reflected in the tremendous effect of the disability trend on lifetime and ag-
gregate LTC spending (Lubitz et al., 2003; Manton, Gu, and Lamb, 2006; de Meijer et al., 
2009, 2011). Our study revealed that disability profiles in the Netherlands have improved. 
Evidence from other countries, however, especially the US, found a declining mild disability 
trend while our study found a prevalence shift from severe to mild disability (Jacobzone et 
al., 1998; Waidmann and Liu, 2000; Freedman, Martin, and Schoeni, 2002; Stallard, 2007; 
Manton, Gu, and Lamb, 2006). Most studies, however, define mild disability as the inability 
to perform instrumental activities of daily living. Our conclusions therefore do not neces-
sarily contradict previous findings. Our results do, however, confirm previous evidence of 
a compression of life years with severe disability and an expansion of life years with mild 
disability (Perenboom et al., 2004).
We expect the observed decline in disability prevalence and DFLE to be partly explained 
by improvements in health status. Simultaneous to the disability decline, however, the prev-
alence of chronic conditions has reportedly increased (Parker and Thorslund, 2007; Jang 
and Kim, 2010). Moreover, the relationship between disability and health status has been 
proven to depend on personal capacity and environmental factors. The observed decline in 
disability could therefore at least to some extent be caused by environmental improvements 
that allow greater independence given a certain level of body functioning, such as changes 
in the perception of disability, reduced informal care, or technological improvements like 
electronic shopping and easy-to-prepare meals (Spillman, 2004; Wolf, Hunt, and Knick-
man, 2005; Parker and Thorslund, 2007). Further research should disentangle the causes of 
the disability decline to improve prognoses and possibilities of a continuation of it, and in 
turn stem LTC spending.
Most studies projecting future LTC spending based on disability trends assume that the 
trends are exogenous. The observed declines in disability prevalence and DFLE, however, 
are likely to be partly caused by the growth in acute care spending. Technological advances 
in the acute care sector are often able to mitigate disability – at a price. The decrease in LTC 
spending therefore probably occurs at the cost of the acute care sector. This is confirmed by 
the finding that in most developed countries, disability improvements have been accompa-
nied by an increase in chronic diseases (Parker and Thorslund, 2007; Jang and Kim, 2010).
Our study has a number of limitations. First, our forecasts do not account for future 
changes in informal care availability, which have been found to co-determine formal LTC 
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spending in developed countries (Yoo et al., 2004; de Meijer et al., 2011) The higher prob-
ability of females relying on formal LTC might be partly explained by the fact that they more 
often reside alone; even if co-residing, their partners are less likely to provide sufficient 
informal care. Given that our forecasts assume stable informal care availability rates, they 
might underestimate the future level of LTC spending as co-residence rates are expected to 
decrease; more importantly, increases in the female labour force and the retirement age are 
likely to decrease the availability of informal care. Second, our model assumes stability of 
the LTC expenditure function and constant prices but LTC service prices will most likely 
increase due to a number of reasons such as labour shortages and quality improvements in 
the LTC sector. A final limitation is the likely endogeneity of disability. In addition to the 
impact of disability on LTC use, use of LTC could in turn influence disability rates, which 
might bias our results.
Concluding, we have shown the importance of accounting for changing disability trends 
when modelling future LTC expenditures. Life extension with an improved disability profile 
does not substantially increase individual lifetime spending. Aggregate spending, however, 
will increase considerably due to the sheer number of elderly. Stimulating a compression of 
disability might alleviate the consequences of longevity gains and a growing elderly popula-
tion on LTC spending growth.
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Abstract
Including informal care in economic evaluations is increasingly advocated but problematic. 
We investigated three well-known concerns regarding contingent valuation (CV): (1) the 
item non-response of CV values, (2) the sensitivity of CV values to the individual circum-
stances of caring, and (3) the choice of valuation method by comparing willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) values for a hypothetical marginal change in 
hours of current informal care provided.
The study sample consisted of 1453 caregivers and 787 care recipients. 603 caregivers (41.5%) 
provided both WTP and WTA values, 983 (67.7%) provided at least one. Determinants of 
non-response were dependent on the valuation method; primary determinants were educa-
tion and satisfaction with amount of informal care provided. Caregivers’ mean WTP (WTA) 
for reducing (increasing) informal care by one hour was €9.13 (€10.52). Care recipients’ 
mean WTA (WTP) for reducing (increasing) informal care by one hour was €8.88 (€6.85). 
Values were associated with a variety of characteristics of the caregiving situation; explana-
tory variables differed between WTP and WTA valuations. The differences between WTP 
and WTA valuations were small.
Based on sensitivity CV appears to be a useful method to value informal care for use in 
economic evaluations, non-response however remains a matter of concern.
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6.1 Introduction
Informal care is a substantial part of total patient care, especially in situations of chronic 
illness and palliative care. Its costs and effects can be profound and economic evaluations 
should thus not ignore them (e.g. Gold et al., 1996; Drummond et al., 2005). Indeed, ne-
glecting informal care is identical to considering it a zero-cost substitute for formal care, 
which may lead to sub-optimal allocation of resources from a societal perspective (Brouwer 
et al., 1999; van den Berg, Brouwer, and Koopmanschap, 2004; Koopmanschap et al., 2008). 
Economic evaluations conducted from the societal perspective therefore must consider 
informal care when substantially present. Neglecting informal care also implies ignoring 
the effect its provision may have on the health and well-being of caregivers (Hughes et 
al., 1999; Schulz and Beach, 1999). While caregiver costs may well be deemed irrelevant 
from the narrower health care perspective, this is in fact not the case for the health effects 
associated with informal care (Bobinac et al., 2010).
Even in economic evaluations that claim to adopt a societal perspective, informal care is 
rarely included (Stone et al., 2000). A central reason is lack of knowledge and consensus 
on methods to value informal care in monetary terms. Recent discussion of methods to 
value informal care in monetary terms (e.g. van den Berg, Brouwer, and Koopmanschap, 
2004; Koopmanschap et al., 2008; van Exel et al., 2007) has centred on the proxy good 
method, the opportunity cost method, contingent valuation (CV), conjoint analysis (CA), 
and the well-being valuation method. The first two only value the time invested in informal 
care (van den Berg et al., 2006). CV and CA give a total value of informal care based on 
caregivers’ hypothetical preferences (van den Berg et al., 2005a-c). The well-being valuation 
method gives a total monetary value of informal care based on the loss of well-being due to 
providing informal care (van den Berg and Ferrer-I-Carbonell, 2007).
Our study employed CV, which is increasingly used in health economics to value 
non-market commodities like informal care. CV studies present research subjects with a 
hypothetical market situation to obtain their monetary valuation of a hypothetical change 
in it. CV is rooted in applied welfare economics and has been promoted in health econom-
ics since the early 1990s (Johannesson and Jonsson, 1991), although it is still controversial 
(Cookson, 2000; Blumenschein et al., 2001; Frew, Whynes, and Wolstenholme, 2003). Its 
major advantage is the (theoretical) possibility to value the full impact of providing or 
receiving informal care, sensitive to the individual situation and reflecting the preferences 
of caregivers and care recipients (van den Berg et al., 2005c). However, there also are some 
concerns regarding the use of CV to value informal care. This study researched the method 
and its controversy in a threefold manner. Using a sizeable sample of Dutch caregivers and 
care recipients, we investigated (1) non-response to CV questions, (2) the sensitivity of CV 
values to the individual circumstances of the caring situation, and (3) the choice of valuation 
method by comparing willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) values.
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A first concern relates to the feasibility of the CV method. Respondents may find answer-
ing CV questions to value informal care difficult or even awkward (Smith and Wright, 1994). 
They may dislike thinking of informal care in terms of money or have ethical objections 
against putting a ‘price’ on care provided to a loved one. Consequently, respondents may 
refuse to answer CV questions or give protest answers (e.g. zero) leading to a high and po-
tentially selective non-response and answers that do not reflect true preferences. Moreover, 
respondents may not always have well-developed preferences, leading to starting-point 
bias or anchoring of answers, e.g. payment for domestic help, for instance, is a reference 
point for the value of informal care resulting in a higher CV value of informal care among 
caregivers having a domestic help (van Exel et al., 2006). The feasibility of a CV study to 
value informal care is then put into question. Although its feasibility in this context appears 
to be good at first glance (van den Berg et al., 2005b-c), it cannot be determined without 
an in-depth non-response analysis, which to our knowledge did not exist. This study adds 
to the literature by analysing the selectivity of item non-response in caregivers’ CV using a 
broad range of characteristics and care situations. Because less than 5 percent of the sample 
reported protest answers, these are not analysed.
A second concern relates to the sensitivity of the CV method. Although CV is sensitive to 
the individual circumstances of caring in theory, it is unclear in practice. Van den Berg et al. 
(2005b-c) provide evidence indicating that CV is sensitive to caregiving circumstances. We 
complement these studies by using a larger sample and a greater variety of characteristics 
of the informal care situation, and by introducing the possibility to obtain CV values for 
various informal care tasks – an important aspect of sensitivity. This enables us to test the 
sensitivity of CV values against a broad range of caregiving characteristics.
A final concern relates to the valuation method, that is, WTP or WTA. While standard 
economic theory suggests that WTP and WTA should yield approximately the same value, 
previous studies have shown that WTA values systematically exceed WTP values by a ratio 
of 2:1 or more (Bromley, 1995; Brown and Gregory, 1999; Shefrin and Caldwell, 2001). The 
theoretical reasons for this disparity (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Smith, 2003) notwith-
standing, it leads us to question which method best reflects the ‘true’ value of, in this case, 
informal care. According to (Bromley, 1995) WTP is more appropriate when asking people 
to value a potential welfare gain (i.e., the buyer’s perspective) and WTA when valuing a po-
tential welfare loss (i.e., the seller’s perspective). This argues in favour of using WTA values 
in the informal care setting, since it involves ‘selling’ time in order to provide informal care 
(van den Berg et al., 2005c). On the other hand, WTP is sometimes favoured over WTA as 
it provides a lower bound valuation and it confronts respondents with a budget constraint. 
In practice this is also the method most studies use by referring to the NOAA Panel recom-
mendation (Arrow et al., 1993). Because there are arguments in favour of both, and because 
CV studies applied to informal care have so far revealed only relatively small differences 
between the values (van den Berg et al., 2005b), this study provides values for informal care 
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by using both WTP and WTA. We thus further investigate and compare WTP and WTA, 
and relate their differences to respondents’ characteristics.
In the following pages we discuss the sample, measures and analysis (section 2); the 
results (section 3); and overall findings and conclusions (section 4).
6.2 Methods
Sample
We conducted a secondary analysis on a pooled dataset from two Dutch cross-sectional 
studies among informal caregivers and their care recipients. The data for these studies were 
collected by sending (nearly) identical postal questionnaires to sample respondents regis-
tered at informal care support centres (van Exel et al., 2002) and the association of personal 
care budget-holders16 (van den Berg et al., 2002). Separate questionnaires were used for 
caregivers and care recipients. The pooled dataset consisted of 1453 caregivers aged 18 years 
and older and 832 care recipients, all with a matching caregiver. Part of the caregiver and 
care recipient data had previously been reported in van den Berg et al. (2005b).
Measures
The outcome variables in this study were WTP and WTA values for hypothetical marginal 
changes in the current level of informal care giving. Caregivers were asked about their will-
ingness to pay (accept) for one less (more) hour of informal care per week. Care recipients 
were asked about their willingness to pay (accept) for one more (less) hour of informal care 
per day. WTP and WTA were measured using an open-ended question format (Appendix 
6.1). A limitation is the interpretation of the care recipients WTP: How do we interpret a 
hypothetical internal household transfer? We return to this in section 6.4.
WTP and WTA values could also be related to the type of informal caregiving tasks. 
Caregivers and care recipients were asked which of five tasks – domestic help, personal 
care, outdoor mobility, organisational tasks, or social support – they would prefer to give 
(receive) one hour more (less) of. Respondents could also opt for not reducing (increasing) 
informal care hours. Furthermore, caregivers were asked to give an alternative use for the 
hour gained (lost): paid work, unpaid work, or leisure time.
Although CV values are not normally distributed, no log-transformation was applied 
since a squared-root transformation of CV values better approached the normal distribu-
tion than a log-transformation. The models with the squared root CV values as dependent 
16 In the literature the personal care budget is sometimes referred to as cash benefits, consumer directed services, 
or direct payments.
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variable had similar results to the models with the untransformed CV values. For ease of 
interpretation we chose not to transform the values.
The questionnaires also elicited a broad range of characteristics of the caregiver, care 
recipient and the caregiving situation. Caregiver and recipient health status were assessed 
using the EQ-VAS (The EuroQol Group, 1990). Additionally, the change in health status 
over the last 12 months was measured by a categorical question, i.e., ‘has it deteriorated?’ 
Furthermore, caregivers were asked whether the health complaint of the care recipient was 
physical, mental, or both. The Frenchay Activity Index (FAI) was included in the care recipi-
ent’s questionnaire (Holbrook and Skilbeck, 1983; Turnbull et al., 2000). FAI scores were 
reversed to a 0 to 10 scale for comparability with other measures, i.e., higher FAI scores now 
represented a lower functional ability. Objective burden of the caregiver was measured by 
total time17 and total number of informal care tasks provided using a list of 16 pre-specified 
(instrumental) activities of daily living (van den Berg et al., 2002; van Exel et al., 2002). Sub-
jective burden was assessed using both the Self-Rated Burden (SRB) scale (van Exel et al., 
2004) and the Caregiver Strain Index (CSI; Robinson, 1983). Process utility from providing 
informal care was measured for both caregivers and care recipients. Respondents were asked 
to rate their happiness on a 0 to 10 scale for (1) their current situation and (2) a situation 
without providing (receiving) informal care. Process utility is the difference between those 
values (Brouwer et al., 2005). Finally, socio-demographic and socio-economic measures 
for caregiver and care recipient were elicited, as well as whether a care recipient received 
a personal care budget (PCB). Both socio-economic measures and PCB were expected to 
influence the CV value since it is obviously related to ability to pay. Net household income 
was measured as an ordinal variable. Income was included in the analysis as a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether the net household income was above or below median for 
caregivers (€1569 (fl. 3500)) and care recipients (€1121 (fl. 2500)). Appendix 6.2 presents a 
complete list of selected variables.
Analysis
First, we analysed item non-response to the CV questions. We restricted this to caregiver 
data since caregiver valuation of informal care is the primary measure used in economic 
evaluations. The relationship between response, caregiver characteristics, and caregiving 
situation was explored by using univariate chi-square and t-tests followed by a multivari-
ate logit with the dependent variable being “provided at least one of the two CV values” 
(p<0.05).
Second, we explored the sensitivity of WTP and WTA values among caregivers and care 
recipients using OLS. A distinction was made in the caregiver sample between those below 
17 Time per task and total caregiving time were maximized at 126 hours per week (18 hours per day * 7 days per 
week).
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and over the age of 65 years, the formal pension date in the Netherlands. The underlying 
hypothesis was that labourers and pensioners have different role responsibilities, claims on 
their time, and expectations of life (e.g. professional career, caring for children, quiet old 
age) and consequently provide different values. The analysis of care recipient values was 
restricted to people 18 years or older because we assumed the valuation task might be too 
complex for minors. This was confirmed by the fact that 93.3 percent of the care recipients 
below the age of 18 did not provide a value. Using OLS, a core set of explanatory variables 
was entered into each model: age, gender, health status, care intensity (number of caregiving 
tasks) and duration of the informal care relationship. SRB was forced only in the caregiver 
model.18 Because of the explorative nature of this study, the large number of characteristics, 
and the broad heterogeneity of the dataset in caregiving situations, a stepwise procedure 
was used for the other variables with a fairly generous significance level (.20) for adding 
variables to the model.
Finally, we investigated differences in WTP and WTA values provided by caregivers and 
care recipients. It is important to note that comparability of these values was restricted by 
several factors. First, the WTA question referred to public financing and WTP to out-of-
pocket expenses (appendix 6.1). Different budget constraints thus enter in and may lead to 
variance with respect to mental accounting. Therefore we had to be cautious with interpret-
ing intra-personal comparisons of WTP and WTA values. Second, the caregiver questions 
referred to a change of one hour per week whereas the care recipient questions referred to a 
change of one hour per day. There is no acceptable way to rescale these values to make them 
comparable. Perhaps more important is that an hour of informal care is not equivalent in 
the minds of caregivers and care recipients. Losing an hour of informal care is undoubtedly 
more meaningful to the recipient than the caregiver and therefore should be valued higher 
in recipient response. For these reasons the values provided by caregivers and care recipi-
ents cannot be compared directly, that is, inter-personally. We thus focused on exploring the 
characteristics of caregivers who provided a higher WTP than WTA value. This subgroup is 
most interesting because it behaves counterintuitively.19 A WTP to supply one hour less that 
exceeds a WTA to supply one hour more implies a negatively sloped supply curve and thus 
a strong latent resistance to reduce the amount of caregiving and a strong latent preference 
for extending their informal care supply. We hypothesize that this subgroup of caregivers 
derives substantial process utility from providing informal care (Brouwer et al., 2005). We 
focus on caregivers for two reasons: (1) the value of informal care in economic evaluations 
is usually based on caregiver valuations; (2) the caregiver sample is much larger, yielding 
more robust data. The WTP/WTA disparity was analysed using univariate analyses (p<.05).
18 SRB was selected as measure of subjective burden since it was more strongly correlated with the CV values than 
the CSI score.
19 In discussions of the WTP/WTA disparity, WTA is commonly found to be (much) higher than WTP (e.g. Brom-
ley, 1995; Brown and Gregory, 1999; Shefrin and Caldwell, 2001).
112 Chapter 6
6.3 Results
Sample characteristics
Of the 1453 caregivers, 1087 (74.8%) were 18-64 years old and 366 (25.2%) were 65 or older. All 
787 care recipients were older than 18. Table 6.1 presents the characteristics of the caregivers 
and care recipients who responded to at least one CV question. Caregiver data between 
the two age groups is considerably different. Apart from the characteristics that normally 
coincide with older age, the sample of caregivers 65+ consisted of more males; the duration 
of the caregiving relationship was shorter; the caregiver was more often the sole caregiver; 
the caregiver more often provided care to a partner; cohabitation with the care recipient 
was more common; caregiver educational level was lower; the caregiver more often had 
domestic help; the care recipient more often had a mental health problem; the care recipient 
more commonly had a PCB; and the preferred task to give up or get more of (at the expense 
of social support) was more often domestic help.
Response
746 (51.3%) caregivers provided a WTP value for one hour less informal care; 840 (57.8%) a 
WTA value for one hour more informal care; 603 (41.5%) for both; and 983 (67.7%) for one of 
the two values. 41 provided a zero WTP value and 32 a zero WTA value. Table 6.2 compares 
the characteristics of caregivers who provided at least one CV value and those providing no 
CV value (univariate analysis). A range of variables is significantly associated with respond-
ing to CV questions. A multivariate analysis (n=919) showed that only a lower educational 
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics study sample
Variable
Caregivers Care recipients
Total sample
(n=983)
Age 18-64
(n=785; 79.9%)
Age 65+
(n=198; 20.1%)
Total sample
(n=289)
Stat. S.D. Stat. S.D. Stat. S.D. Stat. S.D.
Age (mean) 54.4 13.1 49.7 9.8 73.3 5.4 67.7 17.2
Male (%) 29.1 25.7 42.4 47.9
Duration (mean) 161.5 134.8 168.1 138.5 134.1 114.6 110.1 92.7
Intensity (mean) 7.8 3.7 7.7 3.7 8.1 3.5 8.0 3.6
Health status (mean) 72.4 16.7 73.1 17.0 69.9 15.5 48.6 20.0
Health deteriorated (%) 16.1 15.0 20.4 58.3
FAIrev (mean) 7.4 1.9
Self-rated burden (mean) 54.3 26.8 53.7 26.8 56.8 26.6
Relationship: partner (%) 45.4 37.4 77.4 59.6
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Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics study sample (table continued)
Variable
Caregivers Care recipients
Total sample
(n=983)
Age 18-64
(n=785; 79.9%)
Age 65+
(n=198; 20.1%)
Total sample
(n=289)
Stat. S.D. Stat. S.D. Stat. S.D. Stat. S.D.
Relationship: parent (%) 23.0 27.6 4.6 20.2
Relationship: child (%) 15.7 17.8 7.2 6.3
Relationship: other (%) 15.9 17.2 10.8  13.9
IC network (mean) 1.9 1.3
IC: single caregiver (%) 53.9 51.5 63.4 53.6
Co-residence (%) 61.8 56.9 81.5 65.6
Child(ren) <18y (%) 27.9 33.0 7.3
Education low (%) 30.5 28.3 39.6 51.1
Education middle (%) 47.4 47.7 45.8  34.9
Education high (%) 22.1 23.9 14.6 14.0
Employment PT (%) 22.6 27.7 2.1
Employment FT (%) 14.4 17.9 0.0
Breadwinner (%) 43.5 42.3 48.1
Income high (%) 48.6 49.4 45.5 30.0
Domestic help (%) 40.1 33.4 66.7 22.4
HC: physical (%) 86.2 86.1 86.9
HC: mental (%) 36.8 35.0 44.0
PU negative (%) 32.8 33.5 30.2 11.2
PCB (%) 50.7 57.1 24.6 18.4
AltTime: paid work (%) 26.6 32.2 2.2
AltTime: unpaid work (%) 15.3 15.6 14.0
AltTime: leisure (%) 74.5 73.1 80.4
Less IC: domestic help (%) 40.8 39.2 47.6 31.3
Less IC: personal care (%) 12.7 13.1 11.0 15.4
Less IC: mobility (%) 10.4 10.1 12.0 17.6
Less IC: organisation (%) 5.3 5.3 5.2 18.0
Less IC: social (%) 12.6 13.9 7.3 17.6
Less IC: no (%) 18.1 18.4 16.8
More IC: domestic help (%) 29.5 26.4 42.2 24.2
More IC: personal care (%) 15.6 15.8 14.4 12.6
More IC: mobility (%) 19.3 20.1 16.0 22.4
More IC: organisation (%) 5.1 5.2 4.8 8.3
More IC: social (%) 19.4 21.3 11.8 32.5
More IC: no (%) 11.1 11.2 10.7
Note: see Appendix 6.2 for glossary
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Table 6.2 Response analysis
Variable Caregivers
CV value
(n=983)
No CV value
(n=470)
T-value
Age (mean) 54.4 59.5 6.89
Male (%) 29.1 25.7 -1.35
Duration (mean) 161.5 148.3 -1.69
Intensity (mean) 7.8 7.1 -2.92
Health status (mean) 72.4 72.0 -0.42
Health deteriorated (%) 16.1 17.0 0.45
Self-rated burden (mean) 54.3 51.6 -1.59
Relationship: partner (%) 45.4 44.6 -0.29
Relationship: parent (%) 23.0 20.0 -1.30
Relationship: child (%) 15.7 12.4 -1.72
Relationship: other (%) 15.9 23.0 3.12
IC: single caregiver (%) 53.9 61.7 2.77
Co-residence (%) 61.8 56.7 -1.82
Child(ren) <18y (%) 27.9 20.9 -2.91
Education low (%) 30.5 44.1 4.91
Education middle (%) 47.4 42.1 -1.87
Education high (%) 22.1 13.8 -3.94
Employment PT (%) 22.6 15.7 -3.19
Employment FT (%) 14.4 9.8 -2.56
Breadwinner (%) 43.5 41.2 -0.77
Income high (%) 48.6 39.5 -3.15
Domestic help (%) 40.1 40.5 0.14
HC: physical (%) 86.2 82.1 -1.96
HC: mental (%) 36.8 43.0 2.24
PU negative (%) 32.8 25.9 -2.53
PCB (%) 50.7 44.4 -2.16
AltTime: paid work (%) 26.6 12.3 -6.56
AltTime: unpaid work (%) 15.3 15.5 0.10
AltTime: leisure (%) 74.5 72.9 -0.60
Less IC: domestic help (%) 40.8 23.3 -6.48
Less IC: personal care (%) 12.7 9.7 -1.64
Less IC: mobility (%) 10.4 11.8 0.70
Less IC: organisation (%) 5.3 5.1 -0.13
Less IC: social (%) 12.6 10.7 -0.98
Less IC: no (%) 18.1 39.4 7.56
More IC: domestic help (%) 29.5 19.0 -4.15
More IC: personal care (%) 15.6 10.4 -2.58
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level and care task preferences increased non-response. With regard to the latter, caregivers 
who did not want to increase their informal care hours at all were less likely to respond to 
at least one CV value. However, caregivers who preferred to reduce domestic help, personal 
care, or social support (reference group: no reduction) were more likely to respond to at 
least one CV value. Caregivers satisfied with the amount of care they provided were thus less 
likely to respond to CV questions.
Providing a WTP value but not a WTA (n=143) was more likely among caregivers who 
provided more care tasks; provided more hours of care; were part of a wider informal care 
network; experienced higher subjective burden or negative process utility; had a higher 
educational and income level; were employed fulltime; had domestic help; provided care to 
a partner or household member; preferred to increase or decrease domestic help, outdoor 
mobility, or personal care tasks; did not want to increase care tasks at all; and/or would use 
alternative time for leisure. Providing a WTA value but not a WTP (n=237) gives exactly a 
mirror image of the above group.
Of the care recipients in the sample, 261 (33.2%) provided a WTP value for one more hour 
of care, 251 (31.9%) a WTA value for one fewer hour of care, 223 (28.3%) for both values, and 
289 (36.7%) for one of each. No response analysis was conducted.
WTP and WTA of caregivers
Caregivers’ average WTP value for one fewer hour per week was €9.13 with a skewed distri-
bution to the right (SD 5.81; min 0.0; max 40.84; 25%/75% percentiles 6.81/11.34). Caregivers’ 
average WTA value for one extra hour was €10.52 (SD 6.79; min 0.0; max 45.37; 25%/75% 
percentiles 6.81/11.34). Figures 6.1a-c present the distribution of the CV values and WTP/
WTA disparity. Caregivers in the older group provided significantly lower WTP (€7.89 vs 
€9.44, t=6.82) and WTA (€9.19 vs €10.82, t=4.86) values.
Table 6.3 explains the caregivers’ WTP for one hour less informal care, which is signifi-
cantly associated with the type of informal care task. The average WTP ranged from €6.75 
for not willing to give up an hour informal care to €10.93 for one fewer hour of organi-
sational tasks. The valuations (i.e. coefficients) of personal care, mobility, and social help 
did not differ greatly. The relation between health and WTP had a parabolic shape with 
Table 6.2 Response analysis (table continued)
Variable Caregivers
CV value
(n=983)
No CV value
(n=470)
T-value
More IC: mobility (%) 19.3 17.6 -0.74
More IC: organisation (%) 5.1 4.1 -0.79
More IC: social (%) 19.4 17.9 -0.66
More IC: no (%) 11.1 31.0 7.59
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the maximum at nearly 85 on the 0-100 health scale. Up to a health score of 85, health was 
positively associated with the WTP; beyond that health has a negative effect on WTP. Ad-
ditionally, the WTP of caregivers with a deteriorating health is €1.18 higher than the WTP 
of caregivers with a stable or improving health, ceteris paribus (p=0.09). Furthermore, the 
WTP of caregivers with above average incomes and caregivers who provide care to their 
own child is higher. Finally, caregivers who take care of a PCB-holder have on average a 
€2.68 higher WTP value. Having a higher education level or a part-time job is close to being 
significant in increasing the WTP value.
As expected, marked differences were found between the age groups. As table 6.3 shows, 
health status, taking care of a child, taking care of a PCB-holder and a higher than average 
income only have significant influence on WTP for the younger group. The type of care task 
is less important for the older population; only providing one hour less of organisational 
help results in a significantly higher WTP, especially compared to the younger group (a 
coefficient of 12.01 versus 3.1). Older group caregivers whose health had deteriorated in the 
previous year and those with higher education levels had significantly higher WTP values. 
Last, the explanatory power of the model is substantially higher for the older age group (0.31 
vs. 0.14).
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Figure 6.1 Caregivers’ and care recipients’ CV values in euro’s
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Table 6.4 indicates that caregivers’ WTA value of one extra hour of informal care is 
positively related to subjective burden, a high education level, an above average income, 
having domestic help, paid work as an alternative use of time, taking care of a person with 
either physical or mental health problems, taking care of a PCB-holder, and a preference 
for organisational tasks. The duration of the care situation had a parabolic shape with a 
maximum of approximately 13 years. Up to 13 years, informal care was positively associated 
with the WTA; beyond that duration has a negative effect on WTA.
Table 6.3 Caregivers’ willingness to pay for one hour less informal care
Variable
Willingness to pay
Total sample
(n=578)
Age 18-64
(n=474; 81.9%)
Age 65+
(n=104; 18.1%)
Coef. S.E. t Coef. S.E. t Coef. S.E. t
Age * -.006 .022 -0.25 -.005 .031 -0.15 -.051 .089  -0.58
Male * -.880 .570 -1.54 -1.095 .662 -1.65 .304 1.014 0.30
Duration .013 .009 1.44 .0127 .010 1.21 -.000  .004 -0.04
Duration^2 -.000 .000 -1.77 -.000 .000 -1.58
Intensity .094 .073 1.28 .065 .083 0.78 .028 .138 0.20
Health status * .170 .076 2.24 .175 .081 2.17 -.025 .035 0.71
Health status^2 -.001 .001 -2.08 -.001 .001 -2.16
Health deteriorated 1.184 .705 1.68  3.476 1.193 2.91
Self-rated burden * -.006 .011 -0.51 .003  .012 0.22  -.0160 .018 -0.87
Relationship: child 1.592 .677 2.35 1.480 .727 2.03
Education middle  2.431 1.014 2.40
Education high .988 .572 1.73 1.210 .629 1.92 2.280 1.380 1.65
Employment PT .974 .587 1.66 .762 .613 1.24 5.009 3.213 1.56
Income high 1.533 .493 3.11 1.658 .557 2.98
Domestic help .632 .519 1.22 .735 .597 1.23
PCB 2.679 .662 4.05 3.207 .737 4.35
AltTime: unpaid work 2.341 1.244 1.88
Less IC: domestic help 1.444 .894 1.62 1.419 .985 1.44
Less IC: personal care 3.078 1.059 2.91 3.745 1.166 3.21
Less IC: mobility 3.709 1.084 3.42 3.981 1.204 3.31
Less IC: organisation 4.553 1.312 3.47 3.108 1.448 2.15 12.01  2.349 5.11
Less IC: social 3.714 1.062 3.50 4.204 1.164 3.61
Constant -2.320 3.019 -0.77 -2.312 3.325 -0.70 7.534 7.508 1.00
Adjusted R² .14 .14 .31
Note: * variable forced into the model, other variables introduced stepwise (see Appendix 6.2 for glossary). 
The variables Age^2, Intensity^2, Self-rated burden^2, Relationship: partner, Relationship: parent, Co-
residence, IC: single caregiver, Child(ren) <18y, Employment FT, Breadwinner, HC: physical, HC: mental, PU 
negative, AltTime: paid work, AltTime: leisure were omitted from this table because these variables were not 
picked up by any of the models.
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Marked differences were again observed in the age groups. Only the impact of subjective 
burden, alternative time use of paid work, and preferences for providing organisational help 
in the extra hour informal care had significant influence on the WTA value in both groups. 
However, the strength of the influence is far from identical in the groups: coefficients in 
the older age group were more than twice as high.20 Being female, the duration of the care, 
20 We should note here that of the older caregivers who provided a WTA value, only 5 (2.0%) chose paid work for 
an alternative time use preference.
Table 6.4 Caregivers’ willingness to accept one hour more informal care
Variable Willingness to accept
Total sample
(n=639)
Age 18-64
(n=529; 82.8%)
Age 65+
(n=110; 17.2%)
 Coef.  S.E. t  Coef.  S.E. t  Coef.  S.E. t
Age * .205 .122 1.68 .060 .032 1.88 .020 .116 0.17
Age^2 -.002 .001 -1.65
Male * -.658 .598 -1.10 -1.371 .671 -2.04 .592 1.210 0.49
Duration * .025 .009 2.59 .026 .011 2.47 -.004 .006 -0.74
Duration^2 -.000 .000 -3.22 -.000 .000 -3.06
Intensity * .137 .081 1.69 .198 .089 2.22 -.257 .178 -1.44
Health status * .003 .016 0.20 .008 .018 0.43 -.001 .038 -0.02
Self-rated burden * .035 .011 3.17 .033 .012 2.63 .073 .023 3.13
Child(ren) <18y -.999 .661 -1.51
Education high 2.067 .636 3.25 2.416 .687 3.52
Income high 1.124 .546 2.06 .925 .589 1.57 2.392 1.195 2.00
Domestic help 1.202 .576 2.09 1.528 .648 2.36
HC: physical 1.871 .860 2.18 1.526 .966 1.58 3.546 1.776 2.00
HC: mental 1.597 .652 2.45 1.867 .749 2.49
PCB 2.852 .695 4.10 2.998 .750 4.00
AltTime: paid work 2.572 .627 4.10 2.071 .645 3.21 7.473 3.090 2.42
More IC: domestic help -.785 .605 -1.30
More IC: mobility .915 .695 1.32 3.168 1.241 2.55
More IC: organisation 3.773 1.157 3.26 1.513 .714 2.12 8.238 2.676 3.08
More IC: social 4.624 1.856 2.49
Constant -3.764 3.837 -0.98 -2.266 2.629 -0.86 .938 10.155 0.09
Adjusted R² .15 .15 .22
Note: * variable forced into the model, other variables introduced stepwise (see Appendix 6.2 for glossary). 
The variables Intensity^2, Health status^2, Health deteriorated, Self-rated burden^2, Relationship: partner, 
Relationship: parent, Relationship: child, IC: single caregiver, Co-residence, Education low, Employment PT, 
Employment FT, Breadwinner, PU negative, AltTime: unpaid work, AltTime: leisure, More IC: personal care were 
omitted from this table because these variables were not picked up by any of the models.
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providing more care tasks, having a higher education, having domestic help, taking care of 
a mentally ill person, taking care of a PCB-holder, and a preference for mobility tasks were 
positively associated with the WTA value of younger caregivers. Taking care of a physically 
disabled person, having an above average income, and a preference for social support tasks 
were positively associated with the WTA value of older caregivers.
Among caregivers who provided both WTP and WTA values, the mean difference be-
tween them was €1.13 (t=51.2; see figure 6.1c). In terms of WTP/WTA disparities generally 
observed, this is fairly low. About half of the caregivers (54.4%) provided identical WTP and 
WTA values, 29.2% a higher WTA value, and 16.4% a higher WTP value. The last group (99 
caregivers) did not behave as expected: what they would pay to forego an hour of caregiving 
was more than what they would have to be paid to provide another hour. This subgroup 
more often (1) provided care for a longer period, (2) experienced deteriorating health, (3) 
provided care to their own child, (4) had children below the age of 18 years, (4) had an 
above average income, (5) took care of someone with a PCB, and (6) preferred not to reduce 
hours of informal care (p<0.05). Our expectation that they would possibly derive more 
utility from providing informal care was not confirmed because the process utility vari-
able was equal to caregivers with WTP greater than WTA. Caregivers with a higher WTA 
nonetheless explicitly signified that they were not willing to reduce their caregiving hours, 
indicating a (strong) preference to provide informal care.
WTP and WTA of care recipients
Care recipients would on average be willing to pay €6.85 (SD 5.49; min 0.0; max 34.03; 
25%/75% percentiles 4.54/9.08) to get an extra hour of informal care per day. They would 
on average be willing to be paid €8.88 (SD 6.21; min 0.0; max 45.37; 25%/75% percentiles 
4.54/11.34) to forego one hour per day. Both distributions were heavily skewed to the right 
(see figures 6.1e and 6.1f).
Table 6.5 presents the sensitivity of care recipients’ WTP and WTA values. The WTP 
value for an additional hour was positively associated with age and negatively associated 
with functional ability, assistance with organisational tasks, and the situation where the 
principal caregiver had child(ren) younger than 18 years old. Close to significant were the 
effects of health status, PCB, and caregiver age. That caregivers value organisational help 
higher than other types of informal care while care recipients value it lower than other tasks 
is worth noting. Care recipients’ WTA is only significantly influenced (p<0.05) by having a 
PCB, increasing its value on average by €4.40. Close to significant in lowering the price of 
forgoing an hour were functional ability and having the caregiver as a partner.
Among care recipients who provided both a WTP and a WTA value, the mean difference 
was €2.05 (t-value: 29.2; see figure 6.1f), which again is fairly low. 51.6% provided identical 
WTA and WTP values, 36.8% a higher WTA value and 11.7% (against expectations) a higher 
WTP value. The counter-intuitive group was too small to analyse further.
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6.4 Discussion and conclusion
This study analysed caregivers’ and care recipients’ value of informal care using CV. Dis-
crepancies between WTP and WTA values in both groups were much smaller than those 
normally found in the literature. On average caregivers and care recipients valued an hour 
informal care at €9.83 and €7.8721 respectively, but the values varied substantially by kind of 
task. Caregiver and care recipient values could not be compared directly because we used 
different time scales and an hour less of more of care will have very different implications 
for the recipient and the care giver.
21 Year 2001 values. A correction of 14.4% based on the consumer price index 2001-2008 would result in equivalent 
year 2007 values of €11.20 and €9.00, respectively (Statistics Netherlands, 2008).
Table 6.5 Care recipients’ willingness to pay for one hour more informal care and willingness to accept one 
hour less informal care
Variable
Willingness to pay
(n=185)
Willingness to accept
(n=184)
Coef. S.E. t Coef. S.E. t
Age * .062 .029 2.15 -.036 .026 -1.41
Male * .044 .839 .05 .462 .901 .51
Duration * -.001 .005 -.21 .003 .005 .57
Intensity * .092 .135 .68 .164 .149 1.10
Health status * .043 .022 1.92 .005 .022 .23
Health deteriorated 1.188 .864 1.38
FAIrev -2.981 1.385 -2.15 2.512 1.482 1.70
FAIrev^2 .195 .103 1.90 -.206 .107 -1.92
Relationship: partner -1.890 1.006 -1.88
Co-residence 1.534 1.094 1.40
Education low -1.372 .837 -1.64 -1.273 .903 -1.41
PCB 2.189 1.122 1.95 4.399 1.090 4.04
More IC: organisation -3.228 1.506 -2.14
CG age -.086 .046 -1.86
CG child(ren) <18y -3.429 1.275 -2.69
CG employed -1.611 1.027 -1.57
Constant 15.457 5.379 2.87 3.801 5.813 .65
Adjusted R² .13 .11
Note: * variable forced into the model, other variables introduced stepwise (see Appendix 6.2 for glossary). 
The variables Age^2, Duration^2, Intensity^2, Health status^2, Relationship: parent, Relationship: child, IC: 
network, IC: network^2, IC: single caregiver, Less IC: domestic help, Less IC: personal care, Less IC: mobility, Less 
IC: organisation, Less IC: social, More IC: domestic help, More IC: personal care, More IC: mobility, More IC: 
social were omitted from this table because these variables were not picked up by any of the models.
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We tested CV feasibility to value informal care by investigating non-response and the 
sensitivity of CV to the heterogeneity of informal care situations. While univariate analysis 
indicated selectivity in response to a range of variables, multivariate analysis found only 
minor selectivity. Educational level and care task preferences alone significantly influenced 
non-response. Caregivers not satisfied with the current amount of informal care they pro-
vided were more likely to respond to CV questions. Consequently, caregivers’ CV values 
might be biased upwards since we expect dissatisfied caregivers to value informal care 
higher than satisfied caregivers. Van den Berg et al. (2005c) also observed a relationship 
between response rates and educational level but, unlike this study, they found that older 
caregivers were less willing to answer CV values. We found substantial differences in the type 
of respondents answering WTP or WTA questions. As a result, the choice of CV method 
used to value informal care can result in substantial differences in terms of participating 
respondents. There were too few protest answers to analyse selectivity within that category.
The low exploratory power of some of the models notwithstanding, our analysis showed 
that WTP and WTA values were sensitive to a variety of characteristics of the caregiver, care 
recipient, and caregiving situation. Striking results were (1) differences in characteristics 
associated with WTP and WTA values, and (2) the considerable impacts of kind of care 
task, alternative time use (i.e., opportunity costs) and having a PCB. Noticeable differences 
were also found in the models explaining the CV values of caregivers above or below the age 
of 65. Different variables were selected and in both models their coefficients differed sub-
stantially. How stable these age group differences are is unclear. It is important to consider 
that the results are based on cross-sectional data. Cohort effects – changing socio-cultural 
values (emancipation), labour market gender ratios, individualisation, and so on – are thus 
not taken into account.
The number of factors associated with the CV value of care recipients was much lower. 
Care recipients’ WTP as a monetary value of informal care has limitations in terms of com-
parability and interpretation. How can we interpret the willingness to pay for care provided 
when this represents a hypothetical internal family/household transfer? In theory, care 
recipients might deliberately value informal care provided by a household/family member 
higher. We found no evidence supporting this theory, however, since the WTP of care 
recipients was not associated with either caregiver-recipient relationship or co-habitation.
The results suggest that CV values are sensitive to the heterogeneity and dynamics of 
informal care, implying that the CV method has the capability of capturing the full effects 
of the informal care situation in monetary terms.
Finally, we explored the characteristics of caregivers providing WTP values to forgo one 
hour of care higher than WTA values to provide an additional hour of care. Such valuations 
are unexpected, uncommon, and not easily explained. The main conclusion may be that 
these caregivers showed resistance or were unwilling to reduce their informal care task. Our 
hypothesis that this would be related to process utility from providing care was not con-
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firmed, indicating perhaps other reasons for preferring not to reduce informal care hours. 
Van Exel et al. (2007) found that care recipients’ resistance to substituting their informal 
care with another type of care or a different caregiver is an important factor in some caregiv-
ing situations. We were not able to test this hypothesis with the available data.
The systematic positive association of informal care values with the care recipient having a 
PCB is worth noting. It raises the question of whether it is related to ability to pay or perhaps 
is a result of the introduction of economic thinking and incentives into what was a non-
market situation, confirming the concerns expressed by (van den Berg and Schut, 2003) that 
PCBs can drive up long-term care expenditures by monetising “free” informal care. This 
elevating effect of a PCB can be caused by different mechanisms. First, PCB-holders and 
their caregivers may be more familiar with formal home care tariffs and subsequently use 
this as a reference point in the valuation of informal care. Second, the ability to pay informal 
care is substantially larger with a PCB than without one, i.e., costs are out-of-pocket. Third, 
most caregivers and care recipients with a PCB do not lose money by paying for informal 
care since it is most often provided by the partner, which amounts to paying oneself. On the 
other hand, PCB-holders who choose formal over informal care do lose money.
A main limitation of this study was related to the model selection. When theoretical 
and empirical evidence is ample enough to build an empirical model and avoid stepwise 
modelling, it is preferable. There is common agreement that the stepwise method can result 
in poor models when used improperly. The danger is especially high in the presence of 
multicollinearity, which increases the probability of a type II error since the standard errors 
of the coefficients (which affect the p-value of a coefficient) will increase, resulting in the 
exclusion of good predictors. However, a correlation matrix showed no correlations close 
to 0.80 and none of the variance inflation factors (VIF) came close to 10 (Myers, 1986). In 
addition, both a likelihood ratio test and a Wald test concluded that the omitted variables 
were not jointly significant. The robustness of the models was further tested by looking at 
the presence of influential outliers using Cook’s distance (Cook and Weisberg, 1982). None 
could be identified using either the critical value of 1 for Cook’s distance or the critical 
F-value at p=0.10. Moreover, stepwise modelling appears to be justified for exploratory 
model building (Wright 1997), which is the case of this study. In our particular case of 
variable selection from the large set of caregiver, care recipient, and caregiving situation 
characteristics, the literature offered insufficient guidance.
A final limitation is that the sample is not representative of Dutch informal caregivers 
and care recipients. Although difficult to determine, the fact that our respondents reported 
themselves to an informal care support centre or were members of the association of PCB 
holders indicates that they may represent caregivers with a higher than average caregiving 
burden. On the other hand, if response to the questionnaire is indeed lower among caregiv-
ers with substantial burden (the expected case), the sample may well represent a ‘middle 
group’. Our sample also consisted of a self-selected group of people motivated to participate 
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in this type of research. It is unclear whether the response rate to CV questions would be 
different among those who did not return this questionnaire, or whether these questions 
perhaps were the reason for not returning it. In sum, our results cannot be generalised to 
the wider population of informal caregivers.
In conclusion, this chapter has investigated the feasibility and sensitivity of the CV 
method for derivation of monetary values for informal care. Our results appear favourable 
in terms of the method’s sensitivity but the feasibility of CV remains a matter of concern. 
In addition, the choice of CV method importantly influences the value of informal care as 
well as the type of respondents answering the CV questions. The WTA and WTP disparity 
estimates were much smaller than those of existing empirical literature. All in all, the use of 
CV appears to be a passable route to value informal care for use in economic evaluations.
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Appendices
Appendix 6.1 WTP / WTA question format
Caregiver one hour 
more
Suppose the person you provide informal care to needed an additional hour of care per 
week and government would pay you for it. How much would you minimally want to 
receive from government to provide this additional hour of care?
one hour less Suppose it were possible to decrease your informal caregiving by one hour per week. 
Someone else would take over this hour, so that the care recipient would still receive the 
same amount of care. How much would you maximally be willing to pay to have this 
hour taken over by someone else?
Care 
recipient
one hour 
more
Suppose you could receive one extra hour of care per day from your principal informal 
caregiver and that you had to pay for this yourself. How much would you maximally be 
willing to pay for the extra hour of care?
one hour less Suppose you were to receive one less hour of care per day from your principal informal 
caregiver and government would compensate you financially for it. How much would 
you minimally want to receive as compensation for this hour?
Appendix 6.2 Glossary
Variable Explanation
Age Age † ‡ *
Male Gender (0=female; 1=male) † ‡
Duration Time providing informal care (in months; maximum set to 30 years) † ‡ *
Intensity Number of care giving tasks (1-16) † ‡ *
Health status EuroQoL EQ-VAS score † ‡ *
Health deteriorated Health status deteriorated over last 12 months (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
Functional ability Frenchay Activity Index (reverse scored and recoded 0-10) ‡ *
Self-rated burden Self-rated burden (0-100) † *
Relationship: partner Relationship caregiver - care recipient (1=CR is partner; 0=other) † ‡
Relationship: parent Relationship caregiver - care recipient (1=CR is parent; 0=other) † ‡
Relationship: child Relationship caregiver - care recipient (1=CR is child; 0=other) † ‡
IC: network Number of informal caregivers the care recipient has ‡ *
IC: single caregiver Care recipient has one informal caregiver (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
Co-residence Co-residence caregiver - care recipient (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
Child(ren) <18y Caregiver has child(ren) below 18 years of age (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
Education low Caregiver’s level of education is low (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
Education middle Caregiver’s level of education is middle (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
Education high Caregiver’s level of education is high (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
Employment PT Caregiver is employed part-time(1=yes; 0=no) †
Employment FT Caregiver is employed full-time (1=yes; 0=no) †
CG employed Caregiver is employed (1=yes; 0=no) ‡
Breadwinner Caregiver is the breadwinner (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
The feasibility of contingent valuation to value informal care 125
Appendix 6.2 Glossary (table continued)
Variable Explanation
Income high Caregiver has above average income in sample (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
Domestic help Caregiver has domestic help (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
HC: physical Care recipient’s health complaints are predominantly physical (1=yes; 0=no) †
HC: mental Care recipient’s health complaints are predominantly mental (1=yes; 0=no) †
PU negative Caregiver experiences negative process utility (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
PCB Care recipient has personal care budget (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
AltTime: paid work Alternative time use preference: paid work (1=yes; 0=no) †
AltTime: unpaid work Alternative time use preference: unpaid work (1=yes; 0=no) †
AltTime: leisure Alternative time use preference: leisure time (1=yes; 0=no) †
Less IC: domestic help Preferred task to reduce: domestic help (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
Less IC: personal care Preferred task to reduce: personal care (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
Less IC: mobility Preferred task to reduce: outdoor mobility (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
Less IC: organisation Preferred task to reduce: organisational tasks (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
Less IC: social Preferred task to reduce: social support (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
Less IC: no Preferred task to reduce: no reduction in any task (1=yes; 0=no) †
More IC: domestic help Preferred task to increase: domestic help (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
More IC: personal care Preferred task to increase: personal care (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
More IC: mobility Preferred task to increase: outdoor mobility (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
More IC: organisation Preferred task to increase: organisational tasks (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
More IC: social Preferred task to increase: social support (1=yes; 0=no) † ‡
More IC: no Preferred task to increase: no increase in any task (1=yes; 0=no) †
Note: † variable included in caregiver model. ‡ variable included in care recipient model. * squared value included in 
model(s)
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Abstract
In the period 1998-2004, Dutch health care expenditures grew by 28 percent but the growth 
was not uniform across the spending distribution. We decompose total, hospital and phar-
maceutical spending growth across the full expenditure distribution into parts deriving from 
changes in its determinants and from changes in their functional relationship with spending 
levels.
Hospital expenditure growth was concentrated at the middle of the distribution and is 
largely explained by increased admission rates, stimulated by policies to reduce waiting lists. 
Growth at the top of the distribution is constrained by shortened length-of-stays and more 
intensive day care and policlinic use. Pharmaceutical expenditure growth was concentrated 
at the top of the distribution. Technological progress dominates the explanation of the 
growth, especially at higher quantiles. Shifts towards less intensive hospital treatment and 
population aging also moderately explain pharmaceutical expenditure growth. We conclude 
that it is worth looking beyond averages when examining expenditure growth and consider-
ing attempts to control growth.
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7.1 Introduction
Expenditures on health care continue to increase substantially, both absolutely and relative 
to national income, throughout most of the developed world. In the Netherlands, for in-
stance, the amount spent on health care as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
rose from 4.1 in 1972 to 13.1 in 2007 while real per capita spending has more than doubled 
over this thirty-five year period from around €1600 to over €3400 in 1998 prices22 (Statistics 
Netherlands, 2011). Expenditure growth on this scale has profound implications for both 
health and economic policy. Not surprisingly, accounting for it has been the purpose of 
much research (e.g. Getzen, 2000; Dormont, Grignon, and Huber, 2006; Mehrotra, Dudley, 
and Luft, 2003; Newhouse, 1992; van Elk, Mot, and Franses, 2010; Koopmanschap et al., 
2010). Medical technology is widely considered to be the key driver of health care expen-
diture (HCE) growth (e.g. Weisbrod, 1991; Newhouse, 1992). Since the public financing of 
health care is typically substantial, government policies can be expected to exert a strong 
influence on HCE growth. A third contributing factor is the rate of increase in health care 
wages and prices, which outpace general inflation through the Baumol (1967) effect. Trends 
in population health and demographics should also play a role but identification of their 
contribution is difficult given the sparsity of reliable data covering both health status and 
costs over time at the individual level. One study with access to suitable data found that 
changes in disease patterns constrained HCE growth in France in the nineties (Dormont, 
Grignon, and Huber, 2006). There is much literature on the contribution of population 
aging to HCE growth (e.g. Getzen, 1992; Richardson and McKie, 1999; Zweifel, Felder, and 
Meiers, 1999; Reinhardt, 2003; Steinmann, Telser, and Zweifel, 2006; Payne et al., 2007; 
Häkkinen et al., 2008; Koopmanschap et al., 2010; de Meijer et al., 2011). Estimates vary 
around a figure of roughly one percent real HCE growth per annum due to aging but this 
largely operates through trends in health (Koopmanschap et al., 2010).
This chapter decomposes the change in the distribution of acute HCE in the Netherlands 
over the period 1998-2004. It contributes to the literature on health expenditure growth in 
three ways. First, we use very rich individual level health insurance claims data that measure 
the actual expenditures reimbursed for hospital treatment and medication of the entire 
sickness fund population (two-third of the Dutch population). These data are linked to the 
hospital discharge and mortality registers allowing medical expenditures to be explained not 
only by disease patterns, time-to-death and cause-of-death, but also by medical procedures 
carried out in hospital and other factors measuring hospital practice styles. This allows us to 
open the black box of medical technology and other sources of change in practice styles. We 
could therefore identify the expenditure growth that can be directly attributed to changes in 
medical practices in the treatment of specific conditions.
22 According to broad definition of HCE.
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Second, we do not merely account for the growth in total or mean HCE but decompose 
the change in its full distribution. This allows us to describe variation in the growth of 
expenditures across the distribution and so, for example, determine whether high cost cases 
are becoming even more relatively expensive and are driving the total expenditure growth. 
It also makes it possible to distinguish between the contributions of determinants at differ-
ent points of the distribution. For example, we can address not only the question of how 
much population aging is contributing to the growth of mean expenditure but also whether 
this contribution is stronger at high expenditures than low expenditures and so whether 
aging stretches or narrows the distribution of HCE. For health insurers, risk adjusters and 
health care providers paid prospectively, it is important to know not only how average 
expenditures vary with observable characteristics but also how their variance differs.
Third, there was a policy decision to increase the funding of inpatient care during the 
period of analysis resulting in real spending increases in excess of four percent in two suc-
cessive years. The intention was to reduce waiting lists for hospital admission for particular 
procedures (van de Vijsel, Engelfriet, and Westert, 2011). There is seldom an opportunity to 
trace how an injection of funding gets distributed across patients. In addition, we further 
disaggregate the growth in acute expenditures by separately examining the growth in its 
two largest components: hospital and pharmaceutical care. Not only the rate of growth 
but also the explanation of the growth differs substantially between these two acute health 
care services. This disaggregation also reveals whether changes in hospital practices (e.g. 
a higher proportion of outpatient hospital care, reduction in the length-of-stay) have had 
spill-over effects on pharmaceutical spending, or vice versa.
The distribution of HCE may change for two broad types of reason. First the levels and/
or distributions of the determinants of HCE may change. Through its impact on population 
health, population aging is the most obvious contributor to this source of change. Second, 
structural changes may alter the way in which given determinants impact on HCE. Medical 
technology, changes in medical practice, and changes in health policy at both the micro 
level of hospitals and insurers and the macro level of government and regulators are the 
most likely sources of shifts in the relationship of HCE to its determinants. Most attempts 
to forecast future trends in medical expenditures, including those that aim to identify the 
contribution of population aging, estimate a model of HCE and use this to simulate HCE 
under alternative scenarios about future trends in the covariates (e.g. Zweifel, Felder, and 
Meiers, 1999; Seshamani and Gray, 2004b; Stearns and Norton, 2004; Breyer and Felder, 
2006; Lafortune et al., 2007; Häkkinen et al., 2008). This assumes that the relationship of 
HCE to its determinants is stable, which is unlikely. At best, these forecasts indicate what 
will happen in the absence of structural changes within a sector that is noted for technologi-
cal progress, high government regulation and many policy reforms.
We employ a decomposition method that separates the observed change in HCE into the 
part due to changes in determinants and that due to their changing impact. The size of the 
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second part gives an indication of how wrong a forecast of HCE growth would be if made 
on the assumption of a stable relationship. In this respect, our study is similar to that of 
Dormont, Grignon, and Huber (2006) who decomposed the growth in French HCE over 
the period 1992-2000 using a method in the spirit of Oaxaca (1973) - Blinder (1973). While 
Dortmont et al. explained the change in mean HCE, we decompose the change in the full 
marginal distribution. This allows us to establish whether the contribution of shifts in de-
terminants, such as aging and population health, is constant across the distribution and also 
whether the structural shifts in the relationship are more evident for high or low cost cases. 
We implement this by using distributional regression to generate counterfactual distribu-
tions (Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Melly, 2009). This approach delivers findings that 
could not have been uncovered by a standard decomposition of mean HCE. For example, 
not only the growth itself, but also the explanation of the growth varies at different points 
in the expenditure distribution.
In the next section of the chapter we describe important changes in health policy and 
other structural changes that occurred within the period over which we explain the growth 
in HCE. In the third section we present the decomposition method employed. The data 
are described in the fourth section and the results are given in the fifth. The final section 
concludes with implications for health policy in the Netherlands and beyond, and the 
acknowledgement of limitations.
7.2 Structural changes in the period 1998-2004
Policy changes
From 1983-2001, the volume of inpatient care was constrained by fixed global budgets, i.e. a 
priori defined budgets determined an income ceiling for hospitals. Hospital use was further 
constrained by financial incentives to under produce: hospitals could keep the surplus when 
production was lower than a priori agreed. In addition, from 1995 medical specialist in hos-
pitals were paid by fixed lump sums instead of fee for services. Budget funding successfully 
contained costs; HCE as a percentage of GDP remained fairly constant at 11.2 percent of 
GDP over the period 1983-2000. The real spending growth in the period 1983-2000 equaled 
2.5 percent annually (Statistics Netherlands, 2011).
However, budgets were set too tight to capture demographic developments and techno-
logical progress resulting in growing waiting lists for inpatient care. In addition to increas-
ing public dissatisfaction with the waiting lists, pressure on the government was raised by 
(inter)national verdicts in legal procedures ruling that patients have an enforceable right to 
timely care (van de Vijsel, Engelfriet, and Westert, 2011). Maximum waiting time standards 
were developed. The mounting pressure on the government resulted in a sudden relax-
ation of inpatient budgets in 2001. Output growth was no longer restricted to the budget; 
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hospitals received posterior compensation when output exceeded their a priori set budget 
(TKSG, 2000). Although the additional investments could only be spent on waiting list 
reduction, in practice budgets became open-ended. As additional measures to increase hos-
pital production, medical specialist’s fees were made dependent on realized production and 
recalculation based on realized production was established to remove financial incentives 
to under produce. These changes in hospital funding led to substantial increases in HCE, 
with aggregate HCE spending growth in constant prices reaching levels of 5.3, 4.4 and 4.3 
percentage points in 2001, 2002 and 2003, respectively (Statistics Netherlands, 2011).
The sudden relaxation of inpatient budgets indeed resulted in improved access to hospital 
care and a reduction of waiting times. In the period 1998-2002, the waiting lists for hospital 
care decreased by 4,000 patients (TCOZ, 2004). Waiting times for several diagnoses were 
however still longer than the agreed maximum waiting time (van de Vijsel, Engelfriet, and 
Westert, 2011). Elderly and individuals in need for treatments previously on the waiting 
list (e.g. cardiovascular, orthopaedic, cataract and plastic surgery) benefited most from the 
relaxation of budgets as their hospitalization rates increased disproportionately. Moreover, 
it is suggested to have contributed to the renewed progress in life expectancy, which had 
stagnated at the beginning of the 21st century (Mackenbach and Garssen, 2010).
Medical technological progress
Medical technological progress is generally viewed as the key driver of HCE growth (e.g. 
(Weisbrod, 1991; Newhouse, 1992). Although technological progress can, in principle, also 
reduce costs (Cutler and McClellan, 2001; Cutler, 2007), it often tends to promote a more 
widespread use, resulting in a rise in total HCE (Bodenheimer, 2005). The influence of 
medical technology has been found to be especially relevant for pharmaceutical spending 
(Dormont, Grignon, and Huber, 2006; Häkkinen et al., 2008). A good example of inno-
vative pharmaceuticals is the introduction of TNF alpha blockers in 2000-2004 to treat 
rheumatoid arthritis. TNF alpha blockers improve the quality of life of rheumatoid arthritis 
patients, but increase pharmaceutical treatment costs considerably.
Medical technological progress may also have contributed to increased efficiency in Dutch 
hospital care during our study period. It has facilitated a shift from clinical (overnight) 
admissions to day care admissions or policlinic visits. As a result, the number of clinical 
admissions and the length of stay have fallen while the number of day care admissions and 
policlinic visits has risen (TCOZ, 2004; Borghans et al., 2008). The possibility to substitute 
more intensive by less intensive hospital care strongly depends on the diagnosis. Next to 
these substitutions of treatment within the hospital, a substitution from hospital to GP 
treatment for some specific diagnoses has also been observed. An important example is the 
increased responsibility of GPs for diabetic care and their active involvement in the detec-
tion of diabetes within their patient population (Rutten et al., 1999; Niessen et al., 2003).
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Other structural changes
In addition to deliberate governmental policy and technological progress, other possible 
sources of structural change are: medical profession policies, consumer preferences and 
other changes in medical practices. Medical profession policies are potentially important 
causes of structural changes that may affect treatment costs of specific diseases. Examples 
include the introduction of integrated care programs, the introduction and enforcement of 
treatment protocols and drug formularies. A well-known example of an integrated care pro-
gram is the introduction of specialized stroke units. These stroke units were implemented 
on a large scale from about 2000 (van Exel et al., 2005). Average treatment costs could either 
be lower or higher after the introduction of the stroke service as average length-of-stay of 
admitted stroke patients decreased from 22 to 12 days between 1998 and 2004, but treatment 
intensified during the shorter stay. A related medical profession policy, also for stroke, is the 
development of GP guidelines to admit all stroke patients to the hospital. This resulted in 
increased hospitalization rates for stroke patients while the average severity of an admitted 
stroke patient decreased.
7.3 Methods
Decomposition method
We will decompose changes in the full marginal distribution of acute HCE into a contribu-
tion of changes in covariates and a contribution of changes in the functional relationship 
between HCE and its covariates, i.e. changes in coefficients. We apply a decomposition 
method of Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Melly (2009) who have extended the clas-
sical Oaxaca (1973) – Blinder (1973) decomposition of the mean to a decomposition of 
the full marginal distribution using distributional regression (Foresi and Peracchi, 1995). 
Distributional regression permits covariates to impact the outcome by changing its loca-
tion, scale and entire shape of the distribution. It performs well in the presence of nonlinear 
conditional quantile functions. Unlike any mean regression based decomposition, full dis-
tribution decomposition allows us to examine whether changes at the top of the distribution 
are characterized differently from those at the bottom or middle. In the case of HCE, it is 
not unlikely that, say, technological progress or population aging have affected HCE growth 
differently at different points in the expenditure distribution. For example, new medicines 
are likely to increase pharmaceutical spending more in the upper half of the distribution, 
resulting in a greater shift in the relationship of HCE to its observable determinants at the 
top of the distribution.
The decomposition is achieved by first obtaining estimates that fully describe the con-
ditional distribution of HCE and then simulating changes in the marginal distribution by 
combining these estimates with different samples of covariates. A distributional model is 
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used to estimate the conditional HCE distribution; m percentiles of the unconditional HCE 
distribution are estimated. For each of these m percentiles, the conditional distribution 
function at this level is estimated by a linear probability model (LPM). That is, we simply es-
timate the impact of covariates on the probability of HCE lying below each percentile point. 
We used LPM models as estimation time was considerable lower than in logit or probit 
models while decomposition results were virtually identical. m was set to 400. Bootstrapped 
standard errors (100 iterations) were obtained to take into account the sampling variation 
due to the estimation of the conditional model.
A simulation of the marginal distribution for each year is obtained by combining the co-
variate distribution of each year with the distributional model estimated for the same year. 
Simulations of the counterfactual distribution are obtained by combining the coefficients 
with the sampled covariates from the other year. The changes in HCE observed between 
2004 and 1998 can be decomposed as follows:
f (h04) - f (h98) = f *(h04) - f *(h04; X98)) + (f *(h04; X98) - f *(h98))+ε      (7.1)
where f(ht) denotes the empirical density of HCE directly estimated from the data, f*(ht) 
the simulated marginal distributions, f*(ht;Xt) the simulated counterfactual distributions, X 
a vector of covariates, and ε the residual caused by differences in the empirical and simu-
lated distributions. The first and second terms on the right-hand side are the contributions 
of changes in covariates and changes in coefficients, respectively.
We decompose both changes in the distribution of hospital and other secondary acute 
care expenditures, and changes in pharmaceutical expenditures. Because differences in 
utilization rates over time complicate interpretation of the results (e.g. is growth caused by 
higher utilization rates or by more expensive treatment conditional on use), we additionally 
decompose changes in each expenditure category conditional on any use.
A detailed decomposition of the contribution of covariates could distinguish the con-
tribution of changes in specific covariates. This detailed decomposition could therefore 
measure the contribution of changes in the age composition, health patterns, and medical 
practice styles over time. The contribution of changes in a specific covariate to the aggregate 
contribution of covariates (X; the universe of X1 and X2) is computed by first resampling 
from the 1998 distribution such that the specific covariate (X2) is distributed as in 2004 
while the remaining covariates remain distributed as in 1998 (X1), then decomposing the 
changes in expenditures between the newly defined sample of 1998 (f(h98;X198;X204)) and the 
sample of 2004 similar to equation (7.1):
f (h04) - f (h98; X198; X204) = ( f *(h04) - f *(h04; X198; X204)) + (f *(h04; X198; X204) - f *(h98; X198; X204))+ε 
(7.2)
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Finally, the contribution of changes in a specific covariate to the HCE growth is the differ-
ence between the aggregate contribution of changes in covariates given by the first expres-
sion in equation (7.1) and the contribution of covariates given by the first expression in 
equation (7.2). This procedure is repeated a number of times to compute the contribution 
of changes in each (group of) covariate(s). However, the procedure to resample the 1998 
sample such that a specific group of covariates is distributed as in 2004 holds correlations 
between this group of covariates and remaining covariates constant. Hence, the distribution 
of the correlates has also changed which entails that the sum of the contributions of changes 
in specific covariates exceeds the aggregate contribution of changes in covariates.
Improved insight into the contribution of changes in specific coefficients is obtained by 
testing the null of no change in the effect of a covariate over time. A two-part model includ-
ing a full set of time interactions is used to estimate these coefficients. A two-part model 
is commonly used to analyze HCE as this model is able to account for the high propor-
tion of non-users by separately analyzing the decision to use and the level of expenditures 
conditional on use (Jones, 2000). A probit model has been selected to analyze the decision 
to use. We followed the procedure proposed by Manning and Mullahy (2001) to select the 
most appropriate model for part II. Residuals from ordinary least squares (OLS) models on 
the logarithm of expenditures were not skewed (k=3.08). Hence, log OLS models are ap-
propriate to identify the relationship between HCE and its covariates at the mean. Stability 
of coefficients in both parts is tested separately through significance of the interaction term 
in each part of the model.
7.4 Data
Sample
A variety of data sources linked at the individual level is used. Detailed information on 
acute HCE is obtained from sickness fund records (Vektis). Vektis covers the entire sickness 
fund population, approximately two-third of the Dutch population. A probability linkage 
process is used to link sickness fund records to the municipality registration. Linkage to the 
municipality registration is required as each of the core data sets used (hospital registry, 
death registry) could also be linked to the municipality registration. Linking variables were 
date of birth, sex, zip code and survival status. Due to incompleteness of date of birth, only 
49% of the records could be linked to the municipality register (N= 9,082,279). Information 
on inpatient hospital use and survival status, as recorded in the national hospital and death 
registry respectively, were also linked to the municipality registration. Of the linked indi-
viduals, we randomly selected 165,000 insured for each year to obtain a sample for which 
computation was feasible. Decedents and inpatient hospital users were oversampled to be 
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able to estimate the effects of covariates related to decedent status and inpatient hospitaliza-
tion more precisely.
Iterative proportional fitting (IPF) weights were derived to correct for the sample selec-
tion caused by the linking process and oversampling. IPF corrects the marginal distribution 
of the weighting variables in our study sample to that of the total sickness fund population 
(Deming and Stephan, 1940; Bethlehem, 2008). We selected age*sex*decedent status, the 
linking keys, plus hospitalization status as weighting variables. The weighted distribution of 
the weighting variables in our study sample was identical to that of the total sickness fund 
population indicating that the derived weights adequately corrected for the selection.
Measures of health care expenditure
The three dependent variables, acute HCE, hospital and other secondary acute spending 
(hereafter: hospital expenditures) and pharmaceutical spending, measure average monthly 
spending, deflated to 1998 values. We model the log of each. Acute HCE comprised the sum 
of spending on hospital care, pharmaceuticals, transport, devices, obstetrics and maternity 
care covered by the basic benefit package. Dental and paramedic care were excluded because 
they were partly removed from the basic benefit package in 2004 resulting in a drop in the 
level of these expenditures in 2004. In addition, general practitioner (GP) expenditures 
were excluded because, given that GP’s were mainly funded on a capitation base during the 
study period, payments made by the insurer do not correspond to the cost of the GP care 
used. Hospital expenditures include the costs of use of: hospital and other secondary acute 
care including care provided by rehabilitation centres and private clinics that are allowed 
to supply care covered by public insurance. Pharmaceutical expenditures comprise spend-
ing on outpatient pharmaceuticals. Apart from pharmaceutical expenditures, expenditures 
were deflated to 1998 values using the consumer price index (CPI). Due to several price 
policies the price of pharmaceuticals decreased by 22 percent in the period 1998-2004 (SFK, 
2009). Hence, pharmaceutical expenditures were deflated by this proportion. In addition 
to correcting for general price changes, we corrected for the Baumol effect as it purely 
reflects changes in health care specific prices and not quality improvements. We applied this 
additional correction for the Baumol effect to labour intensive services only (0.8 percent 
annually; Douven et al., 2006).
Changes in the empirical distribution of expenditures
Table 7.1 reports summary statistics of monthly expenditures on acute care, stratified by 
year and both for the full sample and the samples of users. Figure 7.1 present the empiri-
cal distributions of the logarithm of the three spending categories for 1998 and 2004. The 
distribution of log acute HCE clearly shifted to the right indicating a substantial increase in 
log HCE in the period 1998-2004. Nominal growth rate of monthly spending at the mean 
equals 42 percent; it rose from €83 to €119. Our nominal growth rate for the period 1998-
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2004 is similar to previously reported growth (Statistics Netherlands, 2011). After correcting 
for price effects, the real growth rate at the mean equals 28 percent. This growth at the 
mean is mostly driven by increases in the upper half of the distribution. The 25th, 50th and 
75th percentile of acute HCE increased by -14, 38, and 39 percent, respectively. Expenditure 
growth conditional on use is positive across the entire distribution and is concentrated at 
the centre of the distribution.
Figure 7.2 plots the growth of monthly log spending between 1998 and 2004 (so the verti-
cal difference between the solid and dotted lines in figure 7.1) for each quantile, for the full 
sample and the subsample of users. The spikes in the three expenditure distributions for 
the full sample that follow after some percentiles of zero spending reflect differences in 
non-spenders between 1998 and 2004. The proportion of acute health care users decreased 
from 82.6 to 78.4 percent. This decrease entirely explains the reduction in acute HCE at the 
lower percentiles as a positive growth is observed for the subgroup of users. The reduction 
in acute health care users is driven by a decrease in pharmaceutical users which is almost 
entirely caused by the removal of the oral contraceptives from the basic benefit package in 
Table 7.1 Summary statistics per capita monthly spending (1998 prices) stratified by year and service type
Acute HCE Hospital and other 
secondary acute care 
expenditures
Pharmaceutical 
expenditures
1998 2004 Growth rate 1998 2004 Growth rate 1998 2004 Growth rate
Entire sample
Zero spenders (%) 17.4 21.6 49.5 45.9 23.4 29.2
 Mean 84.3 107.8 28% 57.8 68.0 18% 17.7 29.8 69%
 10th percentile 0.0 0.0 0% 0.0 0.0 0% 0.0 0.0 0%
 25th percentile 1.2 1.0 -14% 0.0 0.0 0% 0.3 0.0 -100%
 Median 9.1 12.5 38% 0.8 2.3 202% 3.3 3.5 5%
 75th percentile 46.3 64.4 39% 15.5 19.5 26% 14.0 23.6 69%
 90th percentile 153.6 201.4 31% 67.3 77.2 15% 49.1 80.3 64%
 95th percentile 308.1 387.0 26% 201.3 217.0 8% 83.2 134.7 62%
Conditional on use
 Mean 102.0 137.4 35% 114.5 125.3 10% 23.1 42.1 82%
 10th percentile 1.3 1.9 46% 2.4 2.7 14% 0.8 1.1 37%
 25th percentile 4.0 6.2 54% 5.1 5.8 13% 2.1 2.8 34%
 Median 16.5 26.3 60% 15.1 16.7 10% 6.0 10.2 70%
 75th percentile 61.6 92.0 49% 46.9 50.8 8% 22.5 42.6 90%
 90th percentile 186.4 253.8 36% 199.0 192.9 -3% 61.7 106.0 72%
 95th percentile 371.9 488.5 31% 463.5 482.2 4% 98.7 165.1 67%
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2004.23 The share of hospital users increased which would be expected from policy decision 
to reduce waiting lists.
Hospital and pharmaceutical spending together comprise approximately 90 percent of 
mean acute HCE. The growth rates in hospital and pharmaceutical spending show markedly 
different patterns. Mean pharmaceutical spending increased by no less than 69 percent, 
mean hospital spending only by 18 percent. Although the expenditure growth of both 
services is situated in the upper half of the distribution, the relative growth of hospital 
expenditures is highest at the centre of the distribution while most of the relative growth 
of pharmaceutical expenditures is highest at the high end of the distribution. Comparing 
the growth rates in the full and user sample reveals that the hospital spending growth is 
mainly driven by an increased proportion of users; hospital expenditures conditional on 
use show only a moderate growth (figure 7.2). Pharmaceutical spending growth, on the 
other hand, is exclusively driven by a rise in the conditional expenditures, pointing towards 
more expensive and/or intensive pharmaceutical treatment, of fewer users. Combining the 
contrasting growth rates of hospital and pharmaceutical spending leads to a fairly constant 
growth of total HCE spread out over most of the upper half of its distribution.
23 The likelihood of pharmaceuticals use significantly decreased for females aged 25-34 only (appendix 7.3).
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Figure 7.1 Observed log monthly expenditures by service type in 1998 and 2004
Note: 95% confidence intervals are included but hardly visible due to large preciseness.
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Covariates
Table 7.2 presents the distribution of covariates in each year and the change in the distribu-
tion of covariates over time which provides an indication of the possible contribution of 
changes in covariates to the growth in HCE. Table 7.2 only presents the (changes in) the 
distribution of covariates for the entire sample; the distributions are very similar for the 
subgroup of users, which is not surprising given that the user sample comprises approxi-
mately four fifths of the full sample.
We capture the impact of demographics on HCE through age-sex group dummy variables 
defined for 10 years age bands, plus 0-14 years and 85+ years. Longevity is measured by 
an indicator of whether the person dies within 5 years of the time of observation and the 
time-to-death (TTD) in months and its square. The Dutch sickness fund population has 
aged: mean age significantly increased by about one year; the 5-year survival rate increased, 
though not significantly.
Another population characteristic included is co-residence status. Couples and mar-
ried individuals are often found to be healthier than those living alone. Co-residence is 
measured by dummy variables: living alone (reference group), couple alone, other private 
household, institutionalized. While institutionalized individuals have a greater need for 
acute care services, their acute health care use is postponed due to basic in-home health 
care services provided by residential and nursing homes. In the Netherlands, cost of these 
in-home health care services is covered by long-term care insurance rather than health care 
insurance. The proportion of females and individuals living alone increased over the period 
1998-2004.
Covariates that measure hospital practice styles include: number of first policlinic visits, 
type and number of inpatient hospital admission, type of hospital admitted to, length-of-
stay (LOS), and primary hospital procedure. Clinical (overnight) and day care admission are 
distinguished. The share of individuals using outpatient (inpatient) hospital care increased 
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Figure 7.2 Growth in log monthly expenditures by type of service between 1998 and 2004
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Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics of covariates and test of change over time
Covariateb 1998 2004 Changea
Age 38.75 39.56 0.81†
Deceased within 5 years (%) 4.70 4.60 -0.10
Male (%) 46.34 45.51 -0.83†
Co-residence status: Living alone (%) 14.49 15.39 0.91†
Co-residence status: Couple alone (%) 26.00 25.11 -0.89†
Co-residence status: Other private household (%) 57.80 58.00 0.20
Co-residence status: Institutionalized (%) 1.71 1.49 -0.22†
Outpatient (policlinic) visit (%) 28.60 35.43 6.83†
 Mean first policlinic visits if>0 1.52 1.60 0.08†
Inpatient admission: day care (%) 3.56 5.07 1.51†
Inpatient admission: clinical (overnight; %) 7.16 6.67 -0.50†
 Mean length of stay if>0 9.08 7.08 -2.00†
Admission to university hospital (%) 10.24 10.71 0.46
Admission to other teaching hospital 20.48 29.61 9.13†
Admission to specialized hospital 1.07 0.92 -0.14
Admission to general hospital 72.35 63.67 -8.69†
Hospital procedure: PT(C)A (% inpatient stay) 1.07 1.77 0.70†
Hospital procedure: surgery eye (% inpatient stay) 5.91 7.47 1.55†
Hospital procedure: other bone and joint surgery(% inpatient stay) 9.34 9.55 0.22
Hospital procedure: other therapeutic/preventive procedure (% inpatient stay) 50.68 50.54 0.14
Hospital procedure: diagnostics 12.71 14.46 1.76†
Hospital procedure: no procedure (% inpatient stay) 26.65 24.62 -2.03†
Work disabled (%) 10.03 10.09 0.06
Cause-of-death: external (% decedents) 4.18 3.91 -0.27
Cause-of-death: neoplasm (% decedents) 27.60 28.73 1.13
Cause-of-death: endocrine, nutritional, metabolic disease (% decedents) 3.35 3.49 0.13
Cause-of-death: mental and behavioral disorder (% decedents) 3.03 4.92 1.89†
Cause-of-death: disease of the nervous system/sense organs (% decedents) 2.26 2.74 0.47*
Cause-of-death: cardiovascular disease (% decedents) 36.13 32.38 -3.75†
Cause-of-death: respiratory disease (% decedents) 9.95 10.30 0.35
Cause-of-death: digestive disease (% decedents) 3.68 4.01 0.34
Cause-of-death: disease of the genitourinary system (% decedents) 1.83 2.16 0.34
Cause-of-death: symptoms, signs and ill-defined conditions (% decedents) 5.31 4.22 -1.09†
Cause-of-death: else (% decedents) 2.66 3.13 0.47*
Hospital diagnosis: infectious disease (% inpatient stay) 1.39 1.24 -0.15
Hospital diagnosis: neoplasm (% inpatient stay) 6.95 7.41 0.46*
Hospital diagnosis: endocrine, nutritional, metabolic disease (% inpatient stay) 1.92 2.08 0.16
Hospital diagnosis: disease of the blood (forming organs) (% inpatient stay) 0.88 1.02 0.14*
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by 6.8 (0.5) percent. The increase in inpatient hospital use was purely driven by increased 
day care admission rates. LOS is measured by the number of nursing days and its square. 
Average LOS for inpatient hospital users decreased from 9.1 to 7.1 days. Concerning type of 
hospital, university hospitals, other teaching hospitals and specialized hospitals are more 
expensive than general hospitals as they often receive a more severe case-mix of patients. A 
greater share of patients was admitted to teaching hospitals in 2004 than in 1998, fewer to 
general hospitals. Although a shift away from general hospital admissions measures changes 
in practice styles, it might also reflect deteriorations of hospital morbidity. We selected 47 
indicators for hospital procedures. Table 7.2 only shows (changes in) the distribution of 
some waiting list procedures compared to remaining procedures. Appendix 7.2 presents 
changes in each of the 47 procedures. As a proportion of the total number of inpatient 
admissions, the share of procedures previously on the waiting list (e.g. PTCA, surgery of the 
eye and lens, bone and joint surgery) increased significantly. Several other procedures also 
increased, but to a lesser extent. Changes in the distribution of hospital procedures could 
therefore largely be attributed to policy change as admissions for ‘waiting list’ procedures 
increased disproportionately. Type of hospital and procedures are excluded from the phar-
maceutical expenditures model.
The only individual health indicator available for the entire study population is work dis-
ability status. In addition, information on hospital diagnosis and cause-of-death is available 
for inpatient hospitalized individuals and deceased sample members, respectively. Because 
we do not have diagnostic information for the entire population but only for individuals 
Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics of covariates and test of change over time
Covariateb 1998 2004 Changea
Hospital diagnosis: mental and behavioral disorders (% inpatient stay) 1.6 1.23 0.07
Hospital diagnosis: disease nervous system/sense organs (% inpatient stay) 11.34 12.54 1.21†
Hospital diagnosis: cardiovascular disease(% inpatient stay) 12.97 13.17 0.21
Hospital diagnosis: respiratory disease (% inpatient stay) 9.71 7.98 -1.73†
Hospital diagnosis: disease digestive system (% inpatient stay) 9.55 10.39 0.84†
Hospital diagnosis: disease genitourinary system (% inpatient stay) 7.99 8.22 0.23
Hospital diagnosis: pregnancy, childbirth, contraception (% inpatient stay) 12.05 10.21 -1.84†
Hospital diagnosis: disease skin, subcutaneous tissue (% inpatient stay) 1.53 1.56 0.03
Hospital diagnosis: disease musculoskeletal system (% inpatient stay) 13.06 13.40 0.31
Hospital diagnosis: congenital abnormalities (% inpatient stay) 1.16 1.12 -0.04
Hospital diagnosis: conditions originating perinatal period (% inpatient stay) 2.32 1.66 -0.66†
Hospital diagnosis: injury and fractures (% inpatient stay) 7.23 7.00 -0.24
Hospital diagnosis: symptoms, signs, ill-defined conditions (% inpatient stay) 7.27 9.76 2.49†
Hospital diagnosis: not allocated and not disease related 6.79 9.49 2.69†
a. P-value null of no change in distribution covariate over time. † p<0.001; ‡ p<0.01; * p<0.05
b. See appendix 7.2 for a complete overview of changes in each category of hospital diagnosis and procedure
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admitted to the hospital, changes in the distribution of hospital diagnosis do not reflect 
changes in disease burden perfectly and should be interpreted cautiously. Changes in the 
distribution of hospital diagnoses reflect changes in the distribution of health and changes 
in admission rates, i.e. the disproportional growth in waiting list diagnoses reflects to an 
important extent the higher admission rates for these diagnoses. Hospital diagnoses are 
grouped into 39 categories according to ICD-10 chapter and prevalence rates (see appendix 
7.1). Table 7.2 presents the distribution of diseases per ICD chapter; appendix 7.2 presents 
(changes in) the distribution of each of the 39 diagnoses. Because we already controlled for 
several admission variables, (changes in) the effect of a hospital diagnosis on acute HCE 
should be interpreted carefully. The effect of a diagnosis captures any diagnostic-specific 
resources used, that are not captured by variation in type and number of hospital admission, 
LOS and procedure (e.g. inpatient medication). Changes in the effect of diagnoses could 
reflect changes in the diagnostic-specific resources used not captured by other hospital-
related covariates (e.g. changes in medication use) or changes in the underlying distribution 
of hospital diagnoses since hospital diagnoses are aggregated.
Changes in diagnoses are closely related to the observed changes in procedures. As a 
proportion of the total number of inpatient admissions, the diagnosis related to procedures 
previously on the waiting list increased significantly (e.g. other cardiovascular disease, eye 
disorders, osteoarthritis). In addition, significant rises of hospital diagnosis shares were ob-
served for neoplasms, diseases of the blood (forming organs), other diseases of the nervous 
system or sense organs, stroke, digestive diseases, rheumatoid arthritis, symptoms signs and 
ill-defined conditions and other not allocated and not disease related. Inpatient hospital 
admission shares fell for epilepsy, ear disorders, CHD, respiratory diseases, dorsopathy, 
conditions originating in the perinatal period, and pregnancy, childbirth and contracep-
tion. Cause-of-death is grouped into 10 categories with an external cause-of-death as the 
reference group. Compared to 1998, a larger proportion died from mental and behavioural 
disorders or a disease of the nervous system/sense organs while the opposite is true for 
cardiovascular death or symptoms, signs and ill-defined conditions.
See appendix 7.1 for a detailed description of the covariates. Note that a number of 
variables (age, survival status) is endogenous to the level of HCE. Since we do not aim to 
estimate causal effects but rather to account for variation in HCE, we are not concerned 
about potential endogeneity.
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7.5 Results
Relation of covariates at the mean
Before presenting the decomposition results, we discuss the relationship between HCE and 
its determinants as has been estimated by a two-part model. Due to the large number of 
determinants, estimates of the two-part model are included in appendices 7.3 and 7.4.
As one would expect, HCE is higher for females than males and increase with age. The 
relatively high level of HCE for females in the fertile age range is due to reproductive or 
contraceptive health care use. Individuals within five years of death are more likely to incur 
acute HCE (1998 only) and their conditional expenditures are significantly higher. The 
significance of higher order terms of TTD reveals that the effect of TTD is nonlinear: the 
effect of TTD on conditional expenditures is greater the closer to death, while the effect on 
the probability of incurring expenditure decreases when approaching death. Those who 
eventually die from a mental and behavioral disorder are less likely to use acute care than 
those that die from an external cause-of-death. This group of decedents often resides and 
dies in nursing homes (de Meijer et al., 2011). Individuals that die from cancer or an endo-
crine, nutritional or metabolic disease (mainly diabetics) were more likely to be hospitalized 
than those that die from an external cause-of-death. The latter group of decedents are also 
more likely to use pharmaceuticals and incur significantly higher conditional pharmaceuti-
cal expenditures. Individuals that die from a cardiovascular or digestive disease are more 
likely to be hospitalized in 2004, those that die from a genitourinary disease or disease of 
the nervous system or sense organs are more likely to be hospitalized but less likely to use 
pharmaceuticals in 2004. Conditional HCE are significantly higher for individuals that die 
from most other causes than an external cause. Work disabled have both a higher prob-
ability and a higher level of acute, hospital, and pharmaceutical expenditures.
Co-residing individuals are more likely to use acute care, hospital care and pharmaceuti-
cals, but their conditional spending levels are lower than individuals living alone, probably 
because co-residing (married) individuals are healthier. Institutionalized individuals are 
less likely to use acute care, but their conditional expenditures are considerably higher 
than for individuals living alone. This latter finding is driven by pharmaceutical spending. 
Institutionalized individuals are less likely to receive acute care and incur lower hospital 
spending conditional on use, most likely because they can receive basic care from their LTC 
institution which postpones hospitalization and accelerates hospital discharge.
The effect of hospital-related determinants was only measured on conditional expendi-
ture levels. Inpatient care is more expensive than outpatient hospital care. Of the inpatient 
care admission, clinical admission are more expensive than day care admissions. Inpatient 
admissions to general hospitals result in lower spending than in other hospitals. LOS posi-
tively contributed to conditional acute HCE.
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The majority of hospital procedures significantly influenced conditional acute HCE and 
conditional hospital expenditures. Most procedures raise the level of spending. Surgery of 
the heart, vessels, arteries, kidneys, facial bones, and obstetrics and PT(C)A were among the 
most expensive hospital treatments.
Given medical practice styles, many hospital diagnoses significantly influenced condi-
tional HCE in both years. Some hospital diagnoses increased conditional expenditures on 
both hospital and pharmaceuticals while others only have a positive influence on either 
one of them. Accounting for medical practice styles, the most costly diagnoses for hospital 
care are: colorectal cancer, breast cancer, prostate cancer, rheumatoid arthritis, and osteo-
arthritis. Diagnoses with the highest pharmaceutical expenditures are diabetes, rheumatoid 
arthritis, COPD and asthma, and multiple sclerosis.
Decomposition of acute HCE growth
Figure 7.3 and table 7.3 present the decomposition of acute HCE growth. Figure 7.3 presents 
the decomposition results for the full sample and the user sample separately. It plots the dif-
ference in the two simulated distributions along with the absolute contribution of changes 
in determinants and changes in their impact on expenditure growth at all quantiles. The 
explanation of acute HCE growth greatly varies across the distribution which indicates the 
superiority of our approach over a decomposition of the mean only. This superiority is also 
confirmed by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test evaluating the null of equality of all quartile ef-
fects to the median effect (p=0.000 for all three expenditure categories).
The contribution of changes in determinants is as important as the contribution of the 
changing impact of determinants to acute HCE growth. Changes in determinants positively 
contributes to the growth at all quantiles, but its contribution is lower at higher quantiles. 
Changes in the functional relationship between determinants and expenditures constrained 
growth in the lower half of the distribution, but positively contributed to growth in the 
upper half of the distribution. Table 7.3 presents the contribution of changes in determinants 
(covariates), their effect (coefficients) and the residual to growth at 9 quantiles of the expen-
diture distribution. Because the simulated distributions approach the empirical distribu-
tion of expenditures closely the residual is very small. Changes in coefficients contribute 
relatively little to HCE growth at the centre of the distribution. Median HCE increased by 
29 percent, of which 26 percentage points could be explained by changes in covariates and 
3 percentage points by changes in coefficients. However, from the median the contribution 
of coefficients increases, both absolutely and relatively, implying that treatment costs of 
patients that were already treated at relatively high costs further increased. From the 80th 
percentile, the contribution of coefficients becomes larger than that of covariates. Changes 
in the effect of covariates explain 20 percentage points of the 27 point increase in the 90th 
percentile.
Explaining growth across the distribution of health care expenditures 147
The right column of figure 7.3 illustrates the decomposition of the growth in expendi-
tures among the subgroup of users. Table 7.4 presents the decomposition results for the 
subgroup of users for 9 quantiles. The decomposition reveals that changes in covariates 
and coefficients both positively contribute to the spending growth in the users group. 
Hence, the negative contribution of changes in coefficients to changes in the lower half of 
the acute HCE distribution in the full sample is due to the increase in the proportion of 
total acute health care
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Figure 7.3 Decomposition of spending growth in contribution of covariates and coefficients
Note: Results are derived by application of the decomposition method as illustrated by equation (7.1). The 
total difference is given by the left hand side, the contribution of changes in covariates by the first term and the 
contribution of changes in coefficients by the second term of equation (7.1).
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zero-spenders. Although HCE growth across all quantiles could to some extent be explained 
by the changing impact of certain events (e.g. condition treated at higher cost), the absolute 
and relative contribution of changes in coefficients increase from the 20th percentile. The 
contribution of changes in determinants to HCE conditional on use, on the other hand, is 
concentrated around the centre of the distribution and contributed little to the growth at 
both tails of the distribution.
Table 7.3 Decomposition of changes in log monthly expenditure distribution in the period 1998-2004
Observed values Decomposition of growth
Quantile 1998 2004 Growth Covariates (s.e.) Coefficients (s.e.) Residual
Total acute health care expenditures
0.20 0.45 0.00 -0.45 0.00 (0.00) -0.45 (0.01) 0.00
0.30 1.16 1.12 -0.04 0.25 (0.01) -0.28 (0.01) -0.01
0.40 1.73 1.90 0.17 0.26 (0.01) -0.09 (0.01) 0.00
0.50 2.31 2.60 0.29 0.26 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.00
0.60 2.94 3.26 0.32 0.24 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01) 0.00
0.70 3.56 3.87 0.32 0.20 (0.01) 0.12 (0.01) 0.00
0.80 4.18 4.51 0.33 0.15 (0.01) 0.17 (0.01) 0.01
0.90 5.04 5.31 0.27 0.07 (0.01) 0.20 (0.01) 0.00
Hospital and other secondary acute care expenditures
0.50 0.56 1.18 0.62 1.20 (0.01) -0.60 (0.06) 0.02
0.60 1.60 1.95 0.35 0.42 (0.01) -0.08 (0.01) 0.01
0.70 2.40 2.66 0.26 0.33 (0.01) -0.08 (0.01) 0.00
0.80 3.18 3.39 0.21 0.27 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01) 0.00
0.90 4.22 4.36 0.14 0.13 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00
Pharmaceutical expenditures
0.30 0.55 0.34 -0.21 0.41 (0.05) -0.55 (0.01) -0.07
0.40 1.01 0.97 -0.04 0.15 (0.01) -0.20 (0.02) 0.01
0.50 1.46 1.50 0.04 0.14 (0.01) -0.09 (0.01) -0.01
0.60 1.86 2.11 0.25 0.16 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01) 0.01
0.70 2.39 2.80 0.41 0.19 (0.01) 0.23 (0.01) -0.01
0.80 3.09 3.60 0.51 0.15 (0.01) 0.36 (0.01) 0.00
0.90 3.91 4.40 0.49 0.11 (0.00) 0.38 (0.01) 0.01
Note: The growth of log spending differs from the growth rate reported in table 7.1 due to approximation. 
Decomposition results are obtained by application of the decomposition method as illustrated in equation 
(7.1). The contribution of covariates (coefficients) is given by the first (second) term. The residual is the 
difference between the observed growth and the sum of the contribution of covariates and coefficients. 
Bootstrap standard errors between brackets.
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Table 7.4 Decomposition of changes in log monthly expenditure distribution among users in the period 
1998-2004
Observed values Decomposition of growth
Quantile 1998 2004 Growth Covariates (s.e.) Coefficients (s.e.) Residual
Total acute health care expenditures
0.10 0.84 1.08 0.24 0.11 (0.01) 0.12 (0.01) 0.01
0.20 1.40 1.69 0.29 0.20 (0.01) 0.09 (0.01) 0.00
0.30 1.85 2.26 0.41 0.25 (0.01) 0.15 (0.01) 0.01
0.40 2.34 2.80 0.46 0.28 (0.01) 0.18 (0.01) 0.00
0.50 2.86 3.31 0.45 0.27 (0.01) 0.18 (0.01) 0.00
0.60 3.37 3.79 0.42 0.25 (0.01) 0.17 (0.01) 0.00
0.70 3.87 4.27 0.40 0.22 (0.01) 0.18 (0.01) 0.00
0.80 4.44 4.82 0.38 0.20 (0.01) 0.19 (0.01) -0.01
0.90 5.23 5.54 0.31 0.11 (0.01) 0.19 (0.01) 0.01
Hospital and other secondary acute care expenditures
0.10 1.22 1.31 0.09 0.09 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) -0.02
0.20 1.57 1.71 0.14 0.16 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01
0.30 1.99 2.11 0.12 0.16 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01) 0.00
0.40 2.38 2.49 0.11 0.17 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01) 0.00
0.50 2.78 2.87 0.09 0.18 (0.01) -0.08 (0.01) -0.01
0.60 3.17 3.26 0.09 0.15 (0.01) -0.05 (0.01) -0.01
0.70 3.62 3.70 0.08 0.12 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) -0.01
0.80 4.21 4.25 0.04 0.05 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.00
0.90 5.30 5.27 -0.03 -0.08 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.00
Pharmaceutical expenditures
0.10 0.60 0.75 0.15 0.04 (0.01) 0.11 (0.01) 0.00
0.20 0.95 1.14 0.19 0.07 (0.01) 0.12 (0.01) 0.00
0.30 1.30 1.54 0.24 0.12 (0.01) 0.12 (0.01) 0.00
0.40 1.61 1.95 0.34 0.16 (0.01) 0.18 (0.01) 0.00
0.50 1.94 2.42 0.48 0.20 (0.01) 0.27 (0.01) 0.01
0.60 2.35 2.94 0.59 0.25 (0.01) 0.35 (0.01) -0.01
0.70 2.86 3.50 0.64 0.24 (0.01) 0.41 (0.01) -0.01
0.80 3.46 4.06 0.60 0.20 (0.01) 0.40 (0.01) 0.00
0.90 4.14 4.67 0.53 0.14 (0.01) 0.40 (0.01) -0.01
Note: The growth of log spending differs from the growth rate reported in table 7.1 due to approximation. 
Decomposition results are obtained by application of the decomposition method as illustrated in equation 
(7.1). The contribution of covariates (coefficients) is given by the first (second) term. The residual is the 
difference between observed growth and the sum of the contribution of covariates and coefficients. Bootstrap 
standard errors between brackets.
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Decomposition of hospital and pharmaceutical expenditure growth
In addition, figure 7.3 and table 7.3 also present the decomposition of hospital and phar-
maceutical expenditure growth. Marked differences in the explanation of the growth in 
hospital and pharmaceutical expenditures exist. The growth in hospital expenditures is 
mainly driven by changes in determinants, which is not surprisingly given the large number 
of hospital-related determinant. The contribution of changes in the effect of determinants 
is close to zero and only plays a larger role from the 90th percentile. The second column of 
figure 7.3 and table 7.3 show that a slightly different pattern is observed for the growth in 
conditional hospital spending. Again, changes in determinants explain most of the growth 
in the subgroup of hospital users. However, changes in determinants constrain expenditure 
growth at the last quintile that mainly comprises inpatient hospital users. This negative con-
tribution of changes in determinants results from a higher proportion of day care admission 
in 2004 and a reduction in LOS. Unlike changes in determinants, changes in coefficients 
negatively contribute to the hospital expenditure growth among the subgroup of users until 
the last quintile. In the last quintile, changes in coefficients positively contribute to hospital 
expenditure growth conditional on use, which might indicate that technological progress 
further increases costs of the most expensive hospital treatments and reduces costs of less 
expensive hospital treatments.
Regarding the growth in pharmaceutical expenditures, changes in coefficients play a much 
more important role than changes in covariates, indicating a large innovation component 
in the pharmaceutical sector. Moreover, the contribution of coefficients increases when 
moving towards higher quantiles. Changes in coefficients explain approximately 30 and 
75 percent of the growth at the 60th and 90th percentile, respectively. Table 7.4 shows that 
changes in covariates and coefficients both positively contribute to the growth of pharma-
ceutical spending among users at all quantiles. However, the latter contribution dominates 
the former across the entire distribution indication a large innovation component in the 
pharmaceutical sector.
The contribution of changes in the distributions of covariates
Figure 7.4 shows the aggregate contribution of changes in determinants to the expendi-
ture growth disaggregated into the contributions of changes in specific determinants. The 
shaded areas indicate the contribution of changes in the determinant indicated in the sub-
heading to the spending growth. Remember that the contribution of a specific determinant 
also incorporates changes in the distribution of its correlates. Therefore, the sum of the 
shaded areas in figure 7.4 may exceed the aggregate contribution of changes in determi-
nants. Although we examined the contribution of changes in all determinants, figure 7.4 
only presents the contribution of changes in determinants that showed a clear contribution 
to spending growth.
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Of the changes in population characteristics, population aging measured by changes 
in the age composition and survival rates, contributes most to acute HCE growth. Aging 
mostly contributes to the growth in pharmaceutical spending, not to hospital spending. 
Changes in general disease burden (i.e. work disability and cause-of-death) did not con-
tribute importantly to the acute HCE growth, nor did hospital disease burden. Changes 
in disease burden seem to have only marginally lowered acute HCE and pharmaceutical 
spending growth. Instead, most of the growth that could be explained by changes in de-
terminants, for all types of spending and at all quantiles, is attributable to increased use of 
hospital care, i.e. day care admissions and policlinic visit. The last row of figure 7.4 shows 
a negative contribution of changes in other determinants at the higher percentiles of acute 
HCE and hospital expenditures after accounting for increased hospitalization rates. This 
negative contribution indicates that changes in other determinants constrained expenditure 
growth at the higher quantiles.
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Figure 7.4 Contribution of population aging, changes in disease burden and changes in hospital rate to 
growth in acute HCE 
Note: Contribution of changes in all covariates is given by the first term of equation (7.1). The contribution of 
changes in covariates other than those indicated in the sub-heading is given by the first term of equation (7.2). 
The shaded area is the difference between the first terms in equation (7.1) and (7.2), and therefore presents the 
contribution of changes in the covariates indicated in the sub-heading.
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Figure 7.5 Contribution of changes in hospital practice styles to growth in hospital and other secondary acute 
care spending 
Note: Contribution of changes in all covariates is given by the first term of equation (7.1). The contribution of 
changes in covariates other than those indicated in the sub-heading is given by the first term of equation (7.2). 
The shaded area is the difference between the first terms in equation (7.1) and (7.2), and therefore presents the 
contribution of changes in the covariates indicated in the sub-heading.
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Figure 7.6 Contribution of changes in hospital practice styles to pharmaceutical spending growth
Note: Contribution of changes in all covariates is given by the first term of equation (7.1). The contribution of 
changes in covariates other than those indicated in the sub-heading is given by the first term of equation (7.2). 
The shaded area is the difference between the first terms in equation (7.1) and (7.2), and therefore presents the 
contribution of changes in the covariates indicated in the sub-heading.
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Figures 7.5 and 7.6 therefore further disentangle the contribution of changes in specific 
hospital-related factors. Figure 7.5 does this for hospital spending growth, figure 7.6 for 
pharmaceutical spending growth. The upper left graph again presents the contribution of 
changes in hospitalization rates (plus correlates). Comparing the above two sub-graphs 
reveals that increased use of inpatient care is only responsible for a small proportion of the 
growth in hospital and pharmaceutical expenditures. Hence, increased use of outpatient 
hospital care must be responsible for the majority of the spending growth in both services. 
This finding is not surprisingly given that outpatient visits increased by 6.8 percent while 
inpatient hospitalizations only grew by 0.5 percent. The contribution of changes in inpatient 
care to the expenditure growth is concentrated at higher quantiles, as can be expected, given 
the relatively larger cost of inpatient care.
Changes in other hospital-related determinants contribute very differently to hospital 
versus pharmaceutical expenditure growth. While shifts to less intensive hospital care 
decreased hospital spending at higher quantiles and increased it at lower quantiles, it in-
creased pharmaceutical expenditures at all quantiles. This strongly suggests that hospital 
care is partly substituted by pharmaceutical treatment. Furthermore, a decrease in the LOS 
of a clinical admission resulted in a lower growth of hospital spending at higher quantiles 
but did not affect the pharmaceutical spending growth. Changes in procedures (e.g. higher 
proportion of bypass surgery, PTCA and hip replacement) increased hospital expenditures 
only at the very top end of the distribution but pharmaceutical expenditures at nearly all 
quantiles. Increased use of pharmaceuticals might be explained by increased use of drugs to 
prevent post surgical thrombosis and wound infections.
Contribution of changes in the functional relationship with determinants
The contribution of changes in the effect of a specific determinant to the aggregate con-
tribution of changes in the functional relationship with determinants not only depends 
on the magnitude of the change in the relationship but also on the size of the population 
to which it applies. Table 7.5 presents stability tests of changes in the effect of (group of) 
determinants in part I and part II of the two-part model over time. Appendices 7.3 and 7.4 
present these stability test for each individual determinant. Although we have decomposed 
expenditure growth – and the contribution of changes in the relationship with determinants 
to this growth – across the full marginal distribution, table 7.5 only indicates change in the 
relationship with determinants (1) on the probability to incur positive expenditures and 
(2) at conditional mean expenditures. The results in table 7.5 could therefore not be used 
to explain variation in the contribution of changes in the relationship with determinants at 
different points of the distribution.
Changes in the effect of some determinants positively contribute to acute HCE growth, 
changes in the effect of other determinants negatively. Of the population characteristics, 
the increased effect of age, especially older age, on both the probability and conditional 
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level of spending is most evident, in particular for pharmaceutical spending. The main 
exception is that females aged 25-44 became less likely to use pharmaceuticals and their 
conditional pharmaceutical expenditures decreased. This finding is caused by the removal 
of oral contraceptives from public reimbursement. In addition to age, the effect of work 
disability on the probability to use hospital care and pharmaceuticals, and on conditional 
pharmaceutical expenditures increased. The effect of survival status on conditional hospital 
and pharmaceutical expenditures significantly decreased. The reduced impact of survival 
status on hospital expenditures is likely related to the increased use of waiting list proce-
dures which are typically not performed in life threatening situations.
Concerning the hospital-related covariates, the effect of an inpatient admission (i.e. effect 
of type of hospital and type of inpatient admission) on conditional acute HCE and hospital 
expenditures significantly decreased. Improved access to inpatient care may have brought 
milder cases of disease into the hospital, resulting in lower average treatment costs. On the 
contrary, more intensive policlinic treatment probably resulted in the increased effect of 
policlinic use on expenditures. In addition, the effect of policlinic visits on pharmaceutical 
spending increased which probably reflects a partial shift of hospital treatment to pharma-
ceutical treatment.
The joint effect of hospital procedures significantly changed over time. The effect of 
surgery of the urinary ways and bladder, PT(C)A, diagnostic endoscopy lower gastroin-
testinal and other diagnostic procedures on conditional acute HCE and hospital spending 
significantly decreased while the effect of surgery of the male genital organs and obstetric 
surgery increased. Overall, the joint effect of hospital diagnoses on acute HCE significantly 
changed over time. The effect of the following hospital diagnoses on acute HCE significantly 
increased: colorectal cancer, lung cancer, other malignant neoplasm, diabetes, mental and 
behavioral disorders, eye disorders, CHD, heart failure, other cardiovascular disease, acute 
respiratory infections, and rheumatoid arthritis. On the contrary, the effect of conditions 
originating in the perinatal period on acute HCE significantly decreased. The following 
coefficients on diagnosis in the hospital spending function increased significantly: infec-
tious diseases, prostate cancer, other malignant neoplasm, mental and behavioral disorders, 
heart failure, acute respiratory infections, asthma and COPD, and rheumatoid arthritis. 
The increased impact of rheumatoid arthritis is likely to be caused by the introduction of 
the TNF alpha blocker infliximab, an expensive inpatient drugs. The effect of a hospital 
diagnosis for diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue and conditions originating in 
the perinatal period significantly dropped. A lower impact of the latter is probably related 
to a decrease in the proportion of surgeries and an increase in non-surgical procedures. 
Regarding the changing impact of determinants on pharmaceutical expenditures over 
time, the effect of most diagnoses on pharmaceutical spending decreased. Only the effect 
of osteoarthritis, dorsopathy and conditional originating in the perinatal period increased 
significantly. However, the effect of the majority of diagnoses on the probability to use phar-
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maceuticals increased over the period 1998-2004 (not shown in table 7.5). This increase was 
significant for diabetes, mental and behavioural disorders, ear disorders, CHD, heart failure 
and stroke. Moreover, individuals hospitalized for prostate cancer or rheumatoid arthritis 
all used outpatient pharmaceuticals in 2004, but not in 1998.
7.6 Discussion
We decomposed the growth of Dutch acute HCE in the period 1998-2004 across the full 
spending distribution into a contribution of changes in population characteristics, changes 
in hospital-related practices, and changes in the functional relationship between HCE and 
its determinants. In addition, we separately decomposed the growth in the two largest 
components of acute care, hospital and pharmaceutical care, to examine whether changes 
in hospital practices had any spillover effects on pharmaceutical expenditures.
Our main findings are as follows. First, although the growth in acute HCE was fairly 
evenly spread across the spending distribution, the growth in hospital and pharmaceutical 
spending varied across the distribution. Hospital spending growth, mainly driven by an 
increased proportion of users, was highest around the centre of its distribution. This was 
related to the much greater increase in the proportion of outpatient rather than inpatient 
hospital users. By contrast, pharmaceutical spending growth resulted primarily from more 
intensive and/or more expensive drug use. Its growth was highest at the higher quantiles, 
implying that largest rise occurred among those who were already very intensive drug users.
Second, the explanation of the growth in acute HCE differs across the distribution. While 
changes in the distribution of determinants and changes in the relationship between HCE 
and these determinants both play an important role, the contribution of changes in deter-
minants generally decreased along the distribution while the contribution of changes in 
the effect of determinants on HCE increased along the distribution. Changes in particular 
determinants (e.g. population aging and growing proportion of outpatient and day care 
users) particularly affected the middle of the distribution, while changes in the spending 
consequences of certain events (e.g. same diagnoses treated at higher cost) mainly affected 
growth at the high end of the distribution.
Third, a marked difference in the explanation for the rise in hospital and pharmaceuti-
cal expenditures became apparent. Hospital expenditure growth can almost entirely be 
explained by changes in determinants. Their contribution, however, falls at higher quantiles 
while changes in the effect of determinants on HCE only contributed to the hospital ex-
penditure growth at the top of the distribution. This strongly suggests that technological 
progress in the hospital sector will increase treatment of high-cost conditions even further. 
By contrast, changes in determinants and their effect on HCE are both important in the 
explanation of pharmaceutical expenditure growth. Changes in determinants being much 
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more important for the hospital expenditure growth is related to our selection of determi-
nants that includes changes in hospital practices but not changes in pharmacotherapeutic 
treatment styles. Instead, the introduction of new expensive medicines, previously viewed 
as the most important source of changes in pharmaceutical treatment, is captured by the 
contribution of the effect of determinants. The relatively high price of innovative medicines, 
due to patent rights (i.e. monopolistic price setting), explains the rise in the contribution of 
coefficients at the higher quantiles of the pharmaceutical expenditure distribution.
Fourth, changes in determinants that measure population characteristics only marginally 
contribute to the rise in acute HCE but among these – population aging – is the most im-
portant contributing factor. Among the contributions of changes in determinants, changes 
in hospital practice styles are by far the most important. Increased hospitalization rates, in 
particular for outpatient care, explain nearly the entire contribution of changes in deter-
minants to the rise in acute HCE. Because hospital expenditure growth is almost entirely 
driven by changes in determinants, increased hospitalization rates nearly explain its entire 
growth. However, changes in other hospital-related factors, have contributed to cost savings 
at the higher quantiles. Growth at the higher quantiles is constrained by a reduction in LOS 
of clinical admissions and a relative larger increase in the number of policlinic visits and 
day care admission than clinical admission. Growth at the centre of the hospital expenditure 
distribution and across the entire pharmaceutical contribution could however be attributed 
to changes in type of hospital use/admission strongly suggesting that hospital care can to 
some extent be substituted by pharmaceutical care. We cannot, however, conclude anything 
on the direction of the causal effect: the introduction of expensive innovative pharmaceu-
ticals may have saved hospital costs, as has been concluded for the US (e.g. Lichtenberg, 
2006, 2007, 2009), or the less intensive hospital treatment may have shifted costs to the 
pharmaceutical sector.
Fifth, further decomposition of the contribution of changes in the effect of determinants 
on HCE revealed that the effect of some covariates was in opposite directions. The positive 
effect of age and outpatient visits combined with the negative effects of inpatient hospital 
admissions explains the rather small contribution of changes in the impact of determinants 
to the rise in hospital expenditures. For pharmaceutical spending growth, increases in the 
effects of age, especially old age, work disability and policlinic visits show significant and 
important contributions. While the effect of several hospital diagnoses and procedures on 
hospital and pharmaceutical expenditures significantly changed over time, they have con-
tributed relatively little to the overall, aggregate contribution of coefficients as the propor-
tion of hospitalized patient with these particular diagnoses or procedure was relatively low.
Our study is not the first that attempts to decompose expenditure trends. Our study 
exhibits most similarities with Dormont, Grignon, and Huber (2006) who not only ap-
plied a similar method to decompose expenditure growth but had also access to rich data 
enabling to analyze expenditures as a function of other determinants than demographics 
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only. Most other previous studies on individual HCE analyzed expenditures as a function 
of demographics (age, sex, TTD; see Payne et al., 2007 for a review). Our study differenti-
ates from previous literature in a number of respects. First, unlike Dormont, Grignon, and 
Huber (2006) we explained change in the full marginal distribution of HCE. Our extended 
approach delivered findings that could not have been uncovered by a standard decomposi-
tion of mean HCE. Our results revealed that the growth rate of hospital and pharmaceutical 
expenditures differs across the expenditure distribution. It has been shown that hospital 
expenditure growth has been concentrated around the median while pharmaceutical ex-
penditure growth was highest at the end of the distribution. In addition to the growth rate 
itself, we demonstrated that the explanation of the growth also varies by location in the ex-
penditures distribution. While previous studies could only conclude that drug expenditures 
were largely driven by technological progress (Dormont, Grignon, and Huber, 2006; Häk-
kinen et al., 2008), our results further reveal that technological progress accounts mostly 
for growth at the end of the drug expenditure distribution. Concerning hospital care, the 
rise in hospital expenditures could almost entirely be explained by changes in determinants.
Second, we had the unique opportunity to trace how an injection of funding gets distrib-
uted across patients. Policies to reduce waiting lists resulted in additional resources spent on 
hospital care. Unsurprisingly, our findings demonstrate that most of the increase in expen-
ditures could indeed be explained by a greater propensity to admit inpatients, as reflected by 
the increased hospitalization rates, rather than the use of more expensive hospital care. The 
relaxation of budgets successfully, but inefficiently, reduced waiting times: although hospital 
use for treatments on the waiting list grew disproportionately, use of treatments not on the 
waiting lists also grew.
Third, richness of our data enabled to explain the observed expenditure growth more 
completely. In addition to individual-specific determinants, we had suitable data that 
measured medical practice styles. While Dormont, Grignon, and Huber (2006) could only 
conclude that changes in medical practices dominate the expenditure growth, we opened 
the black box of medical practices by further disentangling the contribution of specific 
changes in hospital practices. While technological progress accounts for an important part 
of pharmaceutical expenditures growth, our results strongly suggest that cost-increasing 
technological innovations in hospital care are targeted at the most expensive treatments. 
On the other hand, technological progress, but also improvements in for example logistics, 
seem to have increased efficiency in hospital care by reducing LOS and shifting treatment 
to day care and policlinics.
Our study also has its limitations. First, although we have unique and rich data, the 
absence of health information on non-hospitalized patients somewhat complicates the in-
terpretation. In the absence of general population health measures, much of its effect may be 
captured by the age dummies as old age tends to come with health deterioration. Secondly, 
changes in the prevalence rates of inpatient hospital diagnoses and changes in the effect 
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of these diagnoses on HCE should be interpreted cautiously. A fall in a specific hospital 
diagnosis does not necessarily imply a decrease in the overall prevalence of that condi-
tion but may also be due to substitution of inpatient by outpatient care (e.g. policlinic, GP, 
pharmaceuticals). Similarly, changes in the effect of inpatient hospital diagnoses may not 
fully capture (changes in) the effect of a disease on acute HCE, hospital expenditures and 
pharmaceutical. Take the example of outpatient TNF-alpha blockers: while their introduc-
tion has increased pharmaceutical treatment costs for rheumatoid arthritis, this cannot be 
seen from a change in the effect of the hospital diagnosis rheumatoid arthritis as improved 
pharmaceutical treatment is likely to have decreased the probability of an inpatient admis-
sions for rheumatoid arthritis. Third, due to the lack of data on GP spending (funded by 
a capitation system), we could not examine possible substitutions of hospital treatment by 
GP treatment, although some of the prescribing consequences are captured indirectly in 
pharmaceutical spending patterns
In conclusion, we find that changes in medical practices, probably to an important extent 
caused by technological progress and the relaxation of budgets, dominate the acute HCE 
growth. While there is a discernible contribution of population aging to spending growth, 
it is moderate: population aging could explain 3.5 percentage point of the 29.4 percent 
growth at the median. Its impact can, however, not be seen in isolation from technological 
progress and the relaxation of hospital budgets. Both of these developments seem to have 
disproportionately benefited the elderly given that the effect of older age groups rose more 
than for younger age groups, and the expanded waiting list treatments (e.g. cataract and 
orthopedic surgery, PTCA, knee and hip replacement) were more concentrated among 
the elderly. Finally, policymakers should be aware that predictions of HCE solely based on 
changes in population characteristics (e.g. population aging, changing health patterns) are 
very naive and grossly underestimate projections of future HCE. In our case, such projec-
tions would only have estimated a 6 percent growth at the median instead of the 29 percent 
actual growth observed between 1998 and 2004.
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Appendices
Appendix 7.1 Description of covariates
Variable Description Data sourcea
Dependent variables
log acute HCE
log hospital spending
log drug spending
The dependent variables comprise spending on acute health care services 
covered by the basic benefit package.
Logarithm of average monthly spending on hospital and other secondary 
acute care (excluding paramedical care), pharmaceuticals, obstetrics 
and maternity care, transport and devices. Spending is first corrected for 
inflation and Baumol’s disease, then logarithmically transformed.
Logarithm of average monthly spending on hospital and other secondary 
acute care (excluding paramedical care).
Logarithm of average monthly spending on outpatient pharmaceuticals
Vektis
Age and sex Dummy categories: females 0-14 (reference category), females 15-24, 
females 25-34. females 35-44, females 45-54, females 55-64, females 
65-74. females 75-84, females 85+, males 0-14, males 15-24, males 25-
34. males 35-44, males 45-54, males 55-64, males 65-74. males 75-84, 
males 85+.
GBA
Coresidence status Co-residence status on January 1st; dummy categories: living 
alone (reference category), couple alone, other private household, 
institutionalized.
GBA
Work disabled Indictor: individual received work disability benefits Vektis
Number of first 
policlinic visits
Defined as the number of different policlinic specialists an individual 
visited during the year; dummy categories: none (reference category, 1 
first policlinic visit, 2 first policlinic visits, 3 or more policlinic visits
Vektis
Number of day care 
admissions
Number of day care admissions during the year; dummy categories: 
none (reference category), 1day care admission, 2 or more day care 
admissions
LMR
Number of clinical 
admissions
Number of clinical admissions during the year; dummy categories: none 
(reference category), 1 clinical admission, 2 or more clinical admissions
LMR
Length of stay Number of inpatient admission days and its square LMR
Hospital diagnosis Inpatient hospital diagnosis. 39 indicators; coded according to the 
International Classification of Disease 10th version (ICD-10). See 
Appendix 7.2 for an overview of the selected diagnoses
LMR
Hospital proceduresb Restricted to primary procedures during inpatient hospital stays. 47 
indicators. See Appendix 7.2 for an overview of the selected procedures.
LMR
Type of hospitalb Indicators for type of hospital individual was admitted to for inpatient 
hospital stay: general hospital, university hospital, other teaching 
hospital, specialized hospital
LMR
Deceased Indicator: deceased within 5 years after the measurement year DO
TTD TTD in months (set at a maximum of 60 for survivors) and its square DO
Cause-of-Death 10 dummies; measured by the ICD-10. External cause of death 
(reference category); neoplasm; endocrine, nutritional or metabolic 
disease; mental and behavioral disorder; disease of the nervous system 
or sense organs, cardiovascular disease; respiratory disease; digestive 
disease; disease of the genitourinary system; symptoms signs and ill-
defined conditions, else.
DO
a. sickness fund records (Vektis); hospital registry (LMR), municipality register (GBA), national death registry (DO)
b. not included in pharmaceutical expenditure model
Explaining growth across the distribution of health care expenditures 163
Appendix 7.2 Distribution of hospital diagnosis and procedures and change over time
1998 2004 Changea
Hospital procedure (% of inpatient stay) 72.35 63.67 -8.69†
 Neurosurgery 2.62 2.97 0.35‡
 Surgery endocrine glands 0.21 0.19 -0.02
 Surgery lense and eye 5.91 7.47 1.55†
 Surgery ear 2.85 2.38 -0.46†
 Surgery nose and sinuses 1.67 1.45 -0.22*
 Surgery airways, tonsils and adenoid 4.70 3.66 -1.04†
 Surgery heart and thoracic vessels 1.39 1.46 0.06
 Surgery other vessels 1.14 1.37 0.23‡
 Other surgery arteries 0.97 0.88 -0.08
 Surgery spline, bone marrow, lymphatic system 0.41 0.36 -0.05
 Surgery mouth 1.03 1.03 0.00
 Surgery stomach and esophagus 0.44 0.57 0.13*
 Surgery colon and intestines 0.98 1.17 0.19*
 Surgery appendix 0.77 0.68 -0.09
 Surgery rectum and anus 1.03 1.06 0.03
 Surgery gall bladder, bile ducts, liver, pancreas 1.53 1.75 0.22*
 Surgery abdominal hernia 2.06 2.02 -0.04
 Other surgery abdominal wall, peritoneum 0.50 0.48 0.02
 Surgery kidneys 0.28 0.30 0.02
 Surgery urinary ways and bladder 1.22 1.43 0.21*
 Surgery male genital organs 2.49 2.42 -0.07
 Surgery female genital organs incl. curettage 4.69 4.59 -0.09
 Obstetric surgery 5.14 4.81 -0.33
 Surgery facial bones 0.25 0.22 -0.03
 Surgery for fractures and luxations 1.88 1.74 -0.14
 Other bone and joint surgery 9.34 9.55 0.22
 Surgery soft tissue 1.77 1.78 0.01
 Other surgery skeletal and muscular system 0.30 0.24 -0.06
 Surgery mamma 2.05 1.82 -0.23*
 Surgery skin 2.38 2.35 -0.03
 PT(C)A 1.07 1.77 0.70†
 Nonsurgical procedures obstetrics 1.62 1.57 -0.05
 Nonsurgical procedures musculoskeletal system 0.48 0.52 0.04
 Radiotherapy 0.18 0.13 -0.05
 Chemotherapy 0.36 0.40 0.04
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Appendix 7.2 Distribution of hospital diagnosis and procedures and change over time (table continued)
1998 2004 Changea
 Other therapeutic or preventive procedures 3.67 5.09 1.42†
 Biopsy 2.46 2.45 -0.01
 Diagnostic endoscopy respiratory tract 0.84 0.75 -0.09
 Diagnostic endoscopy upper gastrointestinal 0.90 1.25 0.35†
 Diagnostic endoscopy lower gastrointestinal 1.61 3.13 1.52†
 Diagnostic endoscopy urogenital tract 0.54 0.74 0.20‡
 Diagnostic laparoscopy 0.69 0.46 -0.23†
 Diagnostic arthroscopy 1.01 0.76 -0.25†
 Other and unspecified diagnostic endoscopy 0.02 0.04 0.01
 Diagnostic radiology 1.94 1.64 -0.30‡
 Other diagnostic procedures 3.14 3.97 0.83†
 No procedure 26.65 24.62 -2.03†
Inpatient hospital diagnosis (% inpatient stay)
 Infectious disease 1.39 1.24 -0.15
 Colorectal cancer 0.52 0.58 0.06
 Lung cancer 0.50 0.52 0.01
 Breast cancer 0.72 0.63 -0.09
 Prostate cancer 0.22 0.22 0.00
 Other malignant neoplasm 2.39 2.60 0.21
 Benign neoplasm 2.73 3.05 0.31*
 Diabetes mellitus 0.70 0.73 0.03
 Other endocrine, nutritional, metabolic disease 1.23 1.36 0.13
 Disease of the blood (forming organs) 0.88 1.02 0.14*
 Mental and behavioral disorders 1.6 1.23 0.07
 Multiple sclerosis 0.25 0.23 -0.02
 Epilepsy 0.48 0.33 -0.15‡
 Eye disorders 5.91 7.48 1.57†
 Ear disorders 2.82 2.30 -0.53†
 Other disease nervous system/sense organs 1.96 2.30 0.33‡
 Coronary heart disease (CHD) 4.52 4.05 -0.47‡
 Heart failure 1.35 1.27 -0.08
 Stroke 1.60 1.83 0.23*
 Other cardiovascular disease 6.19 6.84 0.65†
 Acute respiratory infections 1.93 1.75 -0.18
 Asthma and COPD 1.64 1.22 -0.42†
 Other respiratory disease 6.46 5.28 -1.18†
 Disease of the digestive system 9.55 10.39 0.84†
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Appendix 7.2 Distribution of hospital diagnosis and procedures and change over time (table continued)
1998 2004 Changea
 Disease of the genitourinary system 7.99 8.22 0.23
 Pregnancy, childbirth and contraception 12.05 10.21 -1.84†
 Disease of the skin and subcutaneous tissue 1.53 1.56 0.03
 Rheumatoid arthritis 0.25 0.35 0.10*
 Osteoarthritis 1.85 2.51 0.66†
 Dorsopathy 3.03 2.70 -0.33*
 Other disease of the musculoskeletal system 8.21 8.15 -0.06
 Congenital abnormalities 1.16 1.12 -0.04
 Conditions originating in the perinatal period 2.32 1.66 -0.66†
 Hip fracture 1.01 0.91 -0.09
 Other fracture 1.42 1.49 0.07
 Injury 4.92 4.73 -0.20
 Symptoms, signs and ill-defined conditions 7.27 9.76 2.49†
 Cancer not allocated 0.42 0.43 0.01
 Other not allocated and not disease related 6.79 9.49 2.69†
a. P-value null of no change in distribution covariate over time. † p<0.001; ‡ p<0.01; * p<0.05
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The main purpose of this thesis was to enhance understanding of the (relative) impact of 
population aging to the health care expenditure (HCE) growth in the Netherlands and other 
developed countries. This chapter identifies and places the main conclusions in perspective, 
and discusses (policy) implications, recommendations and the remaining issues that need 
to be addressed in future research.
Main findings
Point of departure of the thesis is that population aging is just one of the driving forces 
behind the HCE growth. Societal and other individual determinants are even more impor-
tant, e.g. need determinants (health and disability) and technological progress. Both factors, 
however, are strongly interrelated with aging. Nevertheless, few studies thus far adopted an 
integrated approach in investigating the (relative) impact of population aging on the level of 
HCE by integrating either (a) public health and health economics research or (b) evidence 
on the influence of societal and individual determinants. The adoption of these integrated 
approaches indeed provided important new insights.
Time to drop time-to-death?
Due to data limitations, most previous studies that analyzed individual HCE data failed to 
account for the foremost important determinant of HCE, need determinants. Given that the 
relationship between age and HCE is largely due to ill-health requiring medical treatment, 
the contribution of population aging to HCE growth could not be fully considered in these 
studies. In the absence of adequate data on need determinants, mortality (time-to-death) 
has often been used to approximate health and disability. Time-to-death (TTD) studies 
have concluded that population aging has shifted an important part of HCE to older ages, 
especially for acute care, but to a lesser extent for long-term care (LTC) expenditures. As 
a consequence, population aging was anticipated to have a limited effect on the growth in 
acute HCE (0.5-1.0 percent annually), but would impact LTC spending more substantially. 
We have shown that also TTD approximates health and disability incompletely. The impact 
of TTD on acute and LTC spending was found to diminish – or even to become redundant 
– after appropriately controlling for health and disability status. Consequently, when future 
trends in health or disability do not coincide with mortality trends, TTD models probably 
still lead to inaccurate predictions of future spending.
We discussed three competing hypotheses on the relation between longevity gains and 
trends in health and disability: expansion, compression, and postponement of morbidity 
(Fries, 1980; Olshansky et al., 1991; Payne et al., 2007). Using TTD to approximate health or 
disability inherently assumes a postponement hypothesis: the trend in ill-health is shifted 
along the age range, while its duration remains constant. Most recent evidence however 
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favors the compression hypothesis. This strongly suggests replacing TTD with informa-
tion on better need determinants, as TTD is unable to fully capture the effect of (healthy) 
aging on HCE. It does, however, by no means indicate that one should dispose of TTD in 
predicting future expenditures. Unlike future trends in health and disability, forecasts of life 
expectancy are readily available for most countries and probably less prone to uncertainty 
than forecasts of disability and health which increases the usefulness of TTD in forecasting 
HCE.
Multicolored gray: the impact of aging depends on the trend in ill-health
This thesis improved insight in the relationship between need determinants and health 
care use and spending in the Netherlands. Disability is indeed the most important need 
determinant of LTC use. However, age remains an important driver of LTC spending, even 
after controlling for disability. Population aging is therefore anticipated to further increase 
LTC expenditures, regardless of the trend in disability. However, the extent to which it will 
do so greatly depends on the disability trend.
Furthermore, population aging impacts lifetime and aggregate LTC spending to different 
extents but both depend on the trend in disability. In the Netherlands, longevity gains are 
expected to be accompanied by a compression of severe and expansion of mild disability. 
As institutional LTC use is mainly driven by severe disability and home care use by mild 
disability, longevity gains increased lifetime spending on home care. Because home care is 
relatively inexpensive compared to institutional LTC, longevity gains are expected to only 
slightly increase lifetime spending on LTC. By contrast, the increasing proportion of elderly 
is expected to substantially increase aggregate LTC spending. To what extent it will do so 
depends on the underlying disability trend; accounting (not accounting) for the trend in 
disability, Dutch home care spending is expected to increase by 23 (87) percent between 
2004 and 2040. A continuation of the disability decline therefore importantly alleviates the 
consequences of population aging on the LTC sector.
It’s all relative: population aging is just one of the driving forces behind the HCE 
growth
In addition to largely neglecting need determinants, the vast majority of microeconomic 
studies have studied the impact of population aging in isolation of the societal determinants. 
The partial effect of population aging, defined as changes in the population age composi-
tion, deviates importantly from the full effect of population aging that also incorporates the 
interaction between population aging and other individual and societal determinants of 
HCE. Changes in de age composition of the population contribute moderately to the total 
HCE growth; it explains 0.5-1.0 percent of a total annual real growth rate that can reach 
4-5 percent (Burner, Waldo, and McKusick, 1992; Richardson and McKie, 1999; Reinhardt, 
2003). At the macroeconomic level, medical technological progress, facilitated by economic 
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growth and willingness to pay, is the strongest driver of HCE growth, in particular for 
acute care and to a lesser extent for LTC. Medical technology alters treatment patterns and 
could decrease, but more often turns out to increase, treatment costs for a specific health 
problem. Baumol’s disease is another societal determinant that structurally contributes to 
HCE growth. Its contribution has been found to approach the partial effect of population 
aging (e.g. 0.6 percent annually for the Netherlands; Douven et al., 2006). Unlike most 
studies, chapter seven simultaneously unraveled the contribution of individual and several 
societal determinants to acute HCE growth. Changes in population characteristics (e.g. ag-
ing, health) could only marginally explain the rise in acute HCE. Instead, changes in medi-
cal practice styles, mainly due to changed government policy and technological progress, 
contributed to three quarters of the acute HCE growth in the Netherlands.
Although the partial effect of population aging is limited, its full effect could be sub-
stantial as the impact of population aging is strongly related to that of other important 
individual and societal determinants. In addition to the strong association between age 
and need determinants, the impact of population aging is strongly related to influential 
societal determinants. First, because medical technological progress largely depends on the 
demand for it, e.g. the health of the population, population aging and corresponding trends 
in population health largely stimulate medical technological progress. Innovations are likely 
to be targeted at individuals with the highest need for health care. Consequently, elderly 
benefit more from technological progress than younger generations. Second, government 
policies (i.e. relaxation of budgets) are likely to disproportionately benefit elderly popula-
tions. Third, population aging increases the relative importance of Baumol’s disease. Due to 
population aging, serious labor force shortages in health care, in particularly in the LTC sec-
tor, are expected. Population aging is therefore likely to put an upward pressure on wages in 
health care. Hence, population aging importantly influences the HCE growth. Its relevance 
is underestimated when not considering that the impact of population aging is interrelated 
to other important driving forces of the HCE growth.
As different as chalk and cheese? The drivers of acute versus LTC spending
Driving forces of expenditure growth vary by health care sector. LTC spending growth 
seems to depend most on changes in the determinants of LTC expenditures: the age compo-
sition and disability rates. On the contrary, acute HCE growth is mainly subject to structural 
changes that alter the impact of determinants on HCE by changing medical practice pat-
terns. Important sources of structural change are technological progress and government 
policy. Instability of the acute HCE function explains three quarters of the Dutch acute HCE 
growth over the period 1998-2004 while changes in population characteristics (e.g. aging, 
health) contributed only moderately to acute HCE growth. An important message to be 
derived from this finding is that forecasts of acute HCE solely based on trends in population 
characteristics are likely to considerably underestimate the actual growth. For instance, only 
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a 6 percent growth of median acute care spending over the period 1998-2004 would have 
been predicted in 1998, while the actual growth amounted to 29 percent.
The relatively low impact of medical technology on LTC spending growth is related to the 
aim of the LTC sector which is to care for instead of cure. In addition, LTC expenditures 
are mainly composed of personnel and housing costs. However, the limited effect of medi-
cal technology does by no means imply stability of the LTC expenditure function. Instead, 
instability of this function is caused by other developments. Structural changes to improve 
the quality of care have definitely increased LTC expenditures, e.g. the shift from six person 
bedrooms to two person or private bedrooms in LTC facilities at the beginning of the 2000s 
(TKSG, 2000). Even higher quality standards are expected to be adopted in the near future. 
Elderly increasingly demand “more hands around the bed” resulting in a rise of personnel 
costs (Eggink, Oudijk, and Woittiez, 2010). Although the above structural changes in LTC 
provision result in rising per capita LTC expenditures, structural changes might also lead 
to a decrease in per capita LTC expenditures, e.g. the separation of the housing and caring 
function. All these examples illustrate that structural changes will definitely impact the 
LTC expenditure function resulting in inadequate forecasts of LTC spending that would be 
projected by combining future trends in determinants with current LTC functions.
In addition to the different drivers of acute and LTC expenditure growth, explanation 
of the rise in expenditures varies between sub sectors of acute health care. Application of 
an innovative decomposition method to explain hospital and pharmaceutical expenditure 
growth revealed important new insight: not only the growth itself, but also the explanation 
of the growth varies across the expenditure distribution and between hospital and pharma-
ceutical care. Hospital expenditure growth can almost entirely be explained by increased 
hospital rates facilitated by changes in government policy (i.e. relaxation hospital budgets), 
while changes in other hospital practices (e.g. decreased length-of-stay, shift to less inten-
sive hospital treatment) decreased spending at the top end of the distribution and increased 
spending at lower percentiles. By contrast, the pharmaceutical spending growth resulted 
primarily from more intensive and/or more expensive drug use. Technological progress (i.e. 
the introduction of medicines) seems to be the most important driver of pharmaceutical 
spending growth, especially at the higher percentiles of the pharmaceutical expenditure 
distribution.
Limitations
The present thesis has several limitations, of which the most important will be outlined. 
First, our forecasts of LTC spending in chapter four and five did not control for possible 
changes in the impact of determinants on LTC expenditure. More research is needed on 
the magnitude of the instability of the LTC function to shed light on this conjecture and 
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to be able to forecast LTC expenditures more adequately. Second, the impact of population 
aging on the supply of and demand for informal care is far from clear yet. Continuing shifts 
from severe to mild disability might increase future demands for informal care as informal 
care is a better substitute for the less skilled LTC services (Bonsang, 2009). Simultaneously, 
increases in the female labor force participation, retirement age and the number of single 
living elderly are likely to decrease informal care supply. Consequently, the gap between 
supply and demand for informal care is likely to increase. Given that informal care partly 
substitutes formal LTC, research on the consequences of population aging on informal care 
is required to be able to improve prognoses of LTC expenditures in aging populations. Third, 
the relationship between health and disability and HCE is complex as causality works in 
both directions. We were, however, unable to control for this endogeneity which has prob-
ably underestimated the effects of health and disability on acute and LTC spending. Fourth, 
although we have been able to illustrate the improvement in HCE models when accounting 
for variation in health and disability, we could not actually show that these richer models 
also improved the accuracy of expenditure forecasts. Finally, in the absence of individual 
data on general health, we could not fully capture the effect of changing population health 
on the growth in acute HCE.
Policy implications and further research
Instability of the expenditure function is shown to considerably impact HCE growth. Gov-
ernment policies being an important source of instability of the HCE function, suggests 
that it is indeed possible to influence future growth rates. However, our study period was 
characterized by a centrally governed and supply-restricted health care sector. Given that 
the Netherlands has moved towards a demand-driven health care system with less involve-
ment of the central government, it is of utmost importance that health insurers take over 
the responsibility as guardians of HCE growth while simultaneously respecting the wishes 
of their clients. Early evidence of regulated competition indeed revealed that health insurers 
were able to increase efficiency by lowering prices of drugs and hospital services (CVZ, 
2009; NZa, 2009). The different nature of spending growth in acute and LTC calls for sec-
tor tailored recommendations on modes to influence future spending growth. The list of 
recommendations to influence acute and LTC expenditure growth is not exhaustive, but is 
restricted to options that more or less arise from the results.
Long-term care
Various policy options recently passed the review to relieve the consequences of popula-
tion aging on public LTC expenditures. Options could be organized under three headings: 
changes in epidemiology, improvement in efficiency, and support of informal caregivers. 
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The first option directly evolves from our main findings as LTC spending growth largely 
depends on the future trend in disability. Hence, policies stimulating a continuation of the 
disability decline alleviate LTC spending growth. It is however uncertain to what extent the 
current decline in disability will continue. E.g. inclining obesity rates with a concurrent rise 
of chronic conditions might boost HCE. More research is needed to reduce uncertainty 
surrounding the future disability trend. Research on the causes of the disability decline 
will for example reduce uncertainty surrounding its future trend. Suggested causes of the 
disability decline are: a reduction in the prevalence of chronic illnesses, a reduced disabling 
impact of these diseases, better educated elderly, development of (non)medical technology 
that enhances the ability to live independently (e.g. appliances, micro wave). From an public 
health perspective, decreasing disability by preventing or treating chronic conditions is the 
most preferred mode as this option intrinsically prevents disability instead of providing 
modes to deal with disability independently. However, reaching a compression of disability 
by preventing or curing health problems most probably demands a large medical innovation 
component resulting in further increases in acute HCE. This strong interaction between 
acute and LTC spending calls for a better linkage between acute and LTC financing in the 
Netherlands.
Second, numerous modes have been suggested to improve efficiency in LTC provision. 
Some initiatives have recently received attention by the Dutch government. First, a renewed 
focus on the substitution policy to keep individuals at home as long as possible has received 
full attention. Part of this policy is the government proposal to separate the housing and 
caring function in LTC that will be stimulated by the introduction of the “complete home 
package” (EKSG, 2011). The housing function of institutionalized elderly will only be pub-
licly financed if institutionalization is inevitable. This renewed emphasis on the substitution 
policy definitely will alter per capita LTC expenditures: institutional LTC use will partly be 
replaced by home care use. As long as the most severely disabled individuals could enter 
LTC institutions, this substitution policy is likely to lower growth rates of LTC spending. 
The observed shift from severe to mild disability indeed suggests that future LTC could be 
more targeted at independently living individuals as home care services could adequately 
meet the needs of mildly disabled individuals.
A second mode to improve efficiency is to replace the current pay-as-you-go financing 
system by LTC saving accounts. In a system of LTC saving accounts, LTC is funded on a 
capital basis. LTC users become more responsible for their expenses and have a greater free-
dom of provider choice. Besides possible efficiency improvements and increases in informal 
LTC provision, LTC savings accounts improve the intergenerational solidarity. Currently no 
international experience regarding LTC savings account exists. More research is needed to 
investigate under which conditions LTC saving accounts improve efficiency
A third mode to increase efficiency in LTC provision is extending cash benefits in LTC. 
Cash benefits are shown to be more efficient than in-kind benefits (Sadiraj et al., 2011; van 
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den Berg and Hassink, 2008). However, on the short run extending cash benefits also at-
tracts public LTC users that would not have used publicly financed care in the absence of 
the extension of cash benefits. Moreover, the introduction of cash benefits has monetized 
previously unpaid informal care. Nonetheless, extending the personal care budget might 
be a viable option to further explore given the expected labor shortages in formal LTC. 
Extending cash benefits not only improves efficiency but also provide a way to stimulate 
informal care. As demographic development are likely to increase the gap between supply 
of and demand for informal care, future shortages of informal care are likely to further 
accelerate the demand for public LTC. Governments therefore need to consider policies 
that stimulate the provision of informal care as its supply is likely to fail meeting its demand. 
In addition to LTC saving accounts and extending cash benefits, informal care provision 
could be stimulated by employment of the informal caregiver at government/municipality 
possibly with pension benefits similar to some Scandinavian countries.
Acute health care
Modes to control acute HCE growth mainly constitute initiatives to improve system perfor-
mance. The prominent roles of changes in hospital practices and technological progress to 
acute HCE growth provide two key initiatives how to influence future growth rates. First, 
it is worth to further examine to what extent expensive acute care services could be sub-
stituted by less expensive ones. Medical technological progress has facilitated an increased 
efficiency of the provision of hospital care. Expensive hospital care has been substituted 
by less expensive hospital care, primary care and pharmaceuticals, which has been proved 
to reduce acute HCE. In addition, further reductions in length of hospital stay could be 
reached given that length-of-stay in the Netherlands is still above average compared to 
other countries (Borghans et al., 2008). Reductions in length of stay could only be reduced 
if it is beneficial for all three parties involved: patients, hospitals and insurers. Health insur-
ers could use their negotiating power to reward hospitals close to the benchmark. However, 
in the absence of full information on the quality of care and length-of-stay health insurers 
do not have sufficient insight in the performance of hospitals resulting in an inappropriate 
reward system.
Second, (stricter) efficiency criteria could restrict diffusion and reimbursement of tech-
nologies. Establishing or tightening of efficiency criteria for innovative technologies, how-
ever, has its pitfalls. Besides possible public dissatisfaction, the acute care spending growth 
might have contributed to the observed disability decline. Hence, restricting the growth by 
medical technological progress too rigorously might shift expenditures to the LTC sector. 
Concerning technological progress in hospital care, new procedures can access the basic 
benefit package relatively easy given that they are evaluated on effectiveness only and do not 
have to pass a cost-effectiveness hurdle. A systematic evaluation of efficiency as part of the 
reimbursement decision for hospital procedures could lead to acute HCE savings.
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The large innovation component in the pharmaceutical sector implies that tightening 
reimbursement (criteria) of (new) medicines is especially a relevant mode to reduce drug 
expenditure growth. Currently, the Dutch reimbursement criteria and reimbursement 
prices of outpatient drugs depend on the therapeutic value. For new drugs with therapeutic 
equivalent value, a reference pricing system applies: reimbursement equals the average 
price within a therapeutic equivalent group of drugs. Evidence of the therapeutic value is 
required to obtain a reimbursement decision. In addition, for new drugs with therapeutic 
added value, cost-effectiveness evidence and an assessment of the national budget impact is 
required. Drugs with a therapeutic added value are fully reimbursed.
Drug expenditure savings could be reached by several adaptations of the drug reimburse-
ment (criteria). First, as no rating in the amount of therapeutic added value exists, costs 
savings could be substantial by defining a reasonable threshold for therapeutic added value. 
Second, although cost-effectiveness is a formal reimbursement criterion for drugs with 
therapeutic added value, it does not seem prominent in actual decision-making (Franken, 
Sandman, and Koopmanschap, 2011). A more systematic assessment of efficiency should 
lead to better value for money of publicly financed drugs. Third, regulations could be intro-
duced to hold manufacturers more accountable when aggregated costs of their drug exceed 
their assessment of the budget impact, e.g. manufacturers could be obliged to discount drug 
prices once the estimated budget impact has been exceeded (Le Polain et al., 2010). Fourth, 
cost-effectiveness of drugs is evaluated at launch only and is not systematically reviewed. 
A systematic reevaluation of the cost-effectiveness of reimbursed drugs will reduce drug 
expenditures by excluding drugs from the reimbursement system based on updated (cost-)
effectiveness evidence. Fifth, savings could be substantial by changing the reference pricing 
system, e.g. set the reference price equal to the price of the least expensive drugs within a 
group of equivalent drugs instead of the average. Finally, European Union member states 
should collaborate in assessing the (cost)-effectiveness of orphan drugs. Currently, these 
drugs are often reimbursed despite solid evidence on (cost-)effectiveness (Denis et al., 2010; 
Vegter et al., 2010).
In addition to improving efficiency by adjusting the drug reimbursement system, phar-
maceutical expenditures could be saved when insurers collectively bundle their power to 
lower the price of reimbursed drugs and to restrict full reimbursement to the lowest priced 
drugs. Preferential policies of insurers and claw-back agreements between government and 
pharmacy retail have led to substantial savings in the past (€1.5 million in 2008; CVZ, 2009).
In conclusion, the integrated approaches adopted by this thesis to investigate the relative 
contribution of population aging to the HCE growth provided important new insights. 
Nonetheless, more research is needed to fully understand the contribution of population 
aging by incorporating trends in health and disability. To facilitate this research, improved 
data on disability and ill-health is needed to enable reliable forecasts of their trends over 
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time. Epidemiological expertise on future trends in ill-health and disability has to be com-
bined with health economics models to improve predictions of future spending levels. As 
the causality chain of the relationship between health and HCE works in both directions, 
future research should account for this mutual relationship between health and disability 
and HCE. Finally, it is of utmost importance to further disentangle sources of the instabil-
ity of the HCE function that alter medical practice styles, and most often cause a rise in 
expenditures.
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Summary
Introduction
In recent decades, populations in developed countries have aged considerably. In the 
Netherlands, the proportion of the population aged 65 and above doubled, from 7.6 to 15.3 
percent in the period 1950-2010. This proportion will reach its peak in 2040 when 25.9 
percent of the population will be aged 65 and above. On top of the increased share of the 
65+ population, population aging also reflects gradual increases in the share of the very old 
(85+) within the 65+ population. This share increased from 12.9 to 25.5 percent in the period 
1950-2010, and is expected to rise to 33.3 percent in 2040.
Population aging will definitely have a large impact on society. It will challenge current 
social security systems, among others the financial sustainability of health and long-term 
care systems. Simultaneous to population aging, an upward trend in health care expendi-
tures (HCE) has been observed. In the Netherlands, the amount spent on health care as a 
percentage of GDP rose from 8.7 to 13.1 percent over the period 1972-2007 while per capita 
HCE in constant prices more than doubled. The main objective of this thesis is to improve 
understanding of the (relative) impact of population aging on acute and long-term care 
(LTC) expenditure growth in the Netherlands. Point of departure of the thesis was that 
population aging is just one of the driving forces behind the HCE growth: societal and other 
individual determinants are even more important, and are strongly interrelated with aging. 
This thesis therefore adopted an integrated approach in investigating the relative impact of 
population aging on the level of HCE by integrating: (a) public health and health economics 
research and (b) evidence on the influence of societal and individual determinants.
The thesis consists of three parts. Part A provides a general overview of the current state 
of the literature on the causes and consequences of HCE growth in aging populations. 
Although the impact of population aging on acute HCE has been studied abundantly, few 
studies have analyzed its influence on LTC expenditures. Part B therefore investigates the 
impact of population aging on LTC expenditures in the Netherlands in greater depth. Part 
C further disentangles the contribution of several factors to acute HCE growth.
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A. The impact of aging and other determinants on 
health care expenditures
Chapter two provides a literature overview of the impact of aging(-related) factors on HCE 
growth. It discusses the consequences of population aging to the HCE growth in relation to 
other determinants of HCE that interact strongly with aging, like health and technological 
progress. A distinction is made between the influence of determinants on acute and LTC 
expenditures.
Given that HCE are generally higher in older age groups, population aging has tradition-
ally been viewed as a prime suspect of HCE growth determinant. This view revised as a result 
of the cost-of-dying and time-to-death literature: the high spending at older ages appears to 
be associated with time-to-death (TTD) rather than with age. Because individuals can die 
only once, this means that the impact of population aging on HCE growth is recognized to 
be significantly lower than traditionally believed. Still, TTD is at best a proxy for health, the 
real determinant of HCE (needs). The extent to which population aging impacts on HCE 
therefore depends primarily on the underlying trends in population health. Most of the 
literature on population aging and HCE could however only include rough approximations 
of health determinants, like age or TTD. It is shown that the influence of population aging 
on HCE could not accurately be estimated when ignoring important trends.
The strongest driver of expenditures, in particular for acute care, seems to be techno-
logical progress, facilitated by economic growth. The contribution of the increased share of 
elderly to HCE growth is relevant but modest. It explains 0.5-1.0 percent of the 4 percent 
real annual growth in HCE. The influence of population aging on LTC expenditures is much 
stronger. Although the partial contribution of population aging to the HCE growth is rather 
limited, it does not mean that aging is unimportant for HCE. Many important drivers of 
HCE, especially technological progress (for acute care), developments in wages and prices, 
and disability (for LTC), interact very strongly with age. E.g. technological progress dispro-
portionately benefits the elderly.
B. The impact of population aging on long-term care 
expenditures
To enhance our understanding of the LTC expenditure growth, a better insight in the 
decision process leading to LTC utilization is paramount. The Dutch institutional context 
imposes a strong influence of disability status on LTC use: the presence of disabilities is 
an important prerequisite for obtaining access to publicly financed LTC. The objective of 
chapter three is therefore to examine the determinants of home care and institutional LTC 
use, and focuses on the role of disability.
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Age importantly drives LTC use, even after extensive control for disability. LTC needs of 
aging populations will therefore keep rising irrespective of age-specific disability trends. 
However, because disability is also an important driver of LTC use in its own right it still 
provides opportunity policy level to policymakers since disability trends can be influenced. 
The additional disabilities required to use home care are considerably lower than the ad-
ditional disabilities to switch from home care use to institutional LTC use: an increase of the 
disability index by one point increases the probability to use home care (institutional LTC) 
on average by 2.3 (0.6) percentage points.
Having determined the relationship between disability and LTC use in chapter three, 
chapter four disentangles the separate roles of age, TTD and disability in explaining LTC 
expenditures. Literature on population aging and HCE commonly used age, and more 
recently TTD, to approximate need determinants. We reconsider the roles of age and TTD 
by controlling for cause-of-death and disability and illustrate their relevance for projecting 
LTC expenditures in aging populations. A number of findings emerged. First, the large 
variation in decedent expenditures by cause-of-death demonstrates that the relationship 
between TTD and LTC expenditures is dynamic: epidemiological changes will affect the 
importance of each cause-of-death and consequently the overall influence of TTD on LTC 
expenditures. Second, after control for disability, the influence of TTD becomes redundant, 
while age remains an important determinant of LTC expenditures. The decline in the effect 
of age and the redundancy of TTD after control for disability indeed confirms that age 
and TTD largely approximate disability. The finding that TTD mainly acts as a proxy for 
disability raises doubts about its validity for projecting LTC expenditures. Projections using 
TTD implicitly assume that longevity gains merely shift disability to older ages. Dynamics 
in the relationship between mortality and disability caused by epidemiological changes 
are ignored and therefore contradict recent evidence favoring a compression of disability. 
Hence, using TTD to approximate disability still overestimates the effect of aging on future 
LTC expenditures as is illustrated by the projections presented in chapter four.
Reliable estimates of future trends in disability are required to improve prognoses of 
LTC spending. This is the objective of chapter five: to estimate future disability rates and 
combine these with LTC utilization rates by disability, age and sex to obtain forecasts of 
individual lifetime and population aggregate annual LTC spending for 2020. The resulting 
LTC expenditure forecasts then explicitly accounted for changing disability patterns instead 
of approximating it by age or TTD. The main findings are as follows. The proportion of life 
years with severe disability is expected to decrease while the proportion of life years with 
mild disability is expected to increase. Lifetime home care spending, mainly determined 
by mild disability, is expected to increase while institutional spending will remain fairly 
constant due to stable life years with severe disability. Given that lifetime LTC expenditures 
are largely determined by institutional spending, future longevity gains with improved dis-
ability will not seriously increase lifetime spending. It is however important to note that 
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this finding strongly depends on the accuracy of forecasts of life years with severe disability. 
On the contrary, the growth of the share of elderly will considerably increase aggregate 
spending for the 55+ population, by 19.2 percent in the period 2007-2020.
Chapter six focuses on informal care, an important component of LTC. We only contrib-
ute indirectly to evidence on the impact of population aging on informal care spending. 
Chapter four reveals that informal care acts as an important substitute for formal LTC. Co-
residence approximates informal care availability as the bulk of informal care is provided 
by the partner. Hence, co-residing individuals spend substantially less on formal LTC. The 
objective of chapter six is to examine the feasibility of the contingent valuation (CV) method 
to obtain a monetary value for one hour of informal care. Main findings are as follows. On 
average caregivers and care recipients value one hour informal care at €9.83 and €7.87. CV 
values are sensitive to the heterogeneity and dynamics of informal care implying that the 
method has the capability of capturing the full effects of the informal care situation in mon-
etary terms. Important determinants of care givers valuations are kind of task, opportunity 
costs and personal care budget (PCB). The latter finding indicates that PCBs can drive up 
LTC expenditures by monetising informal care. Although CV values are sensitive to the 
care giving situation, non-response remains a matter of concern. Selective non-response 
probably biased CV values upwards.
C. Unraveling the determinants of acute health care 
expenditure growth
The objective of chapter seven is to improve understanding of the contribution of various 
factors to the acute HCE growth in the Netherlands over the period 1998-2004. Real acute 
HCE growth in this period was 28 percent, but the growth was not uniform across the 
distribution. We therefore examine and unravel this growth across the full expenditure 
distribution. Growth in acute HCE, hospital and pharmaceutical spending is explained by 
a part due to changes in determinants – such as health, medical practice styles, aging – and 
a part due to the changing impact of determinants on acute HCE. The latter results from 
structural changes (e.g. technological progress) that alter treatment costs of specific condi-
tions. We obtain the following results.
Although the growth in acute HCE was fairly evenly spread across the spending distribu-
tion, the growth rate of hospital and pharmaceutical spending varied across the distribu-
tion. Hospital spending growth was highest around the centre of its distribution and can 
largely be explained by a higher proportion of hospital admissions which was stimulated by 
policies to reduce waiting lists. Reduced length-of-stay and a relatively larger increase in day 
care admissions and outpatient visits have contributed to lower growth of hospital spending 
at the top of the hospital expenditure distribution. The picture is quite different for phar-
Summary 193
maceutical expenditure growth which could entirely be explained by more intensive and/
or expensive pharmaceutical use and was concentrated at the right end of the distribution. 
Technological progress (the introduction of new drugs) dominates the explanation of the 
pharmaceutical expenditure growth, especially at the top of the distribution as new drugs 
are relatively expensive. In addition, pharmaceutical expenditure growth could moderately 
be explained by shifts to less intensive forms of hospital treatment – day care admissions 
and outpatient visits – and population aging. This strongly suggests that hospital care can to 
some degree be substituted by pharmaceutical care. Changes in population characteristics 
(aging, population health) explain only a very small proportion of acute HCE growth. Al-
though the contribution of population aging to spending growth was moderate, its impact 
could not be seen in isolation from technological progress and the relaxation of hospital 
budgets. Both developments seem to have disproportionately benefited the elderly.
Discussion
Chapter eight discusses the main findings, their (policy) implications and recommenda-
tions, the main limitations of the present studies and possibilities for further research. This 
summary is restricted to the main findings and its (policy) implications and recommenda-
tions. The main conclusions were:
First, given that the relationship between age and HCE is largely due to health, the full 
contribution of population aging to HCE growth could only be considered when accounting 
for changing health patterns. Disability is the most important need determinant of LTC use. 
In the absence of disability, TTD largely approximates disability. Findings however show 
that TTD was unable to fully capture the effect of (healthy) aging on HCE suggesting to 
replace TTD with information on better need determinants.
Second, the impact of changes in the age composition of the population on HCE growth 
is limited: it could explain 0.5-1.0 percent of a total annual real growth of 4-5 percent. 
However, the full effect of population aging could be substantial as the impact of population 
aging is strongly related to that of other important individual and societal determinants. 
In addition to need determinants, the full impact of population aging is strongly related to 
technological progress, developments in wages/prices and government policies.
Third, the contribution of several factors to growth in acute HCE and LTC expenditures 
differed. While LTC spending growth seems to depend most on changes in the population 
age composition and the future trend in disability, acute HCE growth is mainly subject 
to changes in medical practices, largely due to medical technological progress and health 
policies. Not only does the impact of population aging differ between acute and LTC ex-
penditures, it also differs between subsectors of acute care (hospital and pharmaceutical 
sector) and between individual lifetime and annual population aggregate LTC expenditures. 
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Longevity gains are expected to slightly increase lifetime spending while the increasing 
proportion of elderly is expected to substantially increase annual aggregate spending.
The most important (policy) implications and recommendations that are discussed in 
chapter eight are as follows. First, the finding that government policies themselves were an 
important source of HCE growth, suggests that it is indeed possible to influence future HCE 
growth. Given that the Netherlands has moved from a centrally governed and supply-re-
stricted health care sector towards a demand-driven health care system with less involvement 
of the central government, it is important that health insurers take over the responsibility as 
guardians of HCE growth while simultaneously respecting the wishes of their clients.
Second, it is worth noting that policymakers should be aware that forecasts of HCE solely 
based on trends in population characteristics are likely to considerably underestimate the 
actual growth, in particularly for acute care. For instance, only a 6 percent growth of median 
acute HCE over the period 1998-2004 would have been predicted in 1998, while the actual 
growth amounted to 29 percent.
Third, the different nature of spending growth in acute and LTC calls for sector tailored 
recommendations on policy options to control future spending growth. Chapter eight briefly 
discussed modes to influence acute and LTC spending growth that more or less follow from 
our results. Concerning the LTC sector, options to relieve public LTC expenditure growth 
are grouped under three headings: changes in epidemiology, improvements in efficiency, 
and support of informal care provision. First, stimulating a continuation of the decline in 
disability rates could alleviate the consequences of population aging on the LTC sectors. 
It is however uncertain to what extent the current decline in disability is time- or cohort-
specific. Second, modes to improve efficiency in LTC provision include: a substitution 
policy to keep individuals at home as long as possible, extending cash benefits in LTC, and 
LTC savings account as an alternative for the current pay-as-you-go financing system of 
LTC. The latter two possibilities to improve efficiency also support informal care provision. 
Given that informal care could substitute more expensive formal LTC services, supporting 
informal care might relieve pressure on the LTC budgets. Finally, informal care could also 
be supported by offering employment at government/municipality possibly in combination 
with pension benefits for informal caregivers.
Regarding acute care, two modes to improve efficiency in acute care provision are briefly 
discussed: reductions in length-of-stay, for example by substituting expensive hospital treat-
ment by less expensive hospital or primary care treatment, and a more systematic assess-
ment of efficiency to restrict diffusion and reimbursement of medical technologies. Given 
the large role of technological progress in the pharmaceutical sector, possibilities to save 
drug expenditures by strengthening the efficiency criteria in the reimbursement decision 
for (new) drugs are discussed in greater depth. Concerning technologies in hospital care, we 
simply recommend the introduction of a cost-effectiveness hurdle as the current reimburse-
ment decision of these technologies solely depends on effectiveness.
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Samenvatting
Introductie
In de afgelopen decennia is de bevolking in ontwikkelde landen sterk verouderd. De 
proportie 65+-ers in Nederland is verdubbeld, van 7.6 naar 15.3 procent, in the periode 
1950-2010. Het aandeel 65+-ers zal naar verwachting zijn piek bereiken in 2040 wanneer 
25.9 procent van de populatie 65 jaar of ouder is. Naast een toenemend aandeel 65+-ers 
leidt de vergrijzing ook tot een toename in de gemiddelde leeftijd van de populatie ouderen. 
De proportie 85+-ers als percentage van het aantal ouderen is toegenomen van 12.9 tot 25.5 
procent in de periode 1950-2010 en zal naar verwachting stijgen tot 33.3 procent in 2040.
De vergrijzing zal beslist zijn impact hebben op de samenleving. Een vergrijzende sa-
menleving vormt een uitdaging voor de huidige sociale zekerheidsstelsels, waaronder de 
financiële houdbaarheid van het gezondheidszorgstelsel en het stelsel voor langdurige zorg. 
Gelijktijdig met de vergrijzing is een opwaartse trend in de zorguitgaven waargenomen. 
Het aandeel van het Brute Binnenlands Product dat in Nederland is besteed aan de ge-
zondheidszorg is gestegen van 8.7 naar 13.1 procent in de periode 1972-2007. De uitgaven in 
constante prijzen per hoofd van de bevolking is meer dan verdubbeld in deze periode. Het 
voornaamste doel van dit proefschrift is om beter inzicht te krijgen in de (relatieve) bijdrage 
van de vergrijzing aan de uitgavengroei voor de curatieve and langdurige zorg. Uitgangs-
punt van dit proefschrift is dat de vergrijzing slechts één van de drijvende factoren achter 
de groei van zorguitgaven is: maatschappelijke en andere individuele determinanten zijn 
nog belangrijker, en zijn sterk verweven met de invloed van de vergrijzing. Dit proefschrift 
handhaaft daarom een integrale aanpak in het onderzoek naar de relatieve impact van de 
vergrijzing op de zorguitgaven door integratie van: (a) epidemiologisch en gezondheids-
economisch onderzoek en (b) bewijs inzake de invloed van maatschappelijk en individuele 
determinanten.
Het proefschrift bestaat uit drie delen. Deel A bevat een algemeen overzicht van de huidige 
stand van de literatuur over de oorzaken en gevolgen van de groei in zorguitgaven in een 
vergrijzende bevolking. Hoewel de impact van de vergrijzing op de curatieve zorguitgaven 
overvloedig is onderzocht, hebben weinig studies de invloed van de vergrijzing op de lang-
durige zorguitgaven bestudeerd. Deel B onderzoekt daarom de gevolgen van de vergrijzing 
op de langdurige zorguitgaven in Nederland in meer detail. Tot slot ontrafelt deel C de 
bijdrage van verschillende factoren aan de groei in curatieve zorguitgaven.
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A. De invloed van de vergrijzing en andere factoren 
op de zorguitgaven
Hoofdstuk twee bevat een literatuuroverzicht van de impact van de vergrijzing en gerela-
teerde factoren op de groei in zorguitgaven. Het bespreekt de bijdrage van de vergrijzing 
ten opzichte van de bijdrage van andere determinanten van zorguitgaven, die sterk samen-
hangen met een vergrijzende bevolking, zoals volksgezondheid en technologische ontwik-
kelingen. Een duidelijk onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen de invloed van determinanten 
op curatieve en langdurige zorguitgaven.
Gezien het feit dat zorguitgaven stijgen met de leeftijd, werd de vergrijzing van oudsher 
gezien als een hoofdverdachte van de toenemende zorguitgaven. Deze visie is herzien als 
gevolg van studies die zorguitgaven in de laatste levensjaren hebben bestudeerd: de hoge 
uitgaven op oudere leeftijd zijn namelijk gerelateerd aan de ‘tijd tot overlijden’ (TTD) in 
plaats van aan leeftijd zelf. Omdat individuen slechts eenmaal overlijden betekent dit dat 
de gevolgen van de vergrijzing voor de groei in zorguitgaven aanzienlijk lager liggen dan 
werd gedacht. Hoe dan ook, TTD is op zijn best een proxy voor gezondheid, de echte de-
terminant van zorguitgaven (behoefte). De mate waarin de vergrijzing van invloed is op de 
zorguitgaven hangt daarom grotendeels af van onderliggende trends in volksgezondheid. 
De meeste studies die de invloed van de vergrijzing op de zorguitgaven bestuderen konden 
gezondheid slechts ruw benaderen, door bijvoorbeeld leeftijd en TTD. Het is aangetoond 
dat de invloed van de vergrijzing op de zorguitgaven niet nauwkeurig kan worden geschat 
wanneer belangrijke trends worden genegeerd.
Technologische vooruitgang, gefaciliteerd door economische groei, lijkt de sterkste kos-
tendrijver, voornamelijk voor de curatieve zorg. De bijdrage van het toegenomen aandeel 
ouderen aan de uitgavengroei is relevant, maar bescheiden. Het verklaart 0.5-1.0 procent 
van de 4 procent jaarlijkse reële groei in zorguitgaven. Het effect van de vergrijzing op de 
langdurige zorguitgaven is veel sterker. Hoewel de directe bijdrage van de vergrijzing be-
perkt is, betekent dit niet dat de vergrijzing onbelangrijk is voor de zorguitgavengroei. Veel 
belangrijke determinanten van zorguitgaven, in het bijzonder technologische vooruitgang 
(voor de curatieve zorg), de ontwikkeling in lonen en prijzen, en beperkingenstatus (voor de 
langdurige zorg), hangen sterk samen met de vergrijzing. Ouderen profiteren bijvoorbeeld 
onevenredig van technologische vooruitgang.
B. De impact van de vergrijzing op de langdurige 
zorguitgaven
Om begrip over de groei in langdurige zorguitgaven te versterken is een beter inzicht in het 
besluitvormingsproces dat leidt tot langdurig zorggebruik vereist. De Nederlandse institu-
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tionele context legt een sterke invloed van beperkingenstatus op langdurig zorggebruik op: 
de aanwezigheid van beperkingen is een belangrijke voorwaarde voor het verkrijgen van 
toegang tot publiek gefinancierde langdurige zorg. Het doel van hoofdstuk drie is dan ook 
om de determinanten van het gebruik van thuiszorg en zorg met verblijf (verpleeghuiszorg 
en verzorgingshuiszorg) vast te stellen, en richt zich voornamelijk op de rol van beperkin-
genstatus.
Leeftijd beïnvloed langdurig zorggebruik, zelfs na uitgebreide correctie voor beperkin-
genstatus. Langdurige zorgbehoeften in een vergrijzende samenleving zullen dus stijgen, 
ongeacht de leeftijdsspecifieke trends in beperkingenstatus. Echter, omdat beperkingensta-
tus zelf ook een belangrijke invloed uitoefent op langdurig zorggebruik, biedt dit nog kans 
voor beleidsmakers omdat trends in beperkingenstatus wel beïnvloed kunnen worden. De 
extra beperkingen nodig voor het gebruik van thuiszorg zijn aanzienlijk lager dan de extra 
beperkingen die nodig zijn om van thuiszorggebruik naar zorg met verblijf te switchen: een 
toename van de beperkingen index met een punt verhoogt de kans op thuiszorggebruik 
(zorg met verblijf) met gemiddeld 2.3 (0.6) procentpunten.
Na de relatie tussen beperkingenstatus en langdurige zorggebruik te hebben bestudeerd, 
ontrafelt hoofdstuk vier de afzonderlijke rollen van leeftijd, TTD en beperkingenstatus in het 
verklaren van langdurige zorguitgaven. Eerder onderzoek naar de vergrijzing en zorguit-
gaven hebben zorgbehoefte benaderd door leeftijd, en meer recent TTD, te gebruiken. Wij 
heroverwegen de rol van leeftijd en TTD door ook rekening te houden met de doodsoorzaak 
en beperkingenstatus en illustreren de relevantie voor het ramen van langdurige zorguitga-
ven. Een aantal bevindingen kwam naar voren. Ten eerste, de grote variatie in de uitgaven 
van overledenen naar doodsoorzaak toont aan dat de relatie tussen TTD en langdurige 
zorguitgaven dynamisch is: epidemiologische veranderingen zullen het belang van elke 
doodsoorzaak beïnvloeden en daarmee dus de algehele invloed van TTD op langdurige 
zorguitgaven. Ten tweede, TTD heeft niet langer een effect op de langdurige zorguitgaven 
zodra gecorrigeerd is voor beperkingenstatus. De daling in het effect van leeftijd en de 
redundantie van TTD na controle voor beperkingenstatus bevestigt dat leeftijd en TTD 
grotendeels proxy’s voor beperkingenstatus zijn. De bevinding dat TTD vooral fungeert als 
een proxy voor beperkingenstatus rijst twijfels over de validiteit van toekomstige ramingen 
voor langdurige zorguitgaven. Ramingen met behulp van TTD gaan er impliciet van uit 
dat een toename in levensverwachting resulteert in een verschuiving van beperkingen naar 
hogere leeftijd. Hierbij wordt dynamiek in de relatie tussen sterfte en beperkingenstatus als 
gevolg van epidemiologische veranderingen genegeerd wat in tegenspraak is met recent 
bewijs ten gunste van een compressie van beperkingenstatus. Het gebruik van TTD om 
beperkingenstatus te benaderen overschat dus waarschijnlijk het effect van de vergrijzing 
op toekomstige langdurige zorguitgaven zoals wordt geïllustreerd door de ramingen gepre-
senteerd in hoofdstuk vier.
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Betrouwbare schattingen van de toekomstige trends in beperkingenstatus zijn dus nodig 
om toekomstige ramingen van langdurige zorguitgaven te verbeteren. Dat is tevens het doel 
van hoofdstuk vijf: het schatten van de toekomstige trend in beperkingenstatus en deze com-
bineren met langdurige zorguitgaven naar leeftijd, geslacht en beperkingenstatus om prog-
noses voor individuele levensloopuitgaven en jaarlijkse populatie geaggregeerde uitgaven 
te verkrijgen voor het jaar 2020. De resulterende ramingen voor langdurige zorguitgaven 
houden dus expliciet rekening met veranderingen in beperkingenstatus in plaats van deze 
te benaderen door leeftijd en TTD. De belangrijkste bevindingen zijn als volgt. Het aandeel 
van levensjaren met ernstige beperkingen zal naar verwachting afnemen, terwijl het aandeel 
van levensjaren met een milde beperking waarschijnlijk zal toenemen. Levensloopuitgaven 
voor thuiszorg, voornamelijk bepaald door de trend in milde beperkingen, zullen naar ver-
wachting toenemen, terwijl de levensloop uitgaven voor zorg met verblijf redelijk constant 
blijven als gevolg van een stabiel aantal levensjaren met een ernstige beperking. Gezien 
het feit dat levensloopuitgaven aan langdurige zorg grotendeels worden bepaald door in-
stitutionele zorguitgaven zal een toename in de levensverwachting gepaard met verbeterde 
beperkingenstatus niet leiden tot een serieuze verhoging van deze levensloopuitgaven. Deze 
bevinding hangt echter sterk af van de accuraatheid van de voorspellingen van het aantal 
levensjaren met ernstige beperkingen. In tegenstelling tot levensloopuitgaven zullen de 
jaarlijkse uitgaven aan langdurige zorg op populatieniveau aanzienlijk stijgen (19.2 procent 
in de periode 2007-2020) als gevolg van een toename in het aandeel ouderen.
Hoofdstuk zes richt zich op informele zorg, een belangrijke component van langdurige 
zorg. We hebben alleen indirect bijgedragen aan beter inzicht over de gevolgen van de 
vergrijzing op informele zorguitgaven. Hoofdstuk vier laat zien dat mantelzorg fungeert als 
een belangrijk substituut voor formele langdurige zorg. Huishoudencompositie is een proxy 
voor informele zorg beschikbaarheid aangezien het merendeel van de informele zorg wordt 
geleverd door de partner. Daardoor besteden personen die samenwonen aanzienlijk minder 
aan formele zorg. Het doel van hoofdstuk zes is de haalbaarheid van de contingent valuation 
(CV) methode te onderzoeken om een monetaire waarde voor één uur informele zorg te 
verkrijgen. De belangrijkste bevindingen zijn als volgt. Zorgverleners en zorgvragen waar-
deren één uur informele zorg gemiddeld op €9.83 en €7.87, respectievelijk. CV-waarden zijn 
gevoelig voor de heterogeniteit en dynamiek van de informele zorgsituatie wat impliceert 
dat de methode de mogelijkheid heeft om alle effecten van informele zorg in monetaire ter-
men te vangen. Belangrijke determinanten van waarderingen door zorgverleners zijn soort 
informele zorgtaak, opportunity costs en persoonsgebonden budget (PGB). Deze laatste 
bevinding geeft aan dat PGB’s de uitgaven van langdurige zorg kunnen opdrijven. Hoewel 
de CV-waarden gevoelig zijn voor de zorgsituatie blijft non-respons een punt van zorg. 
Selectieve non-respons heeft waarschijnlijk geleid tot een overschatting van CV-waarden.
Samenvatting 199
C. Het ontrafelen van de determinanten van de groei 
in curatieve zorguitgaven
Het doel van hoofdstuk zeven is om verder inzicht te krijgen in de bijdrage van verschillende 
factoren aan de groei in curatieve zorguitgaven in Nederland over de periode 1998-2004. 
De reële groei in curatieve zorguitgaven in deze periode was 28 procent, maar de groei was 
niet uniform verdeeld over de distributie. We onderzoeken de groei en ontrafelen deze over 
de volledige uitgavendistributie. De groei in curatieve zorguitgaven, ziekenhuisuitgaven 
en farmaceutische uitgaven wordt verklaard in een gedeelte dat te danken is aan verande-
ringen in de distributie van determinanten – zoals gezondheid, medische praktijkstijlen, 
vergrijzing – en een gedeelte dat is toe te schrijven aan de veranderde impact van determi-
nanten op uitgaven. Dit laatste is een gevolg van structurele veranderingen (bijvoorbeeld 
technologische vooruitgang) die de behandelkosten van specifieke condities veranderen. De 
volgende resultaten zijn verkregen.
Hoewel de groei in curatieve zorguitgaven vrij gelijkmatig verspreid was over de distribu-
tie, varieerde de groei van ziekenhuis- en farmaceutische uitgaven sterk over de distributie. 
De groei in ziekenhuisuitgaven is geconcentreerd in het midden van de uitgavendistributie 
en kan grotendeels verklaard worden door een hoger aandeel ziekenhuisopnames wat 
gestimuleerd werd door beleid om de wachtlijsten terug te dringen. Kortere verpleegduur 
en een relatief grotere toename in dagopnames en polikliniekbezoeken hebben bijgedragen 
aan een lagere groei van ziekenhuisuitgaven aan de bovenkant van de uitgavendistributie. 
Het beeld is heel anders voor farmaceutische uitgaven: de groei werd volledig veroorzaakt 
door intensiever en/of duurder geneesmiddelengebruik en was geconcentreerd in de hogere 
decielen van de uitgavendistributie. Technologische vooruitgang (de introductie van nieuwe 
geneesmiddelen) domineert de verklaring van de groei in farmaceutische uitgaven, in het 
bijzonder de groei aan de bovenkant van de distributie omdat nieuwe geneesmiddelen 
relatief duur zijn. Daarnaast kan een matig gedeelte van de farmaceutische uitgavengroei 
verklaard worden door verschuivingen naar minder intensievere vormen van ziekenhuisbe-
handeling – dagopname en polikliniekbezoek – en de vergrijzing. Dit duidt er sterk op dat 
ziekenhuiszorg tot op zekere hoogte kan worden vervangen door geneesmiddelengebruik. 
Veranderingen in bevolkingskenmerken (vergrijzing, volksgezondheid) verklaren maar een 
zeer beperkt aandeel van de curatieve uitgavengroei. Hoewel de bijdrage van de vergrijzing 
marginaal is, kan deze niet los worden gezien van technologische vooruitgang en beleid om 
wachtlijsten terug te dringen. Ouderen hebben onevenredig geprofiteerd van beide ontwik-
kelingen.
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Discussie
Hoofdstuk acht bespreekt de belangrijkste bevindingen, de (beleids)implicaties en aanbeve-
lingen, de belangrijkste beperkingen van de huidige studies en mogelijkheden voor verder 
onderzoek. Deze samenvatting beperkt zich tot de belangrijkste bevindingen, (beleids)
implicaties en aanbevelingen. De belangrijkste conclusies waren als volgt.
Omdat de relatie tussen leeftijd en zorguitgaven grotendeels te wijten is aan gezondheid, 
kan de volledige bijdrage van de vergrijzing aan de groei in zorguitgaven slechts worden 
overwogen door rekening te houden met trends in gezondheid. Beperkingenstatus is de 
belangrijkste determinant van de behoefte aan langdurig zorggebruik. Bij het ontbreken 
van informatie over beperkingenstatus benadert TTD deze grotendeels. Bevindingen later 
echter zien dat TTD niet volledig de invloed van (gezonde) vergrijzing op zorguitgaven kan 
omvangen wat suggereert om TTD te vervangen door betere informatie over zorgbehoefte.
De impact van veranderingen in de leeftijdssamenstelling van de bevolking op de groei in 
zorguitgaven is beperkt: het verklaart slechts 0.5-1.0 procent van de jaarlijkse reële groei van 
4-5 procent. Het volledige effect van de vergrijzing is echter aanzienlijk omdat de gevolgen 
van de vergrijzing sterk gerelateerd zijn aan die van andere belangrijke individuele en maat-
schappelijke determinanten. Naast de determinanten die zorgbehoefte meten, is het effect 
van de vergrijzing sterk gerelateerd aan technologische vooruitgang, de ontwikkeling van 
lonen en prijzen en overheidsbeleid.
Er is een sterk contrast in de bijdrage van verschillende factoren aan de groei in cura-
tieve en langdurige zorguitgaven. Terwijl de groei in langdurige zorguitgaven het meest 
wordt beïnvloed door veranderingen in de leeftijdssamenstelling van de bevolking en de 
toekomstige trend in beperkingenstatus, kan de groei van curatieve zorguitgaven vooral 
worden verklaard door veranderingen in medische praktijken, grotendeels veroorzaakt 
door medisch technologische vooruitgang en gezondheids(zorg)beleid. Naast dit contrast, 
is er ook een sterk verschil in de bijdrage van factoren aan de uitgavengroei van verschil-
lende subsectoren van de curatieve zorg (ziekenhuiszorg en farmaceutische zorg). Verder 
verschilt het effect van de vergrijzing op de langdurige zorguitgaven naar aggregatieniveau: 
uitgaven over de levensloop van een individu of jaarlijkse uitgaven geaggregeerd op popu-
latieniveau. Levensloopuitgaven aan langdurige zorg zullen naar verwachting nauwelijks 
stijging terwijl jaarlijkse uitgaven op populatieniveau sterk zullen toenemen.
De belangrijkste (beleids)implicaties en aanbevelingen die worden besproken zijn als volgt. 
Ten eerste, de bevinding dat het overheidsbeleid zelf een belangrijke bron van de groei 
in zorguitgaven is, suggereert dat het inderdaad mogelijk is om de toekomstige groei in 
zorguitgaven te beïnvloeden. Gezien de verschuiving van een aanbodgestuurd naar een 
vraaggestuurd zorgsysteem in Nederland, is het belangrijk dat zorgverzekeraars de verant-
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woordelijkheid nemen als bewakers van de zorguitgavengroei met gelijktijdige inachtne-
ming van de wensen van hun klanten.
Ten tweede is het vermeldenswaardig dat beleidsmakers zich bewust moeten zijn dat 
prognoses van zorguitgaven uitsluitend gebaseerd op trends in bevolkingskenmerken de 
werkelijke groei naar grote waarschijnlijkheid aanzienlijk zullen onderschatten. Dit geldt in 
het bijzonder voor de curatieve zorg. Zo zou slechts een groei van 6 procent voorspeld zijn 
voor de periode 1998-2004, terwijl de werkelijke groei in 28 procent bedroeg.
Ten derde vraagt de verschillende aard van de uitgavengroei in de curatieve en langdurige 
zorg om op maat gesneden aanbevelingen op sectorniveau over mogelijke beleidsopties om 
de uitgavengroei te beheersen. Hoofdstuk acht bespreekt deze mogelijkheden beknopt, maar 
beperkt zich slechts tot mogelijkheden die min of meer voortvloeien uit onze bevindingen. 
De opties om de publieke uitgavengroei aan langdurige zorguitgaven te beperken kunnen 
worden onderverdeeld in drie categorieën: epidemiologische veranderingen, efficiëntie 
verbeteringen en ondersteuning van informele zorgverlening. Ten eerste zou het stimuleren 
van een continuering van de dalende beperkingentrend de gevolgen van de vergrijzing 
op de langdurige zorgsector verminderen. Het is echter onzeker in welke mate de huidige 
daling van beperkingen tijd- of cohortspecifiek zijn. Ten tweede, opties om efficiëntie in 
de langdurige zorgverlening te vergroten zijn: een substitutiebeleid om personen zo lang 
mogelijk thuis te laten wonen, een uitbreiding van het systeem van persoonsgebonden 
budgetten, en het huidige omslagstelsel vervangen door een systeem van zorgsparen voor 
langdurige zorg. De laatste twee opties kunnen naast het verbeteren van de efficiëntie ook 
informele zorgverlening ondersteunen en stimuleren. Omdat informele zorg duurdere for-
mele zorg kan vervangen verlicht stimulatie van informele zorg en een betere ondersteuning 
van informele zorgverleners waarschijnlijk de druk op publieke budgetten voor langdurige 
zorg. Ten slotte kan informele zorg ook worden ondersteund door het bieden van werkver-
banden bij de overheid of gemeente eventueel in combinatie met pensioenuitkeringen voor 
mantelzorgers.
Met betrekking tot de curatieve zorg worden twee mogelijkheden om efficiëntie in de 
curatieve zorgverlening kort besproken: een verdere reductie van verpleegduur, bijvoor-
beeld door een verschuiving van dure, intensievere ziekenhuisbehandelingen naar minder 
dure en intensieve behandelmethoden, binnen of buiten ziekenhuis, en een systematischer 
beoordeling van efficiëntie van medische technologieën in vergoedingsbesluiten. Gezien de 
grote rol van technologische vooruitgang in met name de farmaceutische sector, worden 
enkele herzieningen met betrekking tot het besluitvormingsproces rondom de vergoeding 
van geneesmiddelen besproken die kunnen leiden tot meer value for money. Omdat 
technologieën geïntroduceerd in ziekenhuizen thans slechts dienen te voldoen aan een 
effectiviteitcriterium wordt aanbeveelt om een kosteneffectiviteitcriterium in het vergoe-
dingsbesluit van deze technologieën te introduceren om zo een optimalere allocatie van 
publieke middelen te bereiken.
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